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1 Introduction 
The literature on the causes of war is massive, and these ideas, mixed with myriad 
others, can be found in various guises. The main theoretical task facing students of war is not 
to add to the already long list of argument and conjectures but instead to take apart and 
reassemble these diverse arguments into a coherent theory fit for guiding empirical research. 
                      Fearon (1995:382) 
Civil wars are heterogeneous when it comes to onset, duration and termination, although 
some intrastate conflicts seem to display a particular pattern (Hegre 2004:249; Fearon 
2004:283; Fearon and Laitin 2011:199). In “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer 
Than Others?” Fearon (2004:275) categorizes all intrastate conflicts into different groups 
where he finds that five of these categories last dramatically longer or shorter than other civil 
wars: Coup/Revolution; Anti-colonial wars; Eastern European conflicts; conflicts where 
contraband is a factor, and civil wars he calls ‘Sons of the Soil’ (hereafter SOS) (Fearon 
2004). The three former categories tend to be brief intrastate conflicts, while SOS wars and 
conflicts where contraband is a factor seem to last dramatically longer than other civil wars 
(Fearon 2004). Further, Fearon (2004) focuses on SOS wars and argues that the onset, 
duration and termination of these conflicts can be predicted because they display a fairly 
common sequence of actions and reactions (Fearon 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2011:199) 1.  
Fearon (2004) claims to have identified the distinctive features of some of the longest lasting 
civil wars from 1945 to 1999, and defines them as low-intensity conflicts between a 
peripheral minority ethnic group and a state-supported majority ethnic group over natural 
resources or a peripheral territory belonging to or perceived to be the traditional homeland of 
the ethnic minority group. Thus, SOS wars are separated into two general categories as the 
belligerents are either fighting over territory or natural resources. In the former version of 
SOS wars the state has enduring political or economic interests in expansion in the periphery 
and pursue them through measures of state development projects as they encourage the ethnic 
                                                 
1 The SOS theory refers to Weiner`s (1978) initial definition of Sons of the Soil. The SOS explanation and the 
SOS dynamic is used interchangeably and is largely based on the SOS theory as it refers to cases where the 
ethnic minority group fight the ethnic majority group for the rights to territory and/or natural resources/scarce 
resources and includes the commitment problem which may hinder the SOS war to end in any other way than 
military victory (Fearon 2004). Further, SOS wars refer to all SOS wars proposed in Fearon (2004) and Fearon 
and Laitin (2011).The definition of the explanation of SOS, the difference between the SOS theory and the SOS 
explanation, and the nature of SOS wars will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter 3: Sons of the Soil.  
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majority group to migrate into the minority ethnic group`s traditional homeland which the 
minority ethnic group resists (Fearon 2004:283).  
For SOS wars over natural resources the in-migration is less important as the state is 
interested in monopoly of exploitation of fuel or mineral resources in the ethnic minority 
group`s traditional homeland and pursues them through measures of force which the minority 
resists (Fearon 2004: 283). The explanation of SOS wars was recently updated, as it defines 
SOS wars as low-intensity conflicts between a minority ethnic group and a majority ethnic 
group caused by competition due to in-migration over territory or scarce resources in the 
traditional homeland of the minority ethnic group (Fearon and Laitin 2011). Consequently, 
the definition of the explanation of SOS differs slightly from 2004 to 2011, as the latter 
excludes the few SOS wars which were over monopoly of natural resource exploitation. 
Although, it still includes civil wars in which the belligerents fight over the right to scarce 
resources, and highlights the in-migration issue to a larger extent than the initial explanation. 
Despite a differentiation by SOS over territory or scarce resources, the sequence and actions 
in the onset of SOS wars are fairly common as the violence often begins with attacks between 
young men from each side, or in pogroms or riots following on rumors of abuse (rapes, thefts, 
insults) or protests by indigenous people against the migrants (Fearon and Laitin 2011:199) 2. 
The forces of the state intervene most often supporting the migrants, and discriminate in 
retribution and repression against members of the ethnic minority group (Fearon and Laitin 
2011:199). Thus, the onset of a SOS war is due to a disagreement between an ethnic minority 
group and an ethnic majority group over the rights to a territory and/or the resources in the 
traditional homeland of the ethnic minority group. Although, Fearon (2004; Fearon and Laitin 
2011) differentiates between SOS wars over territory and SOS wars over resources the course 
of events, duration and possible mode for termination remain the same. SOS wars are low-
intensity, but seem to be difficult to end. Fearon`s (2004:283) analysis reveals that the 
estimated median and mean for non-SOS wars are 5.8 and 8.5 years, compared to 23.2 and 
33.7 years for SOS wars. According to Fearon`s  (2004; Fearon and Laitin 2011) rationalist 
narrative for why SOS wars last so much longer than other civil wars, there is a commitment 
                                                 
2 Collective violence can be defined as (1) violence perpetrated by a group on another group, which is riots or 
pogroms, (2) violence by a group on an individual, meaning lynching, (3) violence by an individual on a group, 
defined as a terrorist act, (4) or violence by the state on a group, or by a group on agencies of the state, as in civil 
wars (Varshney 2007:279). Riots, pogroms and civil wars are the most widespread forms of collective violence. 
Pogroms and civil wars are similar in the sense that the state abandons the principle of neutrality. However, in 
pogroms the majority attacks an unarmed minority, while the both combating sides are assumed to be armed in 
civil wars. Riots and pogroms may precede civil wars, but does not necessarily lead to civil conflict. 
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problem which may hinder these wars from being ended in any other way than in a military 
victory. Consequently, the duration of SOS wars is dramatically longer than other civil wars 
because they are more difficult to terminate. 
As the explanation of SOS is placed in a rationalist framework, Fearon (2004) introduces a 
game theoretic model which illustrates how the fluctuations in state strength prevents the 
government from giving credible promises of access or ownership to the ethnic minority 
group, as they assume that the state will renege on it`s promises once it has regained its 
strength (Fearon 2004:291) 3. As the state`s strength may be weakened during the civil war, it 
is expected to agree on terms which the state would normally not accept, and once it regains 
strength the state will renege on the deal as it has enduring interest in the territory or natural 
resources and/or because the state is most often recruited from the majority ethnic group and 
therefore supports it (Fearon 2004:283).  Thus, the argument for why the belligerents in SOS 
wars cannot reach a peace agreement is well-founded in a rationalist narrative, which means 
that the SOS explanation may be viewed in the light of the bargaining model of war. 
According to Fearon (2004:291):    
 “In the model`s equilibrium, both government and rebels may fight on, year after year, with but a slim 
hope that luck and effort will put them in a position to impose terms militarily, and despite the presence of 
bargains that both sides would prefer to the situation of constant war. The problem is that bargains are 
unenforceable due to fluctuations in the government`s capabilities”. 
Thus, as the state cannot give credible promises to the minority ethnic group the commitment 
problem may hinder the civil war from being settled in any other way than military victory, 
and the conflict lasts longer because neither side can disarm the other, which leads to  a 
military stalemate (Fearon 2004:276). Therefore, Fearon (2004:290) argues that the 
commitment problem prevents these wars from ending except by a military defeat. As these 
civil wars continue until the ethnic minority group or the ethnic state-supported majority 
                                                 
3 Rational choice is one of the major approaches to civil war studies, and a methodological approach which 
explains both individual and collective outcomes, in terms of individual goal-seeking under constraints. The 
rational choice theories of civil war in political science tend to focus on political oppression, collapsing 
institutions, system transition, or informational problems as causes of war (Sambanis 2002a:223). However, it is 
argued that rational choice fails to appreciate own limitations and the value of alternative approaches (Snidal 
2007:73). One of the main objections to rational choice is that it seems to have developed fetishism over 
mathematical techniques, which leads to complicated models with little substance. Although, there may be some 
truth to this criticism, advocates of the approach argue that the formalization is not the sine qua non of rational 
choice, but merely a tool (Snidal 2007:73). However, rational choice seems deficient in explaining who the key 
actors are, in explaining their interests, the origin of the institutions and how they change. 
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group wins militarily, they last on average longer than the typical civil war (Fearon 
2004:277).   
The SOS explanation is one of the most sophisticated explanations within civil war literature 
because it accounts for a specific course of events and it contains several distinctive features 
and arguments related to ethnic war, in-migration and scarce resources. An overwhelming 
number of SOS wars take place in Asia, which indicates that those ethnic groups seem more 
unable to reach a credible agreement and a peaceful outcome compared to the rest of the 
world (Fearon 2004:283; Fearon and Laitin 2011:199).  In order to make these general 
patterns less abstract, the civil war in Sri Lanka against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) is suggested as the most likely case of SOS wars as it illustrates the SOS dynamic 
(Fearon 2004: 283; Fearon and Laitin 2011:199)4. Initially, Fearon (2004) found 21 SOS wars 
of 128 intrastate conflicts from 1945 to 1999, but as the dataset and the definition of the SOS 
explanation were recently revised it now includes 32 SOS wars from a total of 139 intrastate 
conflicts from 1945-2008 (Fearon and Laitin 2011:199) 5. Thus, the SOS explanation includes 
a proposition for these wars` onset, duration and termination and is supported by highly 
statistically significant results (Fearon 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2011). According to Fearon 
and Laitin (2011:200): 
“We find that SoS wars account for one of the strongest empirical regularities that has emerged from 
cross-national statistical studies of civil war onset, namely, that civil wars are more likely in countries with larger 
populations (…) Thus, it appears that the main reason that larger population is associated with civil war onset is 
that larger countries have been prone to have SoS civil wars.”      
                                                                                      
1.1 Motivations for Testing the SOS Explanation 
The SOS explanation has become a reference-point within conflict studies and is convincingly 
supported by a highly statistically significant finding in Fearon`s (2004) analysis. However, 
several questions remain unanswered about why SOS wars last longer. For example, one 
strong feature of SOS wars is that they involve territory. Could it be that territorial conflicts 
last longer rather than any special dynamic relating to SOS? Moreover, since these wars are 
supposed to be small wars without much political consequence to the international system, 
perhaps these wars tended to be more ignored by the international community, particularly 
                                                 
4 See appendix for a complete list of Fearon`s (2004), and Fearon and Laitin`s (2011) SOS wars.  
5 Fearon and Laitin (2011:299) claim that 31 civil wars are SOS wars in their updated dataset, however their list 
include 32 SOS wars. 
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during the Cold War when large wars would have received more attention from superpowers? 
However, the explanation SOS has received very little attention thus far and no study to date 
has tested the many interesting expectations from this interesting proposition, particularly 
using the new list of SOS wars offered by Fearon and Laitin (2011).  
Thus, the SOS explanation has never been retested rigorously, nor has the SOS variable been 
tested in a dataset with a lower battle-death threshold which is relevant as these wars are 
supposedly low-intensity conflicts6. Further, the updated list of SOS wars has not been tested 
to date7.  The explanation of SOS wars was recently updated as Fearon and Laitin (2011:200) 
argue that the SOS proposition may explain brutal civil wars, such as the case of Sri Lanka, as 
much as it explains several non-violent conflicts. According to Fearon and Laitin (2011:200) 
a SOS conflict “may be violent, but it need not be”. This updated list, thus, includes a more 
heterogeneous group of conflicts and should be tested in a dataset that captures very low 
levels of violence, such as the 25 battle-death threshold used by the UCDP civil war data8. 
Secondly, Fearon (2004:290) argues that the commitment problem could prevent SOS wars 
being ended in any way except by military defeat, which allows this study to test exactly how 
these wars have ended with the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset (Kreutz 2010). Thus, this 
is a better test of the mechanism rather than assuming that long wars are driven by the 
commitment problem. Fearon (2004:290) argues:  
“The model shows how a commitment problem could prevent an insurgency from being ended in any 
other way except by a military defeat. This is so despite the ability of the parties to bargain over the extent of 
regional autonomy by regional leadership/rebels and the absence of private information about military 
capabilities or resolve”.  
Thirdly, the SOS explanation disregards the trend of increased intervention and the 
international community as a plausible actor in a bargaining process as they are not included 
in Fearon`s (2004) explanation, game model or analysis. If a third party intervenes it could 
possibly guarantee a peace agreement or ceasefire as they are based on a minimum level of 
trust between the belligerents (Fearon 2004). A third party intervention may therefore remove 
the first strike advantage which decreases the effect of the commitment problem. Thus, it 
seems relevant to test whether the end of the Cold War which allowed the UN to be more 
                                                 
6 Note that I tested some implications of the SOS explanation in my Bachelor thesis, however this was limited to 
testing whether SOS wars were over territory and whether they were more likely to start during the Cold War 
(Gaski 2009).  
7 Fearon and Laitin (2011) published the updated definition and list of SOS wars without a dataset.  
8 Fearon (2004) has set the battle-death threshold to 100 killed per year and 1000 killed per conflict, while the 
UCDP Conflict Termination dataset has set the battle-death threshold to 25 killed per year. 
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active in terms of intervention in civil wars, has had any effect of the duration and termination 
of SOS wars, especially as SOS conflicts may have been allowed to fester out of neglect. As 
the effect of the end of the Cold War and external intervention on civil war duration and 
termination has been questioned in the general debate in civil war research, it seems highly 
relevant to test whether these factors have influenced the duration and termination of SOS 
wars which are supposedly some of the longest lasting intrastate conflicts (Fearon 2004; 
Weinstein 2007; Cunningham 2010:115). SOS wars are assumed to be local and internally 
focused, however interventions are important for intrastate conflicts as they often contain high 
degrees of external influence (Cunningham 2010:115).   
1.1.1 Propositions to be Tested 
Thus, this thesis will test the following propositions: 
1. SOS wars largely end in military victories because of the commitment problem.  
2. SOS wars last longer than other civil wars because of neglect by the international 
community of these wars during the Cold War.  
3. Since SOS wars might range from extremely bloody to low-level violence, the new SOS 
data will be tested using a lower threshold of deaths identifying civil wars.  
4. Since SOS wars are largely about territory rather than over the control of government, this 
study will test whether these wars last long simply because they are over territory or whether 
the duration is caused by the identifiable SOS dynamics outlined in the explanation.   
Consequently, this thesis performs several quantitative analyses using Fearon`s dataset (2004) 
and the new Uppsala Conflict Termination dataset (UCDP) (Kreutz 2010) which is a unique 
dataset to answer the questions raised. The UCDP Conflict Termination dataset identifies  
how civil wars end by distinguishing between peace agreement, ceasefire, military victory or 
other outcome (Kreutz 2010: 243). As an important explanation for why some civil wars last 
longer than others, SOS should be tested properly as we want to make sure that the dynamic is 
independent of varying circumstances, that the assumptions made in the SOS explanation is 
correct, and that the variable is not driven by influential outliers. Most empirical studies in 
political science do not subject their inferences to robustness or specification tests, while 
replication studies address this issue to some extent (Hegre and Sambanis 2006:508). Fearon 
7 
 
has not performed any robustness tests, but the following analysis will prioritize it as a crucial 
part of the analysis.  
The rest of the thesis is laid out as follows: next, the SOS wars are set within the context of 
the larger problem of civil war, and then theory around SOS wars is discussed. The SOS 
explanation is then critically examined in the light of other possible explanations, justifying 
the need for further analyses. I then discuss the data and methods employed by this thesis, 
present results and briefly conclude by examining some implications.  
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2 Civil War 
The following section briefly summarizes the nature of civil wars and recent empirical 
findings within the civil war literature. Empirical studies of civil war have found highly 
contradictory results which have led to a polarization of explanations focusing on the 
importance of ethnicity or feasibility, although both approaches emphasize rebel movements, 
motivations, capacities and physical environments. Further, this chapter suggests that if the 
proposition of SOS is correct it may build a bridge between the explanations of ethnicity and 
those of feasibility. 
2.1 The Nature of Civil Wars 
Civil wars are massively destructive to life, society and economy. They are increasingly 
prevalent, lethal and threaten human security (Collier et al 2004:253; Ward et al 2010:363). A 
conservative measure of the direct death toll from civil wars since 1945 exceeds 16 million, 
which is more than five times the estimate of people killed in interstate wars (Weinstein 2007: 
5). The indirect effect of civil war such as disease, famine, and destruction of economic and 
social infrastructure increases this estimate dramatically (Weinstein 2007:5).  
The early 1990s saw an increase in civil war onset and duration. The high-water mark for 
intrastate conflicts was in 1994 with 44 ongoing civil wars in almost one-quarter of the states 
in the international system (Fearon 2004:275). Moreover, the average duration of civil wars 
have been steadily increasing since 1945, reaching almost 16 years in 1999 (Fearon 2004:275) 
9. Consequently, recent research suggest that civil wars tend to last more than six times longer 
than international wars, which makes questions concerning shortening their duration and 
creating a lasting peace  important research and policy questions (Hegre 2004:243; Collier et 
al 2009:253). 
Civil war literature has tended to focus on the onset of intrastate conflicts, but the decrease of 
civil wars has led to an increased focus on duration and termination (Collier et al 2004:253). 
Further, important studies have also focused on why some civil wars last so much longer than 
                                                 
9 Intrastate conflicts are characterized by a longer duration than interstate wars regardless of the outcome (Kreutz 
2010:246). However, the median duration for intrastate conflict episodes is dramatically lower than the mean 
duration. This may possibly be due to a positively skewed data where a few of the cases display a long-term 
conflict activity (Kreutz 2010:246). Outliers may have a dramatic effect on the data by driving certain variables, 
especially in datasets with few units.  
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others, and why so many of them recur (Fearon 2004; Walter 2009: 244; Kreutz 2010). 
However, the research community still struggles in explaining and predicting the onset, 
duration and termination of civil wars. Some scholars focus on either onset, duration or 
termination, while others suggests that civil war onset determines its dynamic and how it can 
be terminated, which means that terminating a civil war is dependent on understanding its 
onset (Fearon 2004). Consequently, it is argued that the challenge lies in classifying the civil 
war correctly according to its onset, thus uncovering its dynamic and prerequisites for peace 
(Fearon 2004). However, this argument assumes that civil wars may be categorized into 
groups and that civil wars display similar features, while the opposing argument is that 
intrastate conflicts are complex events affected by numerous factors which makes them 
heterogeneous in onset, duration and termination (Hegre 2004:249; DeRouen and Sobek 
2004; Sobek 2010:267).  
Thus, a large amount of empirical studies on civil war has resulted in little consensus (Mack 
2002:515; Hegre and Sambanis 2006:508). The contradictory results might be due to the 
heterogeneous nature of civil wars; that the empirical studies have prioritized significant 
coefficients to contest others findings as opposed to finding variables to improve our 
understanding of civil wars; or it may simply be a function of different coding rules (Mack 
2002:517; Ward et al 2010:363) 10.  
However, the research community seems to have agreed that the onset of civil war is more 
likely in less economically developed countries and these countries are rarely on top of the 
foreign policy agendas of the major powers (Mack 2002:519; Sambanis 2002a:217). With the 
exception of Yugoslavia and a few other countries, civil wars have tended to take place 
without attracting much attention from the camera lenses or involving the strategic interests of 
major powers in Western parts of the world (Sambanis 2002a: 216). Although, civil wars 
rarely attract attention, they have important implications for security and economy as 
instability of intrastate conflicts affect neighboring states and the stability of the entire region 
(Sambanis 2002a: 216). Thus, the regions which seem most affected by civil violence are 
Sub-Saharan African, South-east Asia, and the Middle East including North Africa. As civil 
wars are more likely to occur in poor countries, it exacerbates economic problems by 
                                                 
10 The search for significant variables which contest others results have dominated civil war research, as few run 
their results through robustness tests and little effort have been made to resolve the differences (Mack 2002:515; 
Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Ward et al 2010).  However, different coding rules may also be a plausible 
explanation for some of the contradictory findings, as the correlation between pairs of databases has been less 
than 50 percent in some cases (Sambanis 2002b:32).  
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destroying economic capacity and reduces growth (Mack 2002:519; Sambanis 2002a:217). 
Thus, the empirical studies on civil war have concluded that the risk of civil war decreases as 
average income increases and the size of a country`s population decreases (Hegre and 
Sambanis 2006:509; Ward et al 2010:363). It is also near consensus that a low level of 
economic development, a prior history of civil war, and political instability increases the risk 
of civil war (Walter 2009:244; Kreutz 2010). Additionally, natural resource dependency, 
ethnic diasporas, concentrated populations, rough terrain, and anocracies are positively 
associated with civil war onset and duration (Fearon 2004; Walter 2009:244). However, there 
are also striking disagreements, where the two most controversial issues seem to relate to the 
relationship or absence thereof between democracy and civil war; and the debate of 
explaining civil war with arguments related to ethnicity or feasibility (Mack 2002:519) 11.   
2.2 Feasibility or Identity? 
An on-again, off-again rebellion where I work, on the northern tip of Sumatra, has 
been about the control over the region`s vast oil and gas resources (although the Western 
press continues to stereotype it as “ethnic conflict”).  
         Bowen (2002:340) 
The following section differentiates between two important and opposing approaches for why 
civil wars occur: feasibility and ethnicity/identity. Fearon (2004) is one of the main advocates 
of the understanding of ethnicity in conflict, while Collier et al (2009) have focused more on 
materially driven and opportunistic rebel movements. As these explanations focus on the 
motivations of the combatant groups, a third option to understanding civil wars is to focus on 
the processes through which organizations produce violence (Weinstein 2007). As the 
explanation of SOS incorporates important features of feasibility and ethnicity, it may build a 
bridge between the opposing approaches. 
The study of civil war is largely focused on the relationship between the state and civilians, 
but civil wars are more complicated than interstate wars as there may be uncertainty regarding 
who the actors are and what the motivation for the rebellion is. Thus, rebel groups are often 
included as an important factor as most studies of civil war seem to begin with the question of 
who is willing to fight (Weinstein 2007:27). However, the difficulty often lies in 
                                                 
11 Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that once GDP per capita is controlled for, 
democracy has no effect in explaining civil war. However, they disagree on the importance of ethnicity and 
feasibility.  
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operationalizing the motivations of the rebel group, and whether they are acting as freedom 
fighters or war-agitators. Since motivations are impossible to measure in quantitative analysis, 
we use proxies to find whether the war is fought over greed or grievance. Is there a weak state 
capacity?  Is the state ethnically fractionalized? Are there natural resources in the area which 
may tempt rebel leaders? Where is the rebel group in the causal chain? Is it a conflict a 
bottom-up or a top-bottom conflict and does it matter?   
Thus, explanations for the onset, duration, and dynamics usually highlight economic 
inequality, ethnic antagonism and political repression as these factors are expected to reveal 
motivations or highlight the context for those who participate in the rebellion (Weinstein 
2007:27). It may be that repression drives those excluded from the political system to 
embrace violent means to obtain power or policies shaped by ethnic favoritism force groups 
who are being discriminated to organize (Weinstein 2007:27). Thus, the explanations for civil 
war onset tend to build on feasibility or identity, although both emphasize rebel movements, 
motivations, capacities, or physical environments (Fearon 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; 
Collier et al 2009; Sobek 2010:268). The two approaches are clearly opposites, partly due to 
the fact that it is difficult to measure motives. While some criticize “the myth of irrelevant 
ethnicity”, others argue that ethnic grievances serve as a cover for greed-driven motives 
(Cederman 2010).  
Those focused on feasibility assume that a rebellion will occur if it is financially and military 
feasible (Collier et al 2009), while the competing theories argue that conflict is driven by 
questions of identity (Fearon 2004; Aspinall 2007). The former approach claim that feasibility 
or opportunity is an important part of the explanation of rebellion, and that insurgent 
movements emerge when resources are available to finance them (Mack 2002; Collier and 
Hoeffler 2009) 12. Thus, it is argued that motivations may be a traditional way of 
understanding civil war, while it may be more informative to focus on the sheer financial and 
military feasibility of the rebellion (Collier et al 2009:2). As the establishment of a rebel army 
is extremely dangerous and expensive, the rare occasions in which rebellion is financially and 
militarily feasible it is likely to occur. Thus, they suggest “where a rebellion is feasible it will 
occur” (Collier et al 2009:2). They also argue that the two most obvious material conditions 
                                                 
12 Gaining access to finance is crucial for rebel group strength, as the question of opportunities available for rebel 
groups to organize an army, recruit soldiers, and obtain the funds to cover running costs is highlighted in several 
of the most leading theories within this field of research (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003). It 
has also been suggested that grievance as a cause for war fits our commonsense understanding of the world, but 
that intense grievance may be an effect rather than a cause of war (Mack 2002:521).   
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for rebellion are financial and military, as it is costly and dangerous to wage war. Thus, the 
explanation of feasibility highlights the importance of circumstances and suggests that rebel 
groups are opportunistic and driven by material motives.  
As some ignore the aspect of ethnic grievance, others argue that ethnicity is an important 
feature of intrastate conflicts13. For many the term “ethnicity” has become an umbrella 
concept that embraces groups which are differentiated by color, language, religion, and covers 
tribes, nationalities and castes (Chandra 2006:397). Ethnic divisions within a state seem to 
affect the probability of experiencing civil war, and many have argued that identity conflicts 
are particularly intractable (Fortna 2004:273). Further, scholars have suggested that the 
criticism of the correlation between ethnic grievance and the outbreak of war rests on “shaky 
foundations” (Cederman 2010).  Although, Fearon and Laitin (2011:199) observe that ethnic 
diversity is not significantly associated with a higher risk of civil war when comparing 
countries at similar levels of economic development, they claim that “ethnic” civil wars are 
quite common. They argue that most of the civil wars since 1945 have included rebel groups 
advocating on behalf of an ethnic or religious group, or the rebels have mobilized and 
recruited principally along the lines of an ethnic cleavage (Fearon and Laitin 2011:199)14. 
However, advocates of understanding the importance of ethnicity in civil war argues that 
onset of civil wars due to ethnic grievance is dependent on factors such as organizational 
resources, political institutions, terrain and transborder support. Consequently, it is suggested 
that ethno-nationalist grievance can be proxied through ethno-demographic measures such as 
diversity and polarization as probabilistic measures of ethic grievance. 
Thus, recent empirical studies of causes of civil wars are largely divided between ethnicity or 
opportunities for private gain (Jakobsen and de Soysa 2009:137). Since we cannot measure 
feasibility and motivations directly scholars use proxies as indirect measures, which may 
explain some of the contradictory results within civil war literature as these proxies tend to be 
                                                 
13 Ethnicity as a term designates a sense of collective belonging, which could be based on common descent, 
language, history, culture, race, or religion (or a combination of these) (Varshney 2007: 277). An ethnic group 
can do without a state, and should therefore be separated distinctly from the term nation. Dispersed ethnic groups 
typically demand affirmative action, which means preferences in jobs, education, and political representation. In 
addition they demand protection of language, religion, and culture (Varshney 2007: 277). Some ethnic conflicts 
may not remain ethnic, as in might escalate towards separatist nationalism. Recent studies have questioned 
whether civil war is more likely in ethnically diverse countries, and found that plural societies are more prone to 
intense internal conflicts. In such cases, multiple groups imply that a territorial political unit can only become 
ethnically homogeneous if it kills, expels, or assimilates all non-nationals. 
14 Doyle and Sambanis (2000) have also found that identity wars are more likely to resume than others, while 
and Dubey (2002) found no significant difference. 
14 
 
imperfect. However, others suggest that the study of violence should provide more accurate 
answers to the motivation of the rebel group (Weinstein 2007).   
2.2.1 Inside Rebellion 
While, attention is given to factors such as feasibility and ethnicity, others argue the focus 
should be on the processes through which organizations produce violence. Violence may 
emerge as a strategy in different contexts and to different degrees as a consequence of the 
interaction between rebels and governments battling for control of the state on the one hand 
and civilians who choose to offer or withhold support from the competing parties on the other 
(Weinstein 2007:27) 15. Rebel groups often share the responsibility for the violence inflicted 
on civilians, although their tactics, strategies and patterns of violence remain largely 
unexplored. Some rebel group abuse noncombatant populations, while others exhibit restraint, 
discipline, and control (Weinstein 2007:6). While insurgent leaders in some states transform 
local structures and engage the civilians for political change, others focus on extracting 
resources. The level of violence differs as some rebel groups kill selectively, while others 
attack randomly (Weinstein 2007:7). Further, some rebel groups loot and destroy the property 
of civilians, while others protect it from government attacks. Consequently, the understanding 
of the pattern of violence may contribute to uncover the motivations of the rebel group.  
Thus, Weinstein (2007:7) argues that the differences in how rebel groups employ violence are 
a consequence of variation in the initial conditions that leaders confront. Weinstein (2007) 
finds that rebel groups that emerge in environments rich in natural resources or with the 
external support of an outside patron tend to commit high levels of indiscriminate violence, 
while movements which arise in resource-poor contexts perpetrate far fewer abuses and 
employ violence selectively and strategically.  As insurgencies require massive resources and 
an organization capable of challenging the government militarily, a rebel leader may choose 
economic or social endowments. Economic endowments could include natural resource 
extraction, taxation, criminal activity or external patronage, while social endowments includes 
shared beliefs, expectations, and norms which may exist in (or be mobilized from within) 
                                                 
15 Despite the differences, recent research has focused on the willingness of actors to utilize violence to alter the 
status quo. Although, it seems as if the focus on rebels and their motivations may exclude how the state affects 
the onset and termination of civil wars. It is therefore argued that the focus on motivations ignores half of the 
theoretical puzzle, as it leaves state strength out (DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Sobek 2010:267). Perhaps a better 
conceptualization would be to differentiate between willingness versus opportunity, or opportunities and motives 
(Sobek 2010:267). 
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certain ethnic, religious, cultural, or ideological groups (Weinstein 2007:7). Thus, this 
approach differentiates between civil wars in which rebel groups have mobilized due to 
feasibility or ethnicity, but claims that we may understand the motivations of rebel group 
more clearly if we take the pattern of violence into consideration.  
Thus, the debate of understanding the onset of civil wars seems polarized between feasibility 
and ethnicity. Further, most empirical studies use proxies such as natural resources, GDP per 
capita as a measure of state capacity and ethnic fragmentations, although others suggest that 
we may understand the motivation of the rebellion by looking at the patterns of violence. 
However, there is one explanation of civil war which seems to build a bridge between the 
explanation of feasibility and those of ethnicity. The explanation of SOS includes the ethnic 
aspect as it assumes that the belligerents are a minority ethnic group and a majority ethnic 
group, but it is not stated that SOS wars are due to ethnicity but rather caused by in-migration 
and competition over territory and scarce resources. Consequently, the latter part incorporates 
a more material approach to the understanding of these civil wars. Thus, the proposition of 
SOS may offer an explanation for why ethnic grievance do little to explain civil wars, as it 
may contribute to establish under what conditions ethnic minorities rebel.  
SOS wars displays features which are proven to be vital in explaining civil war, such as in-
migration, natural resources, territory, populous countries and lower levels of GDP per capita. 
As SOS wars are most often placed in the periphery of a state, it also offers an explanation for 
why some researchers have found that “the risk of conflict increases with the distance from 
group to the capital” (Buhaug and Gates 2002). Moreover, recent cross-national studies have 
found moderate support for increased probability of conflict due to population pressure, in-
migration and scarce resources, although qualitative studies suggest a stronger correlation 
(Urdal 2008:590). Although, it has been suggested that the difference may be caused by 
discrepancy, it may be that an increase of conflict due to population pressure and scarce 
resources are dependent on a specific context. The explanation of SOS includes factors which 
empirical studies have found to be vital features in understanding the onset, duration and 
termination of civil wars. As scholars have found contradictory results, the previously 
mentioned variables such as scarce resources, ethnicity, population pressures and distance to 
capital may be important pieces of the puzzle that the SOS explanation provides. 
Consequently, the explanation of SOS may be important for the future understanding of civil 
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wars, and as it has already become a reference-point within conflict studies it begs further 
empirical scrutiny.  
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3 “Sons of the Soil”  
There is much talk these days about the “Sons of the Soil”. The advocates and 
opponents of this theory do not seem to agree among themselves. Perhaps, the following 
classification might solve the problem of those involved in the controversy.  
           Pushparaman (Weiner 1978: vii) 
This chapter introduces the SOS theory (Weiner 1978) before it proceeds to the explanation of 
SOS (Fearon 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2011)16. Further, the SOS explanation will be discussed 
and compared to the initial theory as it has evolved from a theory for conflict in India to an 
intricate explanation for why some civil wars last longer than others in the 20th and 21st 
centuries. Further, the commitment problem in SOS wars will also be discussed, while the last 
section of this chapter is devoted to discussing the civil war in Sri Lanka through the narrative 
of the SOS explanation as it is viewed as the most likely case of SOS wars (Fearon 2004; 
Fearon and Laitin 2011).  
3.1 The SOS Theory 
Do people who “belong” to a given territory have a special claim to educational facilities, 
housing, and employment within that territory? Does “belonging” to the place of one`s birth 
imply a kind of proprietary claim on behalf of the specific ethnic group to the territory it 
occupies? Why have the reactions to migrants been more acutely hostile in some regions than 
in other, and toward some but not all migrants? How has the local, state and national 
government responded? Weiner (1978:14) focused on these questions to explain why conflict 
arises due to migration in some ethnic societies, and defined the dynamic in these conflicts 
“Sons of the Soil”. Although he derived his explanation based on conflicts in India, the phrase 
“Sons of the Soil” and its many variants convey this special collective right of an ethnic group 
over a territory and how some societies respond to in-migration.  
 
                                                 
16 As previously mentioned the SOS theory refers to Weiner`s (1978) initial definition of Sons of the Soil. The 
SOS explanation/dynamic refers to cases where the ethnic minority group fight against the ethnic majority group 
for the rights to territory and/or resources and includes the commitment problem which may hinder the SOS war 
to end in any other way than military victory (Fearon 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2011). An important notion 
regarding the difference between the SOS theory and the explanation of SOS is that the former explains the onset 
of a SOS conflict, while the latter focus on onset, duration and termination of a SOS war. SOS wars refer to all 
SOS wars proposed in Fearon (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2011). 
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3.1.1 Three Notions 
Weiner (1978) examined the social and political consequences of internal migration in a 
multiethnic low-income society for mainly demographic study purposes. He found three 
concepts to be particularly useful in explaining why some societies saw the rise of conflict 
among certain ethnic groups because of in-migration:  
- Territorial ethnicity 
- Dual labor market 
- Ethnic division of labor  
Firstly, the notion of territorial ethnicity refers to a situation where some ethnic groups seem 
“rooted” in space (Weiner 1978:4). This notion focuses on whether people see themselves as 
having an exclusive proprietary right over a certain area, or whether they are willing to share 
this space with others. The notion of territorial ethnicity seems particularly critical in terms of 
integration within a political system (Weiner 1978:4). The second concept is the dual labor 
market which differentiates between two types of markets, the informal, traditional, low-
skilled manpower at low wages versus the formal, organized high-skilled market. Weiner 
(1978:4) finds this notion important in reference to migrants from the center to the periphery 
in search of low-skilled jobs. The final concept is the idea of an ethnic division of labor, 
where the dual labor market may be ethnically stratified (Weiner 1978:4).This notion focuses 
on whether an occupation recruits from one single ethnic group in the society. In a multiethnic 
society, migration may be ethnically selective, leaving the dual market with an ethnic division 
of labor (Weiner 1978:5).  
Therefore, Weiner (1978) three notions focus on the competition which may arise among the 
ethnic groups if the state favors or discriminates one group in particular. He claims that the 
conflict is due to competition over the same jobs or resources, but that it may cause a 
sharpening of the ethnic distinctions. Further, Weiner (1978:7) argues that it is not 
inequalities between ethnic groups that generate conflict, but competition. However, he 
concludes that whether inequalities are real or perceived, it is not enough to cause a conflict. 
There has to be competition for control or access to economic wealth, political power, or 
social status (Weiner 1978:7).  
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3.1.2 Conditions for Conflict 
However, there are several conditions for the competition to escalate to conflict, such as 
whether the migrant and non-migrant enter a class relationship that ordinarily have a high 
conflict potential, such as landlord and peasant. Conflict may arise once the local population 
seeks access to occupations that they previously did not seek or from which they were once 
excluded. Conflict may also occur when a change in the power structure stimulates 
competition by favoring one group, thus transforming the ethnic division. An additional 
situation for conflict occurs if the new power elite are economically and socially subordinate 
to the ethnic group that dominates the urban center (Weiner 1978:9).  
Tensions are most often produced when modernization opens new spheres. The arenas in 
which migrants and locals compete are defined by what the development process and the 
political process have opened, for a critical dimension of ethnic conflict is the extent to which 
different ethnic groups battle over access or control over new resources (Weiner 1978:10). In 
a competing environment, the group interactions lead to a sharpening of ethnic distinctions, 
which further strengthens ethnic identities, promotes ethnic solidarity, and intensifies ethnic 
exclusiveness (Weiner 1978:10). In the competitions for resources, ethnic groups may create 
their own resources and infrastructures, which may lead to the emergence of ethnic leaders. 
Weiner argues that these are conflicts which may occur in any society, but may be perceived 
as an ethnic problem because of the ethnic division of labor (Weiner 1978:7).  
Although, Weiner (1978) derived the theory based on India he argues that these are conflicts 
which may occur in any society, and may be perceived as an ethnic conflict due to the i.e. 
ethnic stratification of job market. Thus, Weiner (1978) claims that SOS conflicts and it`s 
many variants convey the special collective right of an ethnic group over a territory, and his 
theory focuses on how a society is affected by in-migration. By following the logic of the 
theory of SOS, these conflicts seem to begin as bottom-up conflicts in which workers who 
claim a special right to educational facilities, housing and employment, react to in-migration 
in into what they perceive as their territory. As Weiner (1978) finds that some reactions to 
migrants have been more hostile in certain regions and ethnic group, he argues that this 
illustrates that it is not an ethnic conflict, but rather a conflict spurred by competition between 
some groups based on inequalities. However, as this conflict progresses the competing 
environment leads to a sharpening of ethnic identities which intensifies ethnic exclusiveness. 
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3.2 The SOS Explanation 
The initial explanation of SOS (Fearon 2004) is largely based on the framework of the theory 
of SOS. In general, a SOS war is a conflict between a minority ethnic group and a majority 
ethnic group as in-migration causes a dispute over the rights to a territory or competition over 
natural resources belonging to or perceived to be (in) the traditional homeland of the ethnic 
minority group (Fearon 2004). Thus, the conflict sharpens ethnic distinctions as the 
belligerents in SOS wars mobilize by ethnic lines. According to Fearon (2004:297):  
“Civil wars since 1945 have lasted significantly longer when they have involved land or natural 
resource conflicts between state-supported migrants from a dominant ethnic group and the ethnically distinct 
“sons of the soil” who inhabit the region in question”. 
SOS Wars over Territory 
In the first variant of SOS the minority see themselves as the indigenous people of a certain 
territory (Fearon 2004). Immigrants belonging to the majority may move into the minority`s 
area because of population pressure in the center (Fearon 2004:283). If the state is controlled 
by a majority ethnic group whose members include large numbers of impoverished, land-poor 
farmers, the government has an enduring interest in favoring migration to less populated 
peripheral areas (Fearon 2004:296). As the majority ethnic group migrate into less populous 
and less developed peripheral regions of the country, the minority ethnic group, “the sons of 
the soil”,- take up arms and support insurgencies against the migrants (Fearon 2004:283). If 
the immigrants belong to the ethnic majority in the state, the government will often support 
the majority and fight back. Although the center has incentives to cut regional autonomy deals 
to reduce costly fighting with minority guerilla, both sides know the government will face 
strong political pressures to renege on behalf of migrants (Fearon 2004:296). Thus, the most 
likely termination mode for creating a lasting and credible peace after a SOS war is a military 
victory. 
SOS Wars over Natural Resources 
In the second variant, the sons of the soil are less concerned with in-migration by the ethnic 
majority, and primarily focused on the dispute of monopoly exploitation of fuel or mineral 
resources in their traditional areas (Fearon 2004:283). However, the pattern of the conflict 
remains the same as the sons-of-the-soil take up arms to defend resources they see as 
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rightfully theirs. Since the government has enduring interests in resource exploitation, the 
minority does not trust the commitments given by the state. Although, this variant of SOS 
wars focus on natural resources it is equally difficult to construct a negotiated settlement 
(Fearon 2004:296). Thus, the most distinctive feature of both variants of SOS wars is the 
commitment problem as the strength of the state fluctuates during the conflict, it will agree to 
more of the minority ethnic groups` conditions for peace when weakened. However, the 
ethnic minority group expect the state to renege on the deal once they regained their strength 
mainly because of four factors:  (i) The state has enduring interests in the territory or 
monopoly exploitation of the natural resources; (ii) the state is assumed to have more 
resources to endure a long-lasting civil war; (iii) the state is most often recruited from the 
ethnic majority and prefer to be loyal this group; (iiii) the state face population pressures and 
encourage the ethnic majority group to migrate into less populous and less developed 
peripheral regions of the country through state development projects17. Consequently, the 
motivations and interests of the state hinder the government from giving credible 
commitments to the ethnic minority group. According to Fearon (2004:298): 
“The model`s results showed that a stable regional autonomy deal is harder to construct when the 
political center`s stakes in the region are greater, as when land is wanted for migration of members of the ethnic 
minority or the region has valuable natural resources”.  
Thus, peace in SOS wars seems dependent on a military victory. Unless one of the 
belligerents wins the war militarily, most likely the government, the conflicts recur.  
3.2.1 The Updated SOS Explanation 
The updated version of the explanation of SOS is different from the initial explanation as it 
only includes conflicts where in-migration is an issue. A SOS war involves a conflict between 
members of a minority ethnic group concentrated in some region of a country and fairly 
recent ethnically distinct migrants to this region from other parts of the same country (Fearon 
and Laitin 2011)18. Further, the updated explanation of SOS includes cases where the 
belligerents fight over a territory, but also competition over scarce resources such as land, 
jobs, educational quotas, government services, or natural resources. Further, Fearon and 
Laitin (2011) argue that the nature of the conflict may not always be violent. The members of 
                                                 
17 This feature is true when the belligerents are fighting over territory, and not necessarily the case when the SOS 
war is over natural resources. 
18 Recent migration is within a generation before the violent conflict`s onset (Fearon and Laitin 2011). 
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the minority group think of their group as indigenous, and as rightfully possessing the area as 
their group`s ancestral (or at least very long-standing) home (Fearon and Laitin 2011). 
Consequently, they exclude conflicts where locals protest to the exploitation of natural 
resources exploitation by center and there is no competition arising from in-migration of 
another group (Fearon and Laitin 2011). The definition is therefore slightly changed from 
2004 to 2011 as it previously was a civil war over territory or natural resources, but now 
refers to conflicts caused by competition over land, jobs, educational quotas, government 
services. Moreover, the change does not have to have large implication as the large majority 
of cases the competition is mainly over land, and there are only a handful of natural resources 
cases that do not involve migration issues as well. However, the changes done to the 
explanation of SOS in may be confusing as it now includes a far more heterogeneous group of 
wars. Although, Fearon and Laitin (2011) continue to suggest that SOS wars are longest-
lasting and propose the civil war in Sri Lanka, which turned out to be one of the longest and 
most brutal civil wars in the last 30 years, as the most likely case they also claim that a SOS 
conflict does not have to be violent. According to Fearon and Laitin (2011:200):   
“By ”conflict” we mean competition and dispute over scarce resources such as land, jobs, educational 
quotas, government services, or natural resources. A SoS conflict may be violent, but it need not be”.  
As the explanation of SOS wars is based on an assumption where SOS wars follow a similar 
pattern which makes it homogenous to the degree that their onset, duration and termination 
can be predicted, it is surprising that civil wars which exhibit the same features may range 
from being extremely brutal to non-violent19.  
3.2.2 The SOS Theory versus the SOS Explanation  
The assumption that one ethnic group finds itself as the indigenous people of the territory and 
therefore belong to a certain area is important in both the theory and explanation of SOS 
(Fearon 2004; Weiner 1978). The theory of SOS and the explanation of SOS are clearly built 
on the assumption that an ethnic group claims to have a special collective right over a 
territory, and in-migration is regarded as the main cause of conflict. Consequently, the theory 
and explanation of SOS highlight the feature of competition between ethnic groups. However, 
the interpretation of the onset of conflict is outlined differently in the theory of SOS and the 
explanation of SOS. Weiner (1978) clearly states that inequalities, in-migration and 
                                                 
19 Note that it may be argued that the relevance of this theory may be lost in conflict studies as it now also 
includes non-violent cases, which seems of little interest to the field. 
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competition between the different ethnic groups it does not necessarily lead to conflict. Rather 
the conflict is due to competition between groups as they enter a traditionally conflicting 
relationship such as landlord and peasant.  As the theory of SOS focuses on the relationship 
between the ethnic groups, the explanation of SOS includes the role of the state and the 
importance of a commitment problem. Consequently, the explanation of SOS is based on the 
initial theory of SOS as it focuses on the consequences of in-migration in a territory in which 
the minority regard as their homeland, which spurs a bottom-up, ethnic conflict between the 
ethnic groups. Thus, Fearon`s (2004; Fearon and Laitin 2011) contribution and further 
development of the SOS theory is his focus on the state`s role and how this creates a 
commitment problem between the belligerents. This hinders the parties on settling on a peace 
agreement, which determines the duration of the conflict. However, the updated version of the 
explanation of SOS seems closer to the theory of SOS as they focus increasingly on Weiner`s 
(1978) second and third notion regarding competition over sectors and government jobs.  
3.3 The Nature of Sons of the Soil 
The former section discussed the abstract and theoretical part of the SOS explanation, while 
the following part focuses on the actual nature of the SOS wars. Thus, this section introduce 
the geography and duration of SOS wars, before discussing  the commitment problem and 
how well the most likely case of SOS wars, the civil war in Sri Lanka between the Sri Lankan 
government and the LTTE display the features outlined by the SOS explanation.  
3.3.1 SOS Geography 
In “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?” Fearon (2004) finds 128 
civil wars from 1945 to 1999 where 21 of them are SOS wars, while Fearon and Laitin (2011) 
found 32 SOS wars among 139 intrastate conflicts from 1945 to 2008. They argue that most 
of the SOS wars are placed in Asia as the physical and social geography of many Asian states 
is conducive to this form of conflict. China, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Thailand and 
Myanmar have major lowland river plains densely populated by a large ethnic group that 
dominates the state. The plains are often bordered by rough, less developed mountainous 
terrain inhabited by diverse ethnic minorities, referred to as hill tribes, who use slash-and-
burn agriculture or are pastoralists (Fearon and Laitin 2011:200). Population pressure in the 
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river valleys can make expansion to these formerly peripheral lands attractive for poor 
farmers from the dominant ethnic group.  
Further, Fearon (2004; Fearon and Laitin 2011) claim that the pattern is the SOS explanation, 
as civil wars in which rebels are seeking independence or greater autonomy for a region tend 
to be slightly less deadly on average than civil wars where the rebel`s goal is to capture the 
center. Consequently, SOS wars are much less lethal even within the set of autonomy-seeking 
civil wars (Fearon and Laitin 2011:201). However, as empirical studies have found that civil 
wars over territory last longer than those over government, we should question whether SOS 
wars last longer simply because they are over territory or whether their duration is actually 
caused by the SOS dynamic. Recent research has suggested that the most intractable intrastate 
conflicts in the last 60 years were not ethnic war or ideological wars, but wars over territory 
(Walter 2003:137). Territorial civil wars tend to escalate and produce greater numbers of 
fatalities, while negotiations rarely brought peace (Walter 2003:137)20. Consequently, 
scholars suggest that governments display a “surprising unwillingness to negotiate over land 
in order to avoid or end otherwise costly conflicts” (Walter 2003:137).  
Recent empirical studies have also found that conflicts which are located at a distance from 
the capital, along remote international borders and in regions with valuable minerals last 
substantially longer (Buhaug and Gates 2002:417; Buhaug et al 2009:544). Further, Buhaug 
(et al 2009:544) suggest that geographical factors such as location, terrain and natural 
resources “play a crucial role in determining the duration of conflict”. Thus, there seem to be 
a distinct difference in duration of civil wars over government and territory as the former tend 
to be shorter and more dynamic as they are all-out-wars with a high intensity, while the latter 
tend to be local, with low-intensity and generally with long duration (Buhaug and Gates 
2002:417).  
Consequently, it seems relevant to test whether all SOS wars are over territory, and whether 
the SOS variables capture the effect of territory. There are several implications of testing this, 
as the feature of autonomy over the homeland area is vital for the explanation, SOS wars 
cannot per definition be over government. Further, civil war over territory tend to last longer 
than other civil wars, thus it is relevant to test whether SOS wars last longer because of the 
SOS dynamic and not because it captures the effect of territory.  
                                                 
20 Despite the large number of fatalities, these findings correspond with the explanation of SOS.  
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H1a: SOS wars involves either land conflict or dispute over scarce resources, consequently 
SOS conflicts are over territory, not government. 
H1b: SOS wars over territory last longer than SOS wars over government. 
3.3.2 SOS Duration 
One of the most striking facts about SOS wars is their duration. They seem to simmer at a low 
intensity level, and seem to be very difficult to end. While the estimated median duration for 
all civil wars are 7 years, the model estimates the median duration of SOS conflicts to be 
about 15 years (Fearon and Laitin 2011:201). Further, they find one quarter of all non-SOS 
wars to last more than 15 years, while one quarter of SOS wars are predicted to last longer 
than 31 years making the duration twice as long. Because of these large differences Fearon 
and Laitin (2011) claim that it is extremely unlikely that these differences are random, but 
rather caused by a previously undiscovered pattern. Thus, SOS wars tend to be less lethal, but 
last longer than other civil wars.  
Table 3.1.  Duration and Lethality of SOS versus Other Civil Wars  
Source: Fearon and Laitin 2011 
Fearon`s (2004) analysis showed that SOS wars last longer than other civil wars, but is this 
because his high battle-death threshold includes high-intensity civil wars which are typically 
all-out wars, and consequently has a short duration? As we want to know whether the duration 
of SOS is statistically longer compared to other low-intensity civil wars, we may test the 
 SOS Wars Non-SOS wars 
Estimated median duration 
(years) 
15.1 7.1 
Average killed 33,254 138,54 
Median killed 11,000 20,000 
Average killed/year 3,180 21,106 
Median killed/year 992 3,000 
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duration of SOS wars in a dataset with a low battle-death threshold as it will include civil 
wars with lower levels of violence.  
H2: SOS wars last longer than other civil wars when tested on lower battle-death threshold. 
3.4 A Commitment Problem 
The idea that commitment problems are important obstacles to reaching stable 
regional autonomy deals is advanced here as a theoretical conjecture that has implications 
consistent with the empirical record. Future research might profitably investigate whether or 
how this mechanism matters in particular cases. 
                      Fearon (2004:298) 
The commitment problem in the explanation of SOS is the most interesting and important 
feature of SOS wars, as it supposedly hinders a peaceful termination of these wars and 
consequently affects the duration of these wars. Thus, this section offers a general 
understanding of a commitment problem in civil wars, before placing it within the narrative of 
the explanation of SOS. The following part also discusses Sri Lanka as the most likely case of 
SOS21. 
3.4.1 Spoiling Peace  
Civil wars are often examined from the perspective of commitment problems (Mattes and 
Savun 2010:511). According to the bargaining and war literature, commitment problems may 
make war a rational strategy in situations where the disputants cannot credibly commit to an 
agreement over time (Walter 2009:246). Most scholars using the rationalist approach to 
understand the occurrence and reoccurrence of civil wars assume that a commitment problem 
postpones the peace (Mattes and Savun 2010:511). It is therefore argued that the uncertainty 
regarding military capabilities may persist and hinder and/or lead to the breakdown of peace 
(Mattes and Savun 2010:511). A commitment problem exists whenever somebody has an 
incentive to back out from a threat, an assurance or promise when the time comes to translate 
their words into action (Hovi 1998:1). Thus, the government can never give credible 
commitments to the rebels that they will not renege on the ceasefire or peace agreement when 
they regain their strength, because both parties know that the state has an incentive to do so 
                                                 
21 When a case is thought to be a most likely case it gives more credibility to the testing. Where evidence drawn 
from a most likely case, may falsify or confirm a theory (Gerring 2007:42). 
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(Fearon 2004). Commitment problems may be divided into three main contexts: a threatening 
state`s credibility, commitments in negotiations and finally the compliance problem, where 
the parties might be tempted to cheat after it has committed to a peace agreement (Hovi 
1998:2). In the case of SOS, it is either commitments in negotiations or a compliance problem 
where the state may be tempted to cheat when it regains strength. 
Research suggests that weak state capacity during the transition period determine the duration 
of a peace agreement, as post-conflict institutions which have been weakened by years of 
strife, may not be capable of enforcing the agreement (DeRouen et al 2010:336) 22. Therefore, 
military victories has tended to provide a more enduring peace than peace agreements, 
although many civil wars have ended with a negotiated peace (DeRouen et al 2010: 333).This 
may be due to a commitment problem, where one or both sides seek renegotiation. Recent 
research suggests that an important part of securing a lasting peace by means of a peace 
agreement, lies in the credible information and the agreement`s design (Mattes and Savun 
2010:511). Information asymmetries between the parties are a central explanation for civil 
war, but commitment problems are considered an important part of the problem. Commitment 
problems and information asymmetries play an equally important part in spoiling the peace, 
which suggests that third parties may therefore contribute to a lasting peace by securing 
information and credible commitments (Mattes and Savun 2010:511). 
Thus, third party intervention has proven vital in post-war societies as they may guarantee the 
integrity of the agreement and fosters trust between the sides (DeRouen et al 2010:334). The 
empirical study of Mattes and Savun (2010:511) demonstrates that 51 civil war settlements 
from 1945 to 2005 were possible due to international monitoring and credible information, 
especially with regards to military capabilities. They argue that provisions where the 
belligerents are required to report their military information to a third party may reduce the 
risk of renewed war. The third parties may verify the information, which adds credibility in 
negotiations in post-conflict states (Mattes and Savun 2010:511).  
 
                                                 
22 State capacity is understood as the means of overcoming those problems addressed by a weak government, 
such as autonomy, effectiveness, accountability and responsiveness in economic, political and military matters 
(DeRouen et al 2010:334). 
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3.4.2 The Commitment Problem in SOS Wars 
 “The model shows how a commitment problem could prevent an insurgency from 
being ended in any other way except by military defeat”.  
          Fearon (2004:290) 
Fearon (2004) develops a game model where secessionist war is modeled as a commitment 
problem, because the government cannot commit credibly to autonomy deals signed in 
periods when it is relatively weak. Fearon`s (2004) understanding and argument for why civil 
wars cannot reach a peace agreement is well-founded in the rationalist explanation for war 
and the SOS wars may be viewed in the light of the bargaining model of war23. Fearon (2004) 
argues that the bargaining failure in these conflicts are due to commitment problems, and 
disregards asymmetric information because he assumes that the belligerents know each 
other`s strengths and capabilities as the belligerents in SOS wars fight for a long period of 
time. Consequently, more information would not have an effect for the ending SOS wars, but 
increased credibility between the belligerents could ameliorate the commitment problem 
(Mattes and Savun 2010:513).  
SOS wars have a dynamic tailor made to emphasize the bargaining model of war. The 
government cannot credibly commit to a peace deal with the rebels, and if the rebels were to 
disarm the balance of power shifts in favor of the government which may tempt the 
government to exploit the situation (Mattes and Savun 2010:512). Because the rebels know 
about the government`s incentive to renege on the deal, they are less likely to put down their 
weapons and sign a peace agreement (Mattes and Savun 2010:512). In case of commitments 
in peace agreements, the government might suspect that the rebels will break the 
commitments. Thus, the compliance problem may be more relevant in the case of SOS wars, 
as the minority believe that the government will renege on the peace deal after regaining their 
strength. Even if both parties want a peace agreement, it may be difficult to commit to 
because of the incentive to defect, or the fear that the other party will cheat (Werner and Yuen 
2005:261). Consequently, a first strike advantage hinders any commitment between the 
belligerents. Because the rebels in SOS wars suspect that the government will defect they will 
                                                 
23 The basic premise of the bargaining model of war is that fighting is costly so both parties would receive a 
higher utility with a peace agreement than with war. Since both parties know this, they should be able to agree 
on a deal which reflects exactly what they would receive after the war, without fighting a war. However, civil 
wars occur supposedly due to bargaining failure. The two main explanations for bargaining failure are 
commitment problems and information asymmetries (Mattes and Savun 2010:512). 
29 
 
not dare not put down their arms. An increased cost of defection, enhanced monitoring, or 
rewarded cooperation may work to some extent as carrot and stick, although research on the 
matter has suggested that these measures will prove inadequate if the belligerents are not 
committed to keeping the peace.  
H3: Due to the commitment problem SOS wars are believed to terminate in military victories 
than in other modes of termination. 
3.4.3 Sri Lanka- the most likely case 
Put another way, as one anonymous reviewer pointed out in regard to the Sri Lankan 
case, the Sinhalese (the nation-builders) saw themselves as sons of all Sri Lankan soil, and 
saw Tamils as the cultural threat. Eliminating such cultural threats is a nation-building 
tactic.  
                                       Fearon and Laitin (2011:207) 
The civil war in Sri Lanka between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE is perceived as 
the most likely case of the explanation of SOS. Sri Lanka was formerly a British colony, 
which gained its independence in 1947. It has a population of twenty million, where the 
majority ethnic group Sinhalese amounts to 74 percent, while the largest minority ethnic 
group are Tamils and account for 19 percent of the population (Fearon and Laitin 2011:202). 
The Tamils may be divided between the Sri Lanka Tamils from the North and East who 
regard themselves as the indigenous people, and the Indian Tamils who arrived in the 
nineteenth century as workers to the central plantations (Fearon and Laitin 2011:202). During 
the 1950s and 1960s the Sri Lankan Tamils dominated the business world and the higher 
positions in the civil service, but this changed after the elections in 1956 as the new 
government presented the Official Language Act which declared Sinhala as the one official 
language (Fearon and Laitin 2011: 202). The act stirred reactions among Tamils, who 
perceived their language, culture and economic position to be under attack (Fearon and Laitin 
2011:202). However, the Sri Lankan Tamils did not form violent militias in the period of 
1950s and 1960s, which was the period in which the cultural oppression intensified.   
In 1972 Sri Lankan Tamil groups attacked state targets and became armed secessionists after 
1977. Local elections in 1981 sparked an increase in the violence as Sri Lankan Tamil 
extremists opposed working in the existing political framework (Fearon and Laitin 2011:202). 
The violence reached civil war levels in 1983 as the Sri Lankan Tamil`s rebel group, the 
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LTTE, ambushed an army patrol in the north which left 13 Sinhalese soldiers dead. A 
collective retaliation occurred, and the violence on both sides increased as Sri Lankan 
politicians did little to control the violence, while India supported the LTTE (Fearon and 
Laitin 2011:202). The LTTE guerilla base was in Jaffna which is far North in Sri Lanka, 
although riots, assaults and looting also became a part of everyday life in the Eastern Province 
as many Sri Lankan Tamils were located there. Fearon and Laitin (2011:203) argues that the 
Tamils in the East may not have been concerned with the language act, but claim that the 
violence was due to the complex multiethnic space and complementary to the actions against 
settlers by outraged indigenous populations. The Northern Province was overwhelmingly 
Tamil, although the Eastern Province included Sinhalese and Muslim settlers which objected 
to the merger of these two provinces as it would leave them as minorities in the area. The 
state continued to support Sinhala settlement in Tamil areas, although they understood the 
implications of their policy. The state development scheme was perceived as provocative by 
the Sri Lankan Tamils who increased the violence which made it impossible for the police to 
control.  
The civil war lasted until 2002 in which Norway supported a ceasefire in 2002 which the 
LTTE broke in 2006 (Fearon and Laitin 2011). The civil war restarted in 2006 and lasted until 
2009, when the Sri Lankan army militarily defeated the LTTE, and ended one of the longest 
and most brutal civil wars in the last 30 years (Fearon and Laitin 2011:202). Certain features 
may be highlighted from this conflict as it is not unique to the case of Sri Lanka (Fearon and 
Laitin 2011: 204):  
1. Migration proceeds from a relatively densely settled core to a more sparsely populated 
and ethnically distinct periphery, sometimes with the active support and encouragement of 
state policy. As the state intends to reduce poverty in overpopulated areas and develop 
regions it encourages migrants, most often from the ethnic majority, to settle in a new 
territory (Fearon and Laitin 2011).  
2. Frictions and low-level violent clashes of various sorts arise between migrant and 
indigenous communities, sometimes “naturally” and sometimes with deliberate agitation 
of local leaders on each side. The indigenous population usually feels threatened by the 
new migrants to their region, and a series of incidents raises tension between the ethnic 
groups.  Fearon and Laitin (2011) claim that in-migration by dominant settlers implicates 
the state and causes a higher level of violence.  
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3. Although the police are called on to restore order, they often fail. Fearon and Laitin 
(2011) argue that the police are poorly paid and drawn from the indigenous people, 
consequently they have little interest in protecting the migrants. If the police are able to 
restore order, the conflict does not escalate, however, incidents may recur where the 
police may fail.  
4. If the police are ineffective, the state may call in the army, choosing to side on balance 
with either the sons-of-the-soil or the migrants. If the state supports the indigenous group, 
the defenseless migrants can either return to their home areas or face uncontrolled 
pogroms from the locals. If the state favors the interest of the immigrants (e.g. by 
attacking rebels or even by remaining neutral and making sure that all residents` security 
is protected), the indigenous can either accept their losses or challenge the forces of the 
state, who are now allied with the immigrants. In such cases, the likelihood that members 
of the local`s gangs (or militias) will kill soldiers is high (Fearon and Laitin 2011). If this 
happens, the army is likely to respond with indiscriminate violence against the indigenous 
population, which becomes the first salvo in an escalating rebellion against the state. 
Thus, the state`s decision of which side to ally determines whether the conflict will 
escalate or not, although in SOS cases it is most likely that the state supports the migrants 
as the migrants belong to the dominant ethnic group (Fearon and Laitin 2011).  
3.4.4 Sri Lanka – A Most Likely Case? 
 I don`t think we need weapons or armed cadres any longer. We are a political party 
now. All our leaders have entered the democratic process and we all get security provided 
from the government.  
Colonel Karuna (Pathirana 2008)  
Fearon and Laitin (2011: 199) argue that the civil war in Sri Lanka between the Sinhalese-
dominated state and the Sri Lankan Tamils is well-studied, although greatly misunderstood as 
scholars have missed the importance of Sons-of-the-Soil dynamics in the escalation and 
maintenance of violence in Sri Lanka. As the civil war in Sri Lanka between the state and the 
LTTE is regarded as the most likely case of SOS wars, they provide a summary of the civil 
war on Sri Lanka and highlight the features of the intrastate conflict which support the SOS 
explanation. Fearon and Laitin (2011) mention that the fighting between the Sri Lankan 
Tamils and the government were spread to the Northern and Eastern Province. However, they 
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treat the LTTE as one military group and fail to mention that the Eastern LTTE, which 
controlled 60 percent of the LTTE`s military strength, agreed on a peace agreement with the 
Sri Lankan government in 2004 (Haviland 2010).    
The LTTE was divided into the Eastern and Northern LTTE, although they collaborated and 
fought for an independent Tamil homeland (Haviland 2010). The former group was lead by 
Colonel Karuna, while the latter was lead by Prabhakaran. In 2004 Colonel Karuna agreed on 
a peace agreement with the state, a defection from the Tamil Tigers which lead to the loss of 
the Eastern Province and has also been interpreted as an important factor in explaining the 
military defeat of LTTE in 2009 (Haviland 2010).  The peace agreement between the Eastern 
LTTE and the Sri Lankan government was never broken, and Colonel Karuna entered politics 
after the peace agreement to promote Tamil interests (Haviland 2010) 24.  
As Sri Lanka is regarded as the most likely case of the SOS explanation, the peace agreement 
between the Eastern LTTE and the Sri Lankan government weakens the notion of the 
commitment problem.  If the LTTE was fighting for their homeland, how could Colonel 
Karuna and the Eastern Tigers put down their guns?25 How could they agree on a peace 
agreement if there was a commitment problem? One could argue that Colonel Karuna 
assumed that the war for an independent Tamil homeland would continue with the remaining 
Northern LTTE. However, as the Eastern tigers contributed 60 percent of the LTTE`s military 
capabilities, is it difficult to see how they could win the war without the Eastern part of the 
LTTE. Fearon (2004) assumes that the commitment problem hinders any other termination 
than military victory, which makes it difficult to fit this part of the Sri Lankan civil war in the 
SOS explanation. It should also be noted that the majority Sinhala immigration to the Eastern 
Province was greater than to the North as both Sinhalese and Muslims lived and moved to the 
East, where new lands opened up due to the diversion of Sri Lanka’s longest river, the 
Mahaweli.  
                                                 
24 Today Colonel Karuna is the vice-president of Sri Lanka`s governing party, while Prabhakaran was killed 
when the Sri Lankan state won the civil war militarily over the LTTE (Haviland 2010). 
25 It also promotes the question of why Fearon and Laitin (2011) have left the peace agreement between the 
Eastern LTTE and the Sri Lankan government out of their summary of the civil war in Sri Lanka. Please note 
that the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset also fails to register the peace agreement with the Eastern Tigers in 
2004. This promotes a debate concerning coding of termination and rebel groups. Although, the UCDP dataset  
mention that it does not include changes with regards to the identity of the belligerents it may collapse conflict 
episodes into wars with rebel groups which in reality is not related or ignore important terminations as in the 
case of Sri Lanka.  If these concerns are left unresolved, it can lead to systematic failures. 
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Thus, some of the features of the civil war in Sri Lanka correspond with the explanation of 
SOS, while other decisive features contradict the proposition. The civil war in Sri Lanka 
lasted for a long period of time before it ended in a military victory in favor of the 
government26. However, SOS wars are low-intensity with a low lethality rate, while the civil 
war in Sri Lanka was one of the most brutal civil wars that lasted thirty years (Fearon and 
Laitin 2011). How can one of the most brutal civil wars that lasted three decades be the most 
likely case for a category which also includes non-violent cases? According to the coding 
rules of Fearon (2004:279) he codes a new war if one of the main parties in the conflict was 
defeated or otherwise dropped out. Thus, the civil war in Sri Lanka should not be treated as 
one civil war, but rather two as the Eastern part of the LTTE which controlled 60 percent of 
the rebels group’s military capabilities represented by the Eastern Tigers dropped out because 
they signed a peace agreement with the Sri Lankan government. While discrepancies such as 
this exist in cases, the aggregated results should also be carefully analyzed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Note that this is not registered in any of the datasets as it is outside of the range in time.  
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4 Civil War Termination 
This chapter focuses on the importance of the end of the Cold War as an explanation of how 
civil wars have ended and the importance of the emergence of an intervening international 
community for intrastate conflicts. I will also examine how this may have mattered for the 
termination of SOS wars as the neglect of non-ideological small wars during the Cold War 
might explain why SOS wars last longer, as opposed to the SOS dynamic leading to 
commitment problems. 
4.1 The Post-Cold War Period 
Civil war termination has not been subject to the same methodological rigor as civil war onset 
and duration, and the empirical studies which focus on termination have found contradictory 
results (Kreutz 2010). Although the effect of the end of the Cold War on intrastate conflicts is 
still questioned (Weinstein 2007), most view 1991 as an important turning-point for civil wars 
(Lacina 2004; Mack 2008; Kreutz 2010). Many scholars argue that the end of the Cold War 
has had an impact on civil war politics (Lacina 2004:191). When the international system 
changed from a bipolar to a unipolar world, intrastate conflicts were no longer perceived as 
been driven by superpowers politics and East-West ideologies (Lacina 2004:191; Mullenbach 
2005:529). Intrastate conflicts went from “side show” to center stage because of the absence 
of the superpower conflict (Lacina 2004:191). This also allowed media, policymakers, 
scholars and the United Nations to change focus (Lacina 2004:191). During the Cold War the 
superpowers usually used their vetoes in the UN Security Council to block the UN from 
intervening in their proxy wars in many parts of the world. However, after 1991 the primary 
global security threat changed from a possible nuclear war between the superpowers to zones 
of internal conflict dominated by illegal drugs, human and weapons trafficking, HIV/AIDS, 
famine, terrorism, and theft (Lacina 2004:192). 
 As intrastate conflicts became threats to international security and peace, the threshold for 
intervening in what had traditionally been perceived as a state`s own business was lowered 
(Lacina 2004:193; Mullenbach 2005: 529).Therefore, civil wars were no longer understood as 
a national concern, but an object of international responsibility where the global society 
intervened to stop suffering, promote ideals such as democracy or human rights concerns; and 
contribute to peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction (Lacina 2004:193). Maintaining 
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peace in the aftermath of civil war is considered a difficult endeavor, therefore the 
international community has increasingly been called on to help (Fortna 2004:481). 
Obviously, scholars differ in their perception of separating the pattern of civil wars into 
before and after the end of the Cold War due to simply looking at the changes in the 
international community, although the majority in this debate seems to defend this 
differentiation. However, some scholars disagree with the assumption that 1991 can be used 
as an important turning point regarding changes in civil war, while others doubt whether there 
has been real changes after the end of the Cold War. According to Gates (2002:2):  
“The end of the Cold War led some to optimistically predict an end to war. A decade later we find this 
optimism was premature. War persists”.  
Some scholars argue that the variation in the characteristics of civil war and its perpetrators in 
terms of Cold War and post-Cold War dynamics is simplistic, theoretically unsatisfying, and 
empirically wrong (Weinstein 2007:19). They claim that the variation in conduct of warfare 
are best explained by looking inside insurgent organizations, at how they form and which 
organizational challenges they meet than looking at the changes in the international 
community (Weinstein 2007:19). This means that although the end of the Cold War may 
coincide with a change in the general pattern of civil wars, it is caused by the rebel groups and 
their conduct of warfare. Thus, the best way of understanding the changes may be to focus on 
the insurgent organizations, and disregard the changes in the international community after 
1991.  
However, the trend of increased intervention after 1991 is apparent, although it`s 
consequences and effects on civil war duration and termination are uncertain. Despite an 
increase of third party intervention in the post-cold war period, empirical analyses have found 
contradictory results concerning the international community`s effect on civil wars. While 
parts of the literature claim that third party interventions improve the probability of a lasting 
peace after a peace agreement, others argue interventions prolong human suffering as the 
intervening actors struggle to establish peace. Therefore, it is uncertain how the shift in the 
international society has affected the duration of civil wars.  This poses the question for how 
civil wars end and whether the pattern of termination has changed after the end of the Cold 
War. Further, are third parties capable of creating peace in post-conflict societies and in which 
cases do they intervene? 
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4.1.1 UN Intervention 
Some suggest that peacekeepers are sent to intervene in intrastate conflicts where they are 
most needed where peace would otherwise be difficult to keep (Fortna 2004:273) 27. Gilligan 
and Stedman (2001) claim that peacekeepers are more likely to intervene after very deadly 
civil wars, which suggests that they may choose the more difficult cases28.  Fortna (2004:273) 
argues that peace is more stable after decisive military victories than after wars that end in a 
tie may be the most consistent finding of the literature on the durability of peace after both 
intrastate and interstate conflicts (Fortna 2004:273). Recent research on UN intervention 
suggests that one of the best predictors of UN intervention is the number of deaths in a 
conflict and the military capacity of the state as it is less likely that UN peacekeepers are 
deployed to civil wars with low numbers of battle-death and it is less likely to intervene in 
militarily strong states (Gilligan and Stedman 2001; Fortna 2004:275). 
Possibly more interesting is that they find the level of democracy, war aim for the rebels, 
primary commodity exports nor former colony of a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council make any difference for whether the UN intervenes or not (Gilligan and Stedman 
2001; Fortna 2004:275). Fortna (2004:276) examines the effects of peacekeeping on 
maintaining peace, and claims that “we would want information on every cease-fire in every 
civil war. Unfortunately, given the messy nature of most civil wars, and, frequently, their stop 
and start nature, a comprehensive accounting of cease-fires does not exist”29. Fortna (2004) 
finds that international personnel were sent to keep peace in 41of 115 civil wars, where 7 of 
the 41 wars were during the Cold War, while the remaining 34 was after 1989 (Fortna 
2004:276). The UN intervened in 30 of the total 115 cases, in which 5 intrastate conflicts 
were during the Cold War and the remaining 25 were after 1989 (Fortna 2004:276). This 
suggests that the duration of civil war misses much if one does not account for the activist-
period of intervention after the end of the Cold War. Since the SOS explanation does not take 
                                                 
27 There are competing explanations for the relationship between the cost of war and the durability of peace as it 
is argued that states differ in their tolerance for costs of war and their willingness to make concessions (Fortna 
2004:274; Filson and Werner 2007:691). Some claim that autocratic leaders are less sensitive to cost and conflict 
outcomes than democrats, as the latter is held accountable for their decisions via elections. Democrats may be 
replaced if the population find their actions irresponsible, but the consequences of removal for democrats are 
relatively small compared to autocrats who may face death (Filson and Werner 2007:693). 
28Recent research suggests that a higher death toll decreases the probability of reconciliation (Doyle and 
Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004:275). It is also argued that civil wars with higher number of killed are more likely 
to resume than less deadly conflicts (Fortna 2004:275).  
29 As of now that kind of data exists in the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset (Kreutz 2010). 
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the activist period seriously, we may test whether the Cold War period has affected the 
duration and termination of these intrastate conflicts.  
4.2 Military Victory or Peace Agreements? 
Generally, a civil war can terminate in military victory; a peace agreement; a ceasefire; or the 
conflict may wither away (Kreutz 2010). Since the peacekeeping mission in Namibia in 1989, 
the international community has intervened in an increasing number of intrastate conflicts, 
and negotiated settlements have become the preferred method for ending civil wars (Fortna 
2004:271; DeRouen et al 2010; Kreutz 2010). The involvement has moved beyond 
“traditional peacekeeping”, and become more apparent in different aspects of monitoring and 
managing the transition from war to peace within a state with tasks such as peace agreement 
implementation, election monitoring and police training (Fortna 2004:269; DeRouen et al 
2010:334). Therefore, there has been an increase in peace agreements, cease fires and other 
outcomes after the end of the Cold War, while military victories have become the least likely 
method of ending intrastate conflicts (Kreutz 2010). 
Most empirical studies on civil war termination find that bargains are difficult to reach and 
implement in civil wars and they seem to be harder to establish in civil wars that interstate 
wars (Walter 1997; Walter 2009:244). Few negotiated settlements are signed, and those which 
are signed are less likely to be implemented. As peace agreements are likely to break down, 
the commonly assumed termination mode to end civil wars are military victories. Most argue 
that it is difficult to establish a lasting peace through negotiations after civil wars because of 
information problems (Walter 2009:245). Information about the rebel groups military 
capabilities are often difficult to obtain, as their potential army, financial flow, degree of 
support among the population is unknown (Walter 2009:246).  
A peace agreement leaves both parties vulnerable to attack or abuse because they have to put 
down their weapons and decrease the size of their armies, this promotes a situation of first-
strike advantage. As intrastate wars are assumed to have large power asymmetries between 
the government and the rebel group, it is easy for the government to renege on its promises 
(Walter 2009:246). The government may offer a reform of the political process, share power, 
or transfer autonomy to competitors, but since the rebel group is most often weaker, it has 
little ability to penalize a government should it fail to follow through (Walter 2009:246). The 
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rebel group is most often weakened by a settlement as several armies are not allowed within 
the state. Consequently, soon after an agreement is signed, control over territory is likely to be 
transferred back to the central government, which decreases the strength of the rebel group 
further (Walter 2009:246). 
The bargaining problem may also affect a peace agreement as it may be more difficult if the 
combatants cannot divide the stakes over which they are fighting (Walter 2009:246). 
However, recent empirical studies suggest that even though territory is easily divided the 
government neither will nor consider it as an alternative as it affects its reputation and 
damages its strength (Walter 2003). If both sides seek sole ownership over a piece of territory, 
or control over a single government, then a settlement short of war may be unworkable. 
However, scholars have identified two mechanisms which address the rebels` security 
concerns: securing guarantees from third parties and adopting institutional safeguards to share 
or divide power between the domestic groups (Mattes and Savun 2010:512). The third party 
promise that it will intervene if the government acts opportunistically and reneges on past 
promises (Mattes and Savun 2010:512). The power-sharing institutions reduce the 
government`s ability to take advantage of the rebel group once it has demobilized (Hartzell 
and Hoddie 2003; Mattes and Savun 2010).  
4.2.1 Termination of SOS Wars 
By the logic of Fearon`s argument, a SOS war cannot achieve a lasting peace without a final 
military victory because of the commitment problem. Arguably, ceasefires and peace 
agreements are based on a minimum level of trust between the belligerents, but as the 
minority ethnic group in the SOS conflict assumes that the government will renege on any 
deal there is a lack of credibility and consequently difficult to terminate these wars peacefully 
(Fearon 2004). As the government is believed to have greater military capabilities than the 
rebels, the minority is expected to choose a military strategy such as guerilla warfare which is 
typically the case for long lasting wars (Arreguín- Toft 2005). Thus, SOS wars last longer due 
to commitment problems and a lasting peace can only be achieved after a military victory, 
most likely in favor of the state (Fearon 2004).  
However, how the SOS wars actually ended have not been tested directly. If a lack of trust 
between the ethnic minority group and the ethnic majority group is the main obstacle for 
reaching a peace agreement a third party might guarantee the credibility of the peace 
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agreement. Recent research has demonstrated that peace agreements may be sustainable, if the 
peace is supported by a third party who intervenes if either party ignores the negotiated 
conditions (Walter 1997:361). In these cases it does not matter whether the state is strong or 
weak, or whether the majority presses for the government to intervene. If there is a third party 
guaranteeing for peace, and securing equal rights for all, there is no incongruity. If SOS wars 
are a bottom up wars, both sons-of-the-soil and the government will benefit more from peace 
as civil wars are extremely expensive. Further, if the sons-of-the-soil demands autonomy of 
their homeland and the state cannot agree on their terms, a third party may intervene and 
guarantee some sort of agreement between the belligerents, such as restrictions on the 
governments development scheme or secure the minority ethnic group`s rights to parts of the 
territory or resources in the area30.  
Previous studies argue that the end of the Cold War has led to a more willing and capable 
international community for negotiating settlements (Mack 2008; Kreutz 2010:246). 
Empirical studies have found that military victories have become less common in intrastate 
conflicts after 1989, largely because of increased peacekeeping by third parties (Kreutz 
2010:246). The international community`s involvement in post-conflict societies have 
increased dramatically after the end of the Cold War as the annual number of intrastate 
conflict terminations tripled after the end of the Cold war (Kreutz 2010). However, this image 
is complicated by the fact that both onset and termination rose by the end of the Cold War 
(Elbadawi et al 2008).  The increase of both onsets and terminations may be an important 
factor in explaining why scholars have found contradictory results concerning the 
international community`s effect on civil war termination. Although, global incidences of 
conflicts seem reduced as there were more terminations than onsets, a large part of inactive 
conflicts have increasingly recurred which may affect the results (Elbadawi et al 2008).  
Logically, we would think that a third party would improve SOS wars chances for a lasting 
peace after a peace agreement. If commitment problem is the only reason for why SOS wars 
last longer, the change in the international community and third party intervention should 
have affected SOS wars more than other types of civil war. This statement is supported by the 
fact that SOS wars cannot end because of commitment problems, while other types of civil 
                                                 
30 This argument assumes that the rebel group in a SOS war is fighting for a territory or natural/scarce resources 
in their homeland. If the rebel group is opportunistic and attempts to secure benefits in which the rebel leaders 
would not receive if there was not a war, a third party intervention is not assumed to improve the conditions of 
the civil war. 
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wars are caused by other incompatibilities. As SOS wars are the longest lasting civil wars, the 
understanding of this dynamic and how to shorten their duration, may be of great importance 
for both policy and research within civil war duration and termination, including third party 
intervention literature. Thus, scholars still disagree on how the shift in the international 
society has affected intrastate conflicts including SOS wars, although it seems likely that this 
change has affected SOS duration and termination. Possibly more so than other types of civil 
wars, since SOS wars are low-intensity and may have received little attention in the past.  
Assumptions for H4-hypothesis: “The problem is that bargains are unenforceable due to 
fluctuations in the government`s capabilities” (Fearon 2004:291). An agreement between the 
belligerents may be guaranteed by a third party, making the agreement independent of 
fluctuations in the government`s capabilities. Previous studies argue that the end of the Cold 
War has led to a more willing and capable international community when it comes to 
intervention and negotiation of settlements (Mack 2008; Kreutz 2010:246). The general trend 
of increased intervention should affect SOS wars in several accounts:  
H4a: SOS wars terminate in other outcomes than military victory after the end of the Cold 
War 
H4b: SOS wars lasted longer during the Cold War, than after 1991.  
H4c: If the commitment problem is the sole reason for why SOS wars last longer than other 
civil wars, the end of the Cold War should have a larger effect on SOS wars than other civil 
wars because a increased intervention should improve credibility between the belligerents: 
The end of the Cold War has had a larger effect on termination of SOS wars than other 
intrastate conflicts. 
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5 Method and Research Design 
Put differently, if we have no explanation for why the parties are fighting at all (rather 
than settling), it is not clear how we can “explain” variation in war duration. 
                                Fearon (2004:289) 
5.1.1 Hypotheses 
The SOS explanation has become a reference point within civil war literature, and it may also 
build a bridge between two important approaches to understanding civil war; feasibility and 
ethnicity. Thus, it is crucial to test whether the SOS wars follow the proposed pattern. This 
thesis will test the proposition that the commitment problem implies that SOS wars end in 
military victory by analyzing how the SOS wars have ended; whether SOS wars last longer 
than non-SOS wars by using a lower threshold for battle-deaths as measured by the UCDP 
data; whether the increased intervention after the end of the Cold War has affected the 
duration and termination of SOS wars; and whether increased intervention have ameliorated 
the commitment problem in SOS wars. This thesis will also test whether SOS wars are over 
territory or government which is a vital part of the SOS explanation since the ethnic minority 
group are assumed to have no political ambitions, but are only concerned with the in-
migration to their traditionally perceived homeland or scarce natural resources in their 
homeland31. Put differently, are SOS wars long-lasting because of SOS dynamics as specified 
by the theory or because they are inherently territorial disputes? Further, if SOS wars are over 
government, this challenges the explanation of SOS, as it questions whether in-migration in 
an important feature in SOS wars. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Note that I tested some implications of the SOS explanation in my Bachelor thesis, however this was limited 
to testing whether SOS wars were over territory and whether they were more likely to start during the Cold War 
(Gaski 2009). 
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H1a: SOS wars involves either land conflict or dispute over natural resources, consequently 
SOS conflicts are over territory, not government. 
H1b: SOS wars over territory last longer than SOS wars over government. 
H2: SOS wars last longer than other civil wars when tested on lower battle-death threshold 
H3: Due to the commitment problem SOS wars terminate in military victories 
H4a: SOS wars terminate in other outcomes than military victory after the end of the Cold 
War 
H4b: SOS wars lasted longer during the Cold War, than after 1991.  
H4c: The end of the Cold War has had a larger effect on termination of SOS wars than other 
intrastate conflicts. 
5.2 Three Datasets, Same Questions 
This thesis uses three datasets because of the nature of the questions, which require different 
setups of the data. This may be a source of confusion so I name the dataset 1, 2 and 3 by 
which they will be referred to throughout the analysis. However, the analysis performed in the 
analysis chapter focuses on dataset 1 and 3, while the analyses using dataset 2 is placed in the 
Appendix E for reference.  
- Dataset 1: Fearon`s (2004) dataset in which I have implemented the incompatibility 
variable from the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset (Kreutz 2010). The dataset 
ranges from 1945-99. Fearon’s dataset has a relatively high battle-death threshold as it 
only includes civil wars with a total of 1000 deaths, and a minimum of 100 deaths per 
year. The dataset includes 128 civil wars, where 20 of them are SOS wars32. 
- Dataset 2: The UCDP Conflict Termination dataset (Kreutz 2010) ranges from 1946-
2009 and disaggregates civil wars into conflict episodes to better capture the nature of 
the civil wars as the level of violence often ceases or drops below the battle-death 
                                                 
32 Fearon`s (2004) initial list of SOS wars includes 21 civil wars, although one could not be found in the UCDP 
dataset (China, Xinjiang, 1990). The same SOS war is missing for the updated list of SOS.  
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threshold before it resumes33. Further, the dataset uses a much lower battle-death 
threshold than dataset 1, as it includes conflicts where at least 25 deaths have occurred 
in a single year. I have created two dummy variables for SOS wars: one distinguishes 
between SOS conflict episodes according to Fearon`s (2004) dataset, and the other 
recognizes SOS conflict episodes according to the updated list of SOS wars (Fearon 
and Laitin 2011). Although, the initial UCDP Conflict Termination dataset does not 
differentiate between the identities of the belligerents, dataset 2 does as only SOS 
conflict episodes which include the rebel groups who are SOS are coded as SOS 
conflict episodes. Thus, dataset 2 includes 371 conflict episodes where 62 of them are 
SOS2004 conflict episodes, while 61 of them are SOS2011 conflict episodes. 
However, this dataset may treat low-intensity, long-lasting civil wars such as SOS 
wars unfavorably as they may be divided into more conflict episodes than other civil 
wars. Consequently, all analysis using dataset 2 is placed in the appendix, while the 
analysis chapter of this thesis uses dataset 1 and 334. 
- Dataset 3 is similar to dataset 2, although there is one important difference. Dataset 2 
treats long-lasting, low-intensity civil wars unfavorably since they are divided into 
more conflict episodes because the low battle-death threshold may lead to increased 
number of starts and stops leading to increased number of conflict episodes within 
each civil war. This could lead to misleading results as the analysis could report that 
brief wars such as coups and revolutions last longer than i.e. SOS wars because they 
are coded into fewer conflict episodes. Thus, I identified all the conflict episodes for 
each civil war and collapsed them if there are 5 years or less between the start year of 
the new conflict episode and the end year of the previous conflict episode. This means 
that dataset 3 includes 245 conflict episodes, where the list of SOS2004 show 22 SOS 
conflict episodes, and the list of SOS2011 show 32 SOS conflict episodes, which is 
                                                 
33 This thesis uses the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset Version 2010-1 – November 2010 (Kreutz 2010). 
Although, the dataset offers information of interstate, intrastate conflicts and a dyad-level dataset, the following 
analysis will only include the information of the dataset on intrastate conflicts and some of the extra state wars as 
some of them are SOS wars. 
34 As dataset 2 produces very different results from dataset 1 and 3, it is plausible that the disaggregated data 
treats long-lasting civil wars unfavorably, as it separates these wars into more conflict episodes compared to 
other civil wars. Consequently, the reported results regarding SOS wars may be misleading regarding SOS wars, 
as it may lead to an overestimation of the termination and an underestimation of the duration of these wars.  
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very close to Fearon (2004) and Fearon and Laitin’s (2011) original list of SOS 
wars35.  
Therefore, this thesis argues that there are several advantages to using three different datasets. 
First, it provides a validity test as we want to know whether we get the same results for SOS 
wars by using datasets with different criteria for gauging a civil war. The reason for 
contradictory results in much of the civil war literature may to some degree be caused by 
differences in the operationalizing of variables, the lethality- threshold and criteria for what 
constitutes a civil war. As SOS has become an important explanation for the longest-lasting 
civil wars we want to know whether the results are independent of specific coding rules.  
Secondly, dataset 1 has a higher lethality threshold than dataset 2 and 3 (100 killed compared 
to 25). As SOS wars are low-intensity wars it`s dynamic and pattern may be displayed more 
accurately in dataset 2 and 3, as the it includes more detailed information. The duration of 
SOS wars should increase in the disaggregated datasets if they simmer at low-intensity levels 
for long periods of time, as they should be registered in dataset 2 and 3 before they enter 
dataset 1 due to the lowered battle-death threshold.  Further, the SOS conflict episodes should 
last longer in the disaggregated dataset compared to other low-intensity intrastate conflicts 
because of the commitment problem, which Fearon (2004; Fearon and Laitin 2011) claims 
hinders any other outcome than military victory. Consequently, a ceasefire or a temporary 
peace agreement between the belligerent seems more likely in other civil wars where peace is 
not hindered by the commitment problem. Therefore, by testing SOS wars in a disaggregated 
dataset with a lower battle-death threshold we may gain a better understanding of SOS 
conflicts; ensure that the SOS dynamic is really driving the duration and that these wars are 
not neglected, low-intensity civil wars; and that the long duration of SOS conflicts are 
statistically different from other low-intensity civil wars. 
Gates and Strand (2004:1) claim that there are several fundamental problems related to the 
estimation of civil war duration. They argue that these problems relate to the battle-death 
                                                 
35 Which means that the initial number of SOS wars (2004 include 21 wars, 2011 include 32 wars) is not very 
different from the conflict episodes in dataset 3 (SOS2004 include 22 conflict episodes, SOS2011 include 32 
conflict episodes), while it is very different from dataset 2 (SOS2004 include 62 conflict episodes, SOS2011 
includes 61 conflict episodes). For dataset 3 this means that almost all civil wars have only one conflict episode, 
as the difference between conflict episodes is rarely more than five years. The only exemption for SOS2004 and 
SOS2011conflicts are India (Nagaland), Pakistan (Baluchistan) and Indonesia (OPM) which is coded into two 
conflict episodes. Indonesia (GAM I and II) are also coded in to two different wars, but Fearon (2004; Fearon 
and Laitin 2011) treats these conflicts as two separate wars too.   
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treshold,  repeated events in the same country and the precision of the measurement in time 
(Gates and Strand 2004) . These issues are relevant for the following analysis as the datasets 
use different criteria for what constitutes a civil war, but also affects the duration as the battle-
death threshold for dataset 2 and 3 are ¼ of the casualty threshold in dataset 1. This criticism 
is particularily useful for why Fearon’s (2004; Fearon and Laitin 2011) list of SOS wars 
should be tested in a dataset with a lower battle-death threshold. Further, accounting for 
repeated events in one country is especially important regarding civil war as they tend to 
recur.  
If the SOS explanation describes the accurate pattern of SOS wars the disaggregated dataset 
should be to these wars advantage as they are supposedly long-lasting, low-intensity civil 
wars. Further, the duration and termination of SOS wars compared to other low-intensity 
intrastate conflicts may be more precise in a dataset with a lower threshold36. As all civil wars 
are coded into conflict episodes in dataset 2 and 3 it should display how each conflict episode 
ended, not just how each civil war ended.  
In chapter 6: The Analysis, I use dataset 1 to perform a replication study, before I test whether 
the belligerents were fighting over territory or government37. Further, I use dataset 3 to test 
how the civil wars ended; whether the belligerents were fighting over territory or government; 
and the effect of the post-Cold War period on SOS wars duration and termination. The cause 
of contradictory results in the civil war literature may be due to the hunt for significant 
coefficients to contest others and few robustness tests, thus this thesis will also test residuals 
                                                 
36 Fearon (2004) argues that the dynamic of SOS is different than the dynamic of non-SOS wars, however his 
civil war categories are not mutually exclusive, which naturally poses the question whether the nature of SOS 
wars are that different from non-SOS wars. Further, Fearon (2004) argues that anti-colonial conflicts are civil 
wars and some of the anti-colonial wars are even SOS wars. Dataset 2 and 3 (Kreutz 2010) treat anti-colonial 
wars as extra state wars and exclude them from the list of intrastate conflicts. These two understandings of anti-
colonial wars display an important debate within the literature of civil war. Kreutz (2010) may argue that civil 
wars are conflicts between parties within a state, and as the colonial regimes were not proper states it is not a 
civil war, while Fearon (2004:282) argues that Kreutz` handling of anti-colonial wars is an ex post assessment of 
proper states as we cannot make the definition of civil wars depend on whether secession is successful or on 
territorial contiguity. As there are few SOS cases the loss of these data points could report misleading results, 
consequently I have coded the anti-colonial wars into dataset 2 and 3 from the extra state version of UCDP. This 
means that all the datasets in this thesis include anti-colonial wars. It concerns the following cases: For SOS 
wars in dataset 2: UK/Kenya (Mau Mau) 1952. For SOS wars in dataset 3: UK/Kenya (Mau Mau) 1952; 
France/Algeria 1954; Portugal/Angola 1961; Portugal/Mozambique 1964. 
37 Note that I have performed a complete replication study of Fearon`s (2004) analysis which is placed in 
Appendix B. Note that I cannot test the effect of the end of the Cold War in dataset 1 as the included year 
variable only contains information for when each conflict started and not when they ended. Consequently, a 
dummy for this variable would only show whether it is more likely for a SOS to start before or after the end of 
the Cold War. 
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and possible influential outliers in all three datasets (Ward et al 2010:363). The rest of this 
chapter is laid out as follows: First, I introduce the relevant variables and coding of dataset 1, 
before I move on to the coding of important variables in dataset 2 and 3. 
5.3 Dataset 1 
Rather than just start throwing independent variables at such a diverse list, I decided 
to proceed inductively, sorting the cases by duration and looking for striking patterns. 
                              Fearon (2004:278). 
Dataset 1 has coded civil wars based on the following criteria: (1) They involve fighting 
between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, non-state groups who sought either 
to take control of a government, take power in a region, or use violence to change government 
policies. (2) The conflict killed at least 1,000 people over its course, with a yearly average of 
at least 100. (3) At least 100 were killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels). 
(4) If one of the main parties in the conflict was defeated or otherwise dropped out, it is a new 
war if the fighting continues. (5) The start year is the first year in which 100 people were 
killed or in which a violent event occurred, followed by a sequence of actions that came to 
satisfy the primary criteria (Fearon 2004:279). (6) The war is coded as ended by observation 
of military victory, wholesale demobilization, or truce, or peace agreement followed by at 
least two years of peace. By comparing the civil war`s duration from 1945 to 1999, Fearon 
(2004) identifies five categories of civil war to be strongly correlated with the duration as they 
end either more quickly or last longer than other civil wars (Fearon 2004:277): 
Coup/revolution, Eastern Europe and not-contiguous wars tend to be brief; civil wars where 
the fighting is funded by contraband or SOS wars last longer38.  
5.3.1 Five Categories of Civil Wars 
Coups and popular revolutions 
Several civil wars display violence during or after coup attempts or popular revolutions in 
capital cities, or they are brief popular revolutions which involves mass uprisings and 
                                                 
38 Note that some cases have none of the five attributes (47), some cases have just one (68), some have two (12), 
and some has three. The most common overlap is between not-contiguity and SOS wars (6), while some cases 
are coded both SOS and contraband financed (4) (Fearon 2004:284).  
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demonstrations in the capital city in support of efforts to unseat a dictatorial regime (Fearon 
2004:280). A popular revolution is defined as a civil war which involves mass demonstrations 
in the capital city in favor of deposing the regime in power, while a coup-related civil war is 
defined as a civil war between groups that aim to take control of a state, and that are led by 
individuals who were recently members of the state`s central government, including the 
armed forces39. According to Fearon (2004:297): 
“Wars originating as coups or popular revolutions have tended to be short because the `technology´ for 
taking state power turns on the success or failure of a rapid tipping process- hoped-for defections within the 
security apparatus”. 
Civil wars in Eastern Europe 
Fearon (2004) has sorted all civil wars by region and found that the Eastern European cases 
display similar patterns as they tend to be brief. Some of them are related to the fall of 
communism, and most of them have had the support from a strong power which allows for 
decisive rebel victories at an early stage against weak states (Fearon 2004:298).  
Table 5.1.  Estimated Median and Mean Civil War Duration by Region 
Region Median Mean N 
Eastern Europe 2.3 3.2 13 
North Africa 4.7 6.7 17 
Western Europe + 
US/Canada/Japan* 
6.0 8.5 15 
Latin America 6.9 9.8 15 
Sub-Saharan Africa 9.1 13.1 34 
Asia 12.2 17.5 34 
* 13 anti-colonial wars + Northern Ireland (1969-99) and Greece (1945-49). Source: Fearon (2004:282) 
Not-Contiguous Civil Wars 
Cases included in this category are colonial wars (13) or cases in which the rebel group 
operated primarily on land separated from the land mass of the capital city by at least 200 
kilometers of water or by international boundaries (9). Fearon (2004:282) has collapsed these 
cases because of two assumptions; it is materially costly to carry a war effort across the 
ocean; the norm holding that a proper state is territorially contiguous might cut against a 
                                                 
39 Typical coup-related civil war is cases such as Argentina in 1955 or Paraguay in 1947, while typical popular 
revolution-cases are Cuba in 1958, Iran in 1978 and Nicaragua in 1978. 
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government`s efforts to gain domestic and international support for such wars (Fearon 
2004:282) 40. 
Contraband 
Fearon (2004:283) argues that the use by rebel groups of finances from contraband such as 
cocaine, precious gems or opium, dramatically prolong the duration of civil wars. However, 
contraband is not the only source of finance for rebel groups, as support from foreign states or 
ethnic diasporas may also help the rebels to sustain a long-running war41.  
Sons of the Soil 
A SOS war is a civil war in which an insurgent band fighting on behalf of an ethnic minority 
group in the periphery of a state dominated by another ethnic group; against the state`s 
military or paramilitary formations, and/or members of the majority group who have settled as 
farmers in the minority group`s declared home area; and involves either land conflict with 
migrant from the dominant group or profits and control for fuel or mineral resources in the 
minority`s home area (Fearon 2004:283). A SOS war involves a conflict between members of 
a minority ethnic group concentrated in some region of a country, and relatively recent, 
ethnically distinct migrants to this region from other parts of the same country.  
5.3.2 New Coding in Dataset 1 
I downloaded Fearon`s (2004) replication dataset from the Journal of Peace Research`s 
replication data website which includes a dta-file and a do-file42. Further, I merged the 
incompatibility variable from the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset into Fearon`s (2004) 
dataset as the variable identifies whether the belligerents were fighting over territory or 
                                                 
40  Fearon argues that wars against formal colonial empires such as French Algeria or the Mau Mau rebellion in 
Kenya satisfy the criteria of civil wars, but claims that these cases are often excluded as they are assumed to be 
international wars or assigned to Algeria instead of France (Fearon 2004:282). This may be due to the fact that 
civil war is a war between parties within a state and that colonial regimes were not proper states as the colonial 
territories were separated from the metropoles by water and succeeded in their national liberation wars. Fearon 
(2004:282) argues that this is an ex post assessment of what is a proper state results in misguided coding as 
Algeria was French at the time of the rebellion and should not be coded based on the outcome.    
41 Cases in which contraband has played a vital role since 1945 are Colombia (cocaine; 37 years to 2000 as 
coded in Fearon 2004), Angola (diamonds; 25 years to 2000), and Sierra Leone (diamonds; 9 years to 2000).  
42 A dta-file is a Stata dataset, while a do-file is the list of commands. 
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government43. When I coded the incompatibility variable into dataset 1, there were eleven 
civil wars which could not be identified adequately. Consequently, there are eleven cases 
missing when I use the incompatibility and termination variable44.  
Table 5.2. Descriptive Statistics for Dataset 1 
Variable  Observations Mean  Std.dev Minimum Maximum 
SOS 128 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Territory 117 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Territory*SOS 117 0.13 0.34 0 1 
GDP/Capita (lagged) 125 7.13 0.93 3.91 9.01 
Population (lagged) 128 9.72 1.59 6.08 13.94 
Duration 128 8.75 9.56 1 52 
Outcome  117 2.62 1.35 0 5 
 
5.4 Dataset 2 and 3 
Dataset 2 and 3 are based on the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset (hereafter the UCDP 
dataset) which is based on the UCDP-PRIO Armed Conflict dataset 45. It introduces conflict 
episodes defined as years of continuous use of armed force in a conflict, which allows for a 
deeper understanding of countries with multiple conflicts as well as recurring armed violence 
in post-conflict environment (Kreutz 2010:243). This gives even more detail and nuances to 
the analysis46. Further, as the UCDP dataset is disaggregated with a low threshold for lethality 
it may contribute to a deeper understanding of duration and terminations of SOS wars 
compared to other low-intensity wars. 
                                                 
43 In most cases I have identified the correct wars based on country and rebel group and/or territory and used the 
start year as a guideline due to differences in criteria`s and lethality threshold, while I had to use secondary 
literature in few cases to ensure that it was the right civil wars. This has been most important for civil wars in 
Iran, Afghanistan and Yemen as these are countries which have experienced many civil wars in which some 
conflicts overlap in years and where the rebel groups merge or split. 
44 The missing-cases are: Colombia (La Violencia) 1948; Belgium (Rwandan Revolution) 1956; Central African 
Republic (Fractional fighting) 1996; Congo (Fractional fighting) 1998; Burundi (Hutu uprising) 1972; Burundi 
(Org. massacres in both sides) 1988; Rwanda (Post-rev strife) 1962; Zimbabwe (Ndebele guer`s) 1983; Turkey 
(Militia-ized party politics) 1977; Jordan (Fedeyeen/Syria v. govt) 1970; China (Xinjiang) 1991. The latter case 
is a SOS war, the rest of the cases are non-SOS wars. It is surprising that Fearon (2004) would have civil wars 
the UCDP doesn’t, as the former has stricter criteria’s.  
45 This thesis uses the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset Version 2010-1 – November 2010 (Kreutz 2010). 
Although, the dataset offers information of interstate, intrastate conflicts and a dyad-level dataset, the following 
analysis will only include the information of the dataset on intrastate conflicts and some of the extra state wars. 
46 The following coding-rules are based on the 2010 update of the codebook, corresponding with the conflict-
level datasets 2010-1. Due to space and relevance only the coding of essential variables will be mentioned. 
Please Kreutz (2010) or the website of Uppsala Conflict Data Program for a detailed codebook of the UCDP 
dataset. 
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Armed Conflict 
The start date of each conflict episode is the data when a conflict becomes active according to 
three criteria: (1) a stated incompatibility, (2) organized groups of which at least one is the 
government of a state, (3) armed activity resulting in at least 25 battle deaths, all of which 
must be observed in a given calendar year (Kreutz 2010:244). A conflict episode ends when 
an active year is followed by a year in which there are fewer than 25 battle-related deaths. All 
of the three criteria are considered equally important.  
Incompatibility 
Incompatibility concerning government denotes incompatible positions regarding the state`s 
type of political system or the composition of the government or an aim to replace the current 
government. Incompatibility concerning territory refers to incompatible positions regarding 
the status of a territory and may involve demands for secession or autonomy or the aim of 
changing the state that controls a territory (Harbom and Wallensteen 2009:104).The stated 
incompatibility is what the parties claim to be fighting over. In the UCDP dataset 
incompatibility is coded in three categories: 1= Territory; 2= Government; 3= Government 
and Territory. However, as none of the civil wars in the dataset were over government and 
territory, I have dummy coded incompatibility: 1 = Territory and 0=Government.    
Coding of SOS Conflict Episodes 
First, I dummy coded all SOS wars from Fearon`s (2004) dataset and the updated list of SOS 
wars (Fearon and Laitin 2011) into the UCDP dataset, which translates it to dataset 247. 
Secondly, I created dataset 3 by copying dataset 2 before I collapsed conflict episodes which 
differ less than five years from previous end year to following start year. It is important to 
differentiate between the initial list of SOS wars from 2004 (Fearon 2004) and the updated list 
of SOS from 2011 (Fearon and Laitin 2011), as several of the SOS conflicts have been 
replaced. To simplify it, the dummy variables are called SOS2004 and SOS2011, where 
SOS2004 is the SOS wars from the 2004 version, and SOS2011 are the SOS wars from the 
updated list. Further, I have called them the same in both dataset 2 and 3. Thus, dataset 2 
includes 371 conflict episodes, 62 SOS2004 episodes and 61 SOS2011 conflict episodes. 
                                                 
47 The start date and duration of the civil wars does not always correspond between the UCDP Conflict 
Termination dataset (Kreutz 2010) and Fearon (2004) as they operate with different thresholds and criteria’s for 
civil wars. Therefore, I identified the correct cases by rebel group and location, and to some extent year. 
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Dataset 3 includes 245 conflict episodes, 22 SOS2004 conflict episodes and 32 SOS 2011 
conflict episodes. 
Conflict Termination 
Conflict termination focuses on at least one year of non-activity or when the conflict ceases. 
Non-activity in this sense mean that the criteria with regards to incompatibility, level of 
organization, and 25 battle-related deaths are not met. Concerning the information about type 
of termination, the coding is based on observations about the relations between the parties in 
the last year of activity and the first year of non-activity that follows. The UCDP dataset 
include 6 different types of termination in the intrastate conflict dataset, but includes 7 
different categories in the variable as ongoing remains in the variable: 0=ongoing; 1= Peace 
agreement; 2= Ceasefire agreement with conflict regulation; 3= Ceasefire agreement without 
regulation; 4= Military victory; 5= Low activity; 6= Other outcome (Kreutz 2010).   
Peace agreement 
A peace agreement is an agreement concerned with the resolution of the incompatibility 
signed/ or publicly accepted by all, or the main, actors in the conflict (Kreutz 2010:245). At a 
minimum the agreement addresses the central issues of contention. Civil wars which were 
terminated by a peace agreement are those where agreements were signed during the last year 
of conflict activity or the first year of inactivity that follows. The focus is thus on the signing 
or a verbal commitment by both parties to an agreement, and not whether the agreement is 
implemented or not (Kreutz 2010:245).  
Ceasefire 
The UCDP dataset separates between ceasefire agreements with and without conflict 
regulation. The following analysis will collapse these two categories as I do not believe that I 
loose important information by combining them, but rather improve the pattern of termination 
by doing so. A ceasefire is an agreement between all or the main actors in the last year of the 
conflict or the first year of inactivity in which terminates military operations. It may only 
consist of a pledge to stop fighting, or can include additional measures such as demobilization 
or withdrawal of forces (Kreutz 2010:245). In cases when a ceasefire agreement with conflict 
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regulation is immediately followed by a more comprehensive peace agreement, the latter is 
considered the main cause of termination.  
Military victory 
A victory is when one side in an armed conflict is either defeated or eliminated, or otherwise 
succumbs through capitulation, surrender, or similar public announcement (Kreutz 2010:244).  
Other outcome = Low Activity or Any Other Theoretical Outcome 
Other outcome is the fourth and most important termination method in this dataset, as Kreutz 
(2010:245) argues that this category is the most common type of termination. It includes the 
low activity category and other outcome. The low activity category includes cases where 
fighting is still reported, but does not reach the 25 battle deaths. This category includes 
possible unofficial ceasefires and delayed military victories, but also cases in which there is a 
lull in the fighting because the rebel group reorganize, split or are involved with other armed 
actions. Any other theoretical outcome includes cases when the government is defeated in 
another conflict, the country ceases to exist, or the rebel group merges into another rebel 
group but continues to be active. In some cases the conflict may continue although under the 
death threshold. A party may withdraw for tactical reasons, leadership changes, or change to a 
non-violent strategy. There are also cases where one of the actors are defeated in another 
simultaneous conflict, or simply withdraws (Kreutz 2010:245). Thus, low activity and any 
other theoretical outcome consist of cases where the conflict ceases without a victory or any 
type of agreement (Kreutz 2010:245).  
Kreutz (2010:245) collapses low activity and any other theoretical outcome into one category 
called other outcome and claims that these are the most common outcome whether we look at 
the aggregated totals or separate types of conflict. Consequently, he argues that differentiating 
between these categories may contribute to a deeper understanding within the civil war 
literature, as the previous studies have failed to single out this termination method. Kreutz 
(2010:243) claims that the two latter categories largely present the general trend and pattern 
among both intrastate and interstate wars as conflicts tends to end more often under unclear 
circumstances where fighting simply ceases. Kreutz (2010:246) finds i.e. that only one-third 
of intrastate conflicts end in military victory, while the majority of intrastate conflicts end 
without any decisive outcomes.  
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Table 5.3. Intrastate Conflict Terminations over Time  
1946-89 Intrastate Conflict % 
Peace agreement 12 8.5 
Ceasefire 2 1.4 
Victory 82 58.2 
Other outcome 45 31.9 
Total 141 100 
1990-2005   
Peace agreement 27 18.4 
Ceasefire 29 19.7 
Victory 20 13.6 
Other outcome 71 48.3 
Total 147 100 
Source: Kreutz 2010 
5.4.1 Recoding Outcome 
The outcome variable in the dataset is the most relevant variable in this thesis, and I have 
made a few changes. The first is fairly unproblematic as I combine ceasefire and ceasefire 
with regulation to one category as I do not lose valid information by combining them. The 
category of other outcome is more problematic. Other outcome includes low activity and any 
other theoretical outcome, although the category is clearly dominated by low activity48. As a 
large share of the civil war episodes seems to end in low activity, the treatment of this 
category is theoretically important both generally and for the analysis. Although, Kreutz 
(2010) argues that the category is very important, he offers a very broad definition of it which 
makes it difficult to achieve a clear understanding of it, and one may argue conflicting 
arguments for what this category actually includes. 
In addition to representing cases where there is a lull in fighting, low or no activity may also 
be interpreted as an unofficial ceasefire, where there is no formal agreement. In the case of 
SOS wars over territory, this may mean that the government avoids or stops in- migration of 
the ethnic majority group into the traditional homeland of the ethnic minority group. In cases 
of SOS over natural resources the government may forgo the goal of monopoly exploitation 
of the natural resources in the homeland of sons-of-the-soil.  
                                                 
48 This is only apparent when I run my own analysis, as Kreutz (2010) combine them in his analysis, although 
they are separated in the dataset. Due to few units/ empty cells with “any other theoretical outcome” I have to 
collapse it with “low activity” in the analysis, and therefore also in the descriptive statistics. 
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However, low or no activity may also be a delayed or possibly represent a less dramatic 
military victory. In the case of SOS wars the ethnic minority group may simply give up the 
idea of an autonomous homeland, and put down their guns without the dramatic end military 
victories often imply. Although, this may be less likely according to the explanation of SOS, 
as the minority ethnic group would fear the loss of their homeland or scarce resources to the 
majority ethnic group. Kreutz (2010) may argue that this category reports cases in which the 
fighting is simply put on hold by the rebels or government to i.e. reorganize. As the “low 
activity” category includes so many cases it is crucial that we gain a thorough understanding 
of it, otherwise empirical studies stand to make basic mistakes and future analysis may report 
misleading results which may lead to even more conflicting results within the literature of 
civil war.   
I treat “low activity” and “any other theoretical outcome” as “other outcome” because Kreutz 
(2010) does the same in his analysis. Since “any other theoretical outcome” has so few units 
or often empty cells it reports insignificant result. Thus, the interpretation of the cases which 
end in this category may seem complicated, as some of these may be caused by a lull in 
fighting or de facto ceasefires or military victories. However, since I have not found 
convincing arguments to leave the “other category” unchanged or used as one of the more 
traditional categories; I have chosen to experiment with the category in the multinomial 
analysis using dataset 249. The treatment of this category is only relevant for the multinomial 
as it test the likelihood of a SOS war ending in military victory relative to other categories. I 
have created three different variables based on Kreutz (2010) outcome variable which I use in 
dataset 2: one variable where I treat “other outcome” as a separate category; one variable 
where I collapse “other outcome with ceasefire; and one where I collapse “other outcome” 
with military victory50. Although, this does not solve the debate on how to treat this category, 
I want to see how it affects the termination SOS conflict episodes in the analyses.  
 
                                                 
49 Dataset 2 is the only dataset in which an overwhelming number of civil wars are terminated by other outcome, 
this may indicate that this category is most needed when the dataset is disaggregated to the extent the initial 
UCDP dataset is. It may also indicate that most of the cases in other outcome are correctly coded, as dataset 3 
includes fewer lulls in fighting due to collapsed conflict episodes. Dataset 3 does not include nearly as many 
conflict episodes which end in other outcome. See Appendix C for a detailed list of the termination of SOS 
conflict episodes using dataset 3. Note that Appendix E includes two tables which display how SOS conflict 
episodes and other conflict episodes were terminated using dataset 2.  
50 The multinomial analyses using dataset 2 are placed in Appendix E. 
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5.4.2 Post-Cold War Dummy 
I have generated a dummy variable for the post-Cold War period to test the difference in the 
duration of SOS wars before and after 1991, which I use in dataset 2 and 3. It is relevant to 
control for the end of the Cold War as it is regarded as an important turning point for 
increased intervention. Since SOS wars are low-intensity conflicts, they are very likely to 
have been neglected during the Cold War, or it is plausible that intervention was vetoed by 
the superpowers in the UN Security Council during the Cold War51. If the primary obstacle of 
ending a SOS war is a commitment problem and there has been a trend of increased 
intervention, the duration and means of termination of SOS wars may have changed 
considerably. By following the logic of this argument, the duration of SOS wars after the end 
of the Cold War may have been shortened to a larger degree than other civil wars in which 
termination is hindered for other causes. 
Some object to the use of a Cold War dummy as they claim it is theoretically unsatisfying and 
simplistic (Weinstein 2007). It has also been suggested that a Cold War dummy only 
introduces an “extra variable into the vector of predictors of conflict likelihood”, or in this 
case conflict duration (Brown and Langer 2011:189). Therefore, the Cold War dummy may 
only illustrate whether there was a statistically significant chance of longer or shorter 
duration, ceteris paribus, during the Cold War (Brown and Langer 2011:189). Consequently, 
it is suggested they that the interpretation of this variable is unsatisfactory because it gives no 
idea why the chances of conflict or duration of civil war were higher or lower during the Cold 
War, unless we “indulge in speculative assignment of interpretations” (Brown and Langer 
2011:189).  
However, the end of the Cold War is largely understood as a turning point for the 
international community`s increased intervention (Lacina 2004; Collier et al 2009). Collier 
and Hoeffler (2004) interpret their Cold War variable as a proxy for the availability of outside 
funding to rebel organizations, although Brown and Langer (2011:189) claim that this may 
just be one of many possible impacts of the Cold War. The dummy variable may work as a 
proxy for i.e. a more globalized world, increased intervention or the CNN-effect where media 
shows more interests and focuses more on conflicts in peripheral parts of the world, which are 
all symptoms of a more interventionist international community. Consequently, I interpret the 
                                                 
51 Note that Asian countries which were regarded important during the Cold War such as Afghanistan has no 
SOS wars. 
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post-Cold War dummy as a proxy for the increased attention and intervention by the 
international community in intrastate conflicts. If the duration and means of termination of 
SOS wars have changed after 1991 it may indicate that increased intervention has ameliorated 
the commitment problem.  
Table 5.4. Descriptive Statistics for Dataset 3 
Variable  Observations Mean  Std.dev Minimum Maximum 
SOS2004 245 0.08 0.28 0 1 
SOS2011 245 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Territory 245 0.46 0.49 0 1 
Territory*SOS2004 245 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Territory*SOS2011 245 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Post-Cold War 245 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Post-Cold War*SOS2004 245 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Post-Cold War*SOS2011 245 0.07 0.26 0 1 
GPD/Capita (logged) 197 6.95 1.35 3.49 10.49 
Population (logged) 212 9.84 1.75 5.95 13.96 
Outcome 245 2.47 1.39 0 4 
Duration  245 7.72 11.1 1 60 
5.4.3 Independent Variables in Dataset 2 and 3 
A wide range of independent variables have been controlled for in conflicts studies, but GDP 
per capita and population size are the only control variables which appear robust (Brown and 
Langer 2011:188).  Fearon and Laitin (2002) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) agree that GDP 
per capita and other surrogate variables for modernization/economic development are crucial 
predictors of the risk of armed conflict (Mack 2002:519; Sambanis 2002a:217). Ceteris 
paribus, as GDP rises the incidence of war falls (Mack 2008:521). As rich countries are 
relatively peaceful and poor countries seem to suffer more civil wars it may seem as if 
development is the best from of conflict prevention (Mack 2002:521). Therefore, the 
empirical studies on civil war have concluded that the risk of civil war decreases as average 
income increases and the size of a country`s population decreases (Hegre and Sambanis 
2006:509; Ward et al 2010:363). Consequently, it has become more of norm to include GDP 
per capita and population size into the analysis, although it has been suggested that the latter 
may be unnecessary once SOS is included (Fearon and Laitin 2011). As dataset 2 and 3 does 
not include any control variables, I have implemented GDP per capita and population size 
from the Penn World Tables dataset (PWT). The PWT dataset only includes information of 
GDP and population from 1950 and excludes Myanmar, which creates 48 missing data points 
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for the GDP per capita variable and 30 missing values for the population variable in dataset 
352. Although, this is not ideal, it is the best alternative as I find it important to include these 
control variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 Note that the value of the logged population and logged GDP per capita represent the value of the year civil 
war broke out. The GDP per capita variable includes more missing values than the population variable on some 
of the relevant cases, as it is often difficult to gather information regarding GDP during a war. Further, SOS 
cases like the civil wars in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania drop out because we do not have information of GDP 
per capita for these countries during the Cold War. The PWT dataset does not include population for Algeria in 
1954 and Angola in 1961, but I coded in the values for respectively, 1960 and 1970 to include them in the 
analysis when using the control variables.  
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6 The Analysis 
The following analyses will use only dataset 1 and 3. I have organized the analysis chapter by 
hypotheses, as the first part focuses on hypothesis 1 and 2 which examines the influence of 
incompatibility and duration, while the second part addresses hypothesis 3 and 4 which is on 
the nature of termination and the effect of the end of the Cold War53. 
The idea that commitment problems are important obstacles to reaching stable 
regional autonomy deals is advanced here as a theoretical conjecture that has implications 
consistent with the empirical record. Future research might profitably investigate whether or 
how this mechanism matters in particular cases.  
                                  Fearon (2004:298) 
6.1 SOS Wars Over Territory or Government? 
H1a: SOS wars involves either land conflict or dispute over natural resources, consequently 
SOS conflicts are over territory, not government 
There are large differences between civil wars where the belligerents are fighting over 
territory or government, as the former tend to be more local and low-intensity, but longer-
lasting. SOS wars tend to be the longest lasting civil wars because of their dynamic between 
the ethnic minority group and the ethnic majority group who fight over territory or natural 
resources. By following the logic of the SOS explanation, the sons-of-the-soil have no 
political ambitions, but are concerned with in-migration and is caused by competition over 
scarce resources such as land, jobs, educational quotas, government services, or natural 
resources . Consequently, all SOS wars should be over territory and not the fight for 
governmental power. To test whether SOS wars are over territory I have created table 6.1, 
which is based on dataset 1 and displays whether the belligerents in the different types of civil 
wars were fighting over territory or government. 
Table 6.1 shows that coups and revolutions have been most often over government, which is 
not surprising. Most of the civil wars in the category of Eastern Europe are related to the fall 
of communism, where all but one was over territory. The not-contiguous category and SOS 
                                                 
53 As dataset 2 separates SOS wars into more conflict episodes than non-SOS wars because of the nature of SOS 
wars, the results may be misleading and the coefficients are most often insignificant. However, I have performed 
the same analysis in dataset 2 as with dataset 3, where the results from the former are included in the appendix. 
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wars display the same pattern, as the belligerents were fighting over territory in 19 of the 21 
cases. Civil wars which include the contraband factor are over government in two thirds of the 
cases. Most of the SOS wars correspond with the SOS explanation, as 16 of the 20 cases were 
over territory.  
Table 6.1. Estimates of Civil War over Territory or Government  
Type of civil war Territory Government Total 
Coup/Revolution 5 16 21 
Eastern Europe 12 1 13 
Not Contiguous 19 2 21 
Sons of the Soil 16 4 20 
Contraband 6 11 17 
Total  58 34 92 
Source: Fearon 2004 and Kreutz 2010 
To test whether the difference of type of war over territory is statistically significant we can 
perform chi-squared tests. The smaller chi-square signifies that the null hypothesis is true, 
conversely, the larger it is the more certain we are that we can reject the null hypothesis. 
Therefore, the test measures the degree of deviance between the theoretical and the observed 
data. I collapse the other types of civil war to one group in order to test whether there is a 
statistical difference for civil wars over territory between SOS and non-SOS.     
H0: There is no correlation between SOS wars and territory. 
H1: There is a correlation between SOS wars and territory. 
Simple calculations of expected and observed values show that chi-square is 3.15 and since I 
have collapsed all non-SOS wars into one category the df = 1. Usually, we want to reject the 
null hypothesis at a 95 percent level, meaning p < 0,05. In this case chi-squared  is too small 
to be significant on a 5 percent level, although it is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level. Consequently, we cannot reject the null hypothesis as the relationship between SOS 
wars and territory is not statistically significant. The chi-squared test shows that there is no 
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correlation between SOS wars and wars over government. Since there are some SOS wars 
over government we may reject H1a.  
6.2 The Duration of SOS Wars 
H1b: SOS wars over territory last longer than SOS wars over government 
H2: SOS wars last longer than other civil wars when tested on a lower battle-death threshold 
The following analyses test the remaining hypotheses which mostly focus on the duration and 
changes in duration of SOS wars due to certain factors54. Thus, to replicate Fearon`s (2004) 
analysis and to test whether SOS over government or territory last longer, whether SOS 
conflict episodes last longer than other conflict episodes, and whether SOS last longer after 
the end of the Cold War, I use a Weibull analysis55. In this thesis the Weibull analysis 
measures how each variable would affect the duration of a conflict episode relative to if it was 
not present. This means that the duration of all the conflict episodes which exhibit this factor 
is compared to the duration of all the conflict episodes in the dataset which do not include that 
factor56.  
Fearon (2004:283) argues that SOS wars last longer than other civil wars as his analysis 
reveals that the estimated median and mean for non-SOS wars are 5.8 and 8.5 years, 
compared to 23.2 and 33.7 years for SOS wars. As I want to display the difference in the 
duration of SOS wars and other civil wars using dataset 1, I use a Kaplan-Meier graph as it 
illustrates the probability of the duration of civil wars and the proportion of ongoing for each 
category included. Thus, Figure 6.1 is a Kaplan-Meier graph using dataset 1 to illustrate the 
probability of survival past time t for SOS wars compared to non-SOS wars (Cleves et al 
2004:93). The figure shows large differences in the survivor function of SOS2004 wars and 
non-SOS wars as the graph clearly displays that SOS wars last longer than other civil wars. It 
also illustrates that the proportion of other ongoing civil wars drops quicker than SOS wars. 
                                                 
54 The only exemption is the multinomial analysis and predicted probabilities which is concerned with how the 
SOS wars were terminated. 
55 As I had to stset dataset 2 and 3 before performing the Weibull analysis I followed the stsetting of Fearon 
(2004). Thus, I created two variable called cumduryrs: one in dataset 2 and one in dataset 3, which counts the 
duration of each conflict episode. Thus, I stset using cumduryrs and failure is obviously ended which is a dummy 
variable that Kreutz (2010) has already coded in UCDP dataset. 
56 Note that the coefficients in a Weibull analysis are called covariates. The interpretation of the covariates is 
rather simple, although I will also include more information and interpretation when I comment on the analyses.  
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Figure 6.1 displays that SOS wars last longer compared to other civil wars and that the 
proportion of ongoing SOS wars decreases at a slower rate than other civil wars.  
Figure 6.1. Kaplan-Meier Estimate of SOS Wars and Non-SOS Wars 
  
To test whether these differences are statistically significant I use the log-rank test, which is 
one of several available nonparametric tests which allow testing the equality of survivor 
functions (Cleves et al 2004:113) 57. The log-rank test indicates statistically significant 
difference (p< 0.001) between SOS wars and other civil wars, which indicates that we may 
accept H258. However, this analysis is performed using dataset 1, while the difference in 
duration between SOS conflict episodes and other intrastate conflict could be different in 
dataset 3 as the battle-death threshold is lower and consequently includes more low-intensity 
civil wars. 
Figure 6.2 and 6.3 are Kaplan-Meier graphs using dataset 3 to illustrate the probability of 
survival past time t for SOS conflict episodes and other intrastate conflict episodes (Cleves et 
al 2004:93). By comparing these three Kaplan-Meier graphs we see that the difference in 
proportion of ongoing SOS wars compared to other civil wars, and their predicted duration 
seems more extreme in Figure 6.1. However, Figure 6.2 also indicate large differences in 
survival probability between SOS2004 and other conflict episodes, while Figure 6.3 indicates 
less difference between SOS2011 conflict episodes and non-SOS conflict episodes. The 
Kaplan-Meier graphs illustrate large differences in the probability of survival time for 
                                                 
57 The log-rank test is a global test which compares the overall survival functions and compares the expected 
versus the observed number of failures for each group, and combines these comparisons over all observed failure 
times. The log-rank test is a rank test, but it can be viewed as an extension of the familiar Mantel-Haenszel test 
applied to survival data (Cleves et al 2004:114). Note that these tests do not test the equality of the survivor 
functions at a specific time point, which means that i.e. the difference between SOS wars and non-SOS wars 
after the end of the Cold War cannot be tested here (Cleves et al 2004: 113). 
58 See Appendix F for the do-file conducting the analyses in this section.  
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SOS2004 conflict episodes relative to other intrastate conflict episodes, while the SOS2011 
indicate fewer differences. Since dataset 2 shows no difference between SOS conflict 
episodes and other conflict episodes this confirms that the coding of conflict episodes does 
have an effect on the outcome of duration. This justifies my recoding of SOS conflict 
episodes in dataset 3. 
Figure 6.2 and 6.3. Kaplan-Meier Estimates of SOS Wars and Non-SOS Wars 
 
To test whether these displayed differences are statistically different, I use the log-rank test 
for Figure 6.2 (P<0.001) and Figure 6.3 (P=0.001), which confirms that the pattern displayed 
in the Kaplan-Meier graphs is statistically significant. Thus, both dataset 1 and 3 indicate that 
the difference in duration between SOS and other civil wars is highly statistically different59. 
Additionally, the updated list of SOS given by Fearon and Laitin (2011) confirms that SOS 
wars last longer than other civil wars. To test these differences further, I replicate Fearon`s 
(2004) analysis using both dataset 1 and 3.   
6.2.1 Testing SOS Duration and Territory in Dataset 1  
In this section I perform a replication study of Fearon`s analysis using dataset 1, before I 
include the Territory variable to test whether SOS wars over territory last longer than SOS 
wars over government. I also perform the same analysis using dataset 3 with both SOS2004 
and SOS2011, as I want to know whether the results differ between dataset 1 and 3, but also 
whether SOS2004 and SOS2011 produce different results. After each analysis I test 
influential outliers using dfbeta, before I reject or confirm H1b and H2.   
                                                 
59 Dataset 2 finds no statistically significant difference between SOS2004 and other intrastate conflict episodes, 
while some difference for SOS2011.  
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To replicate Fearon`s (2004) analysis I use a multivariate Weibull analysis, which is a 
parametric approach which is based on a general Weibull distribution (Hamilton 2009:323). 
The Weibull distribution allows the failure to increase or decrease over time, and the model 
implies that ln(-ln(S(t))) is a function of ln(t) (Hamilton 2009:323). The covariates are 
reported in time ratio form, consequently it reports the estimate of change in war duration 
when a factor is present (Fearon 2004:284)60. The interpretation of the covariates are rather 
simple as the reported covariates are the multiple by which the expected war duration is 
estimated to change when the factor is present, i.e. the average duration of a SOS war lasts 
more than three times longer (3.102) than a case without the attribute. Consequently, the 
expected duration increases by a factor of more than three for SOS cases. This means that 
covariates which are above 1 indicate a longer duration, while covariates below 1 predict a 
short duration, i.e. coups and revolutions tend to be brief, consequently, their covariate reports 
a duration of 0.320, which means they last three times shorter compared to cases without this 
attribute.  
Table 6.2 (Model 1) displays Fearon`s (2004) basic model and the covariate which is highly 
statistically significant indicates that SOS wars last three times longer (3.102) that civil wars 
without this attribute. Model 2 includes the same variables as Model 1, but excludes Indonesia 
as 4 of the 20 SOS cases in dataset 1 are placed in Indonesia61. This affects the covariate 
(2.667) and the significance of the SOS variable from significant on a 1 percent level to 5 
percent level in model 2. However, the exclusion of Indonesia does not affect it more than 
what we would expect as the SOS variable has few units, and indicates that it is not Indonesia 
which is driving the significance of the SOS variable.   
Model 3 includes Indonesia again, but also a dummy variable which differentiates between 
civil wars over territory and government as SOS wars are supposedly caused by the dispute of 
territory, but also because civil wars are assumed to last longer if they are over territory62. 
However, the covariate of the territory variable is negative (0.865) and not statistically 
significant, nor does it affect the significance of the SOS variable. To further ensure that the 
SOS variable does not capture the effect of territory, I exclude SOS from model 4 which 
                                                 
60 Note that all covariates in the following Weibull analyses are reported in time ratio. 
61 Note that Indonesia has several wars in dataset 1, consequently 4 SOS wars and 3 non-SOS wars are excluded 
which decreases the observations from 128 to 121.  
62 Note that 11 cases are excluded as they cannot be found in the UCDP dataset, consequently 1 SOS case and 10 
non-SOS are not included in the remaining models in the table. See footnote in method chapter for which cases 
this concerns. 
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makes little difference to the result on the territory variable. This proves that SOS wars are 
not sensitive to the inclusion of territory in the model.  
Table  6.2. Determinants of Civil War Duration using Dataset 1, 1945-1999 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Coup/Revolution 0.320*** 0.317*** 0.291*** 0.300*** 0.273*** 
 (-5.36) (-5.56) (-5.61) (-5.16) (-5.95) 
Eastern Europe 0.330*** 0.325*** 0.325*** 0.311*** 0.320*** 
 (-4.21) (-4.40) (-4.00) (-3.84) (-4.13) 
Not-contiguous 0.684 0.705 0.690 0.899 0.647 
 (-1.62) (-1.45) (-1.39) (-0.37) (-1.68) 
Contraband 2.562** 2.517** 2.270* 2.975** 2.023* 
 (2.76) (2.78) (2.44) (3.07) (2.14) 
SOS 3.102*** 2.667** 3.017***  0.899 
 (3.86) (3.20) (3.79)  (-0.22) 
Territory   0.865 1.102 0.789 
   (-0.67) (0.43) (-1.10) 
Territory*SOS     4.483* 
     (2.56) 
N 128 121 117 117 117 
Log lik. -160.5 -149.3 -143.3 -152.0 -140.8 
Chi-squared 72.35 69.89 70.49 53.11 75.52 
N (ended) 103 98 93 93 93 
Source: Fearon 2004 and Kreutz 2010. Weibull regression with duration in years as the dependent variable. The 
coefficients are reported in the estimated multiplicative effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable 
on mean war duration; e.g. .32 means that a one-unit change is associated with a reduction in mean war duration 
by a factor of about three. T-statistics are in parentheses. Estimations performed by using Stata 11.0. 
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
To test whether SOS is really driven by the fight over territory I created an interaction term 
with SOS and the incompatibility variable (SOS*Territory) in Model 5. If SOS cases are 
really over territory this variable should be highly statistically significant with a large 
covariate63. Model 5 displays that the SOS covariate which now measures the duration for 
SOS wars over government is not statistically significant and drops to a negative predicted 
                                                 
63 Note that the interpretation of the covariates changes when I include an interaction term.  
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duration, which means that SOS wars over government tend to be brief (0.899). Further, the 
territory variable is still not statistically significant, and indicates an even shorter duration for 
other conflict episodes over territory (0.789) than SOS wars over government. The 
Territory*SOS variable measures the duration of SOS wars over territory. This is statistically 
significant on a 5 percent level and the covariate increases from  3.102 in the basic model to 
4.483. This means that SOS wars over territory last 4.483 times longer than civil wars which 
do not include this attribute. As SOS2004 and territory may drop in significance due to 
inflated standard errors and fewer observations I test the joint significance of SOS2004, 
territory and SOS*Territory, which shows that the parameters are jointly statistically highly 
significant (p<0.001). Thus, we can accept that the interactive terms are statistically 
meaningful. 
Consequently, Table 6.2 confirms the pattern displayed in the Figure 6.1, and reports large 
differences in duration between SOS wars and non-SOS wars. Further, it displays that the 
interaction term increases the size of the covariate from Fearon`s (2004) initial analysis. This 
is because the interaction term now includes the SOS wars which fulfill the initial criteria 
described in the explanation of SOS, as these wars are supposedly over territory or scarce 
resources and not over governmental power. Thus, Table 6.2 largely confirms the explanation 
suggested by Fearon (2004; Fearon and Laitin 2011), but the territory variable included from 
the UCDP dataset indicates that Fearon (2004) has included some wars which do not fulfill 
the criteria as they were over government. Consequently, the interaction term improves 
Fearon`s (2004) initial findings. To ensure that these results are reliable, I test the influential 
outliers in the SOS variable in dataset 1. 
6.2.2  Influential Observations in the SOS Variable in Dataset 1 
After running the analysis, it is important to determine whether any observations or groups of 
observations have a disproportionate influence on the estimated parameters (Cleves et al 
2004: 193). This is known as influence or leverage analysis, and an appropriate tool used to 
uncover influential outliers is dfbeta. Thus, I use dfbeta to see whether there are a few units 
driving the results64. However, a disadvantage with the dfbeta is that the number of values to 
examine grows with sample size and number of regressors. Another disadvantage is that since 
there has been little focus on testing influential outliers, there are few guidelines for what 
                                                 
64 Note that I focus on the SOS variable in dataset 1 and 3 when testing the dfbetas. 
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constitutes an influential outlier and little literature of what the cut-off point should be65. It 
has been suggested that the cut-off point can be 2/√n, which would translate to a cut-off point 
of 0.17 for dataset 166. Although, none of the outliers in Figure 6.4 exceeds this limit, this 
formula seems to be used as a guideline more than a set rule. Thus, I have to experiment with 
the data and exclude the most extreme observations. Further, the interpretation of dfbeta as 
measures of influence is fairly straightforward67. The dfbeta indicate how much each 
observation influences the regression coefficient, consequently is reports how much the 
coefficient would change if the observation was removed (Hamilton 2009:223). The outliers 
below zero would affect the time ratios in the Weibull analysis negatively if they were 
removed, while those above zero would increase the size of the covariate.  
As Figure 6.4 tests the data points in the SOS variable it differentiates between SOS and non-
SOS wars, where the former is reported in red and marked with an x, while the latter is 
reported in blue and marked with a *. From Figure 6.4 we find that if Papua New Guinea was 
removed it would decrease the covariate of SOS by approximately 0.05, and if we remove Sri 
Lanka it would increase the covariate of SOS with approximately 0.05. Based on the plot it 
seems relevant to exclude observations such as Chad, Indonesia, Zimbabwe, Pakistan and 
Papua New Guinea when rerunning the analysis. As Indonesia includes four of the SOS wars, 
I have already tested SOS without these observations in Table 6.2, Model 2, which made little 
difference to the analysis, this may also be because Indonesia has observations which 
according to the dfbeta-plot increases and decreases the SOS covariate. Thus, I test possible 
influential outliers in the basic Table 6.2, Model 1, which seems to have extreme values both 
above and below zero, such as Chad, Pakistan and Zimbabwe, but also India, Burma and 
Philippines. These tests do not report any significant changes although the removal of Sri 
Lanka and the Philippines affects the SOS covariate to some degree. However, this may also 
be due to few observations. Consequently, it seems as if the SOS variable is quite robust.  
However, the contradictory results are not primarily connected to a dispute of the duration of 
SOS, but rather the duration of SOS over government and territory. Consequently, I test 
dfbeta using the interaction term, which suggests that many of the same observations as when 
                                                 
65 Although, STATA manuals offer information on how to perform these tests, there is little information of what 
the cut-off point should be.  
66 Thus, datasets with fewer data points has a higher threshold for influential outliers. 
67 Note that the coefficients reported in the dfbetas are hazard ratios, while the covariates reported in the Weibull 
analysis are time ratios.  
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testing the SOS variable. Figure 6.5 shows that Chad and Myanmar are potential influential 
data points.  
Figure 6.4. Influential  Outliers in the SOS2004 Variable in Dataset 1 
Figure 6.5. Influential  Outliers in the Territory*SOS2004 Variable in Dataset 1 
  
When testing the interaction term of SOS*Territory the covariate of the interaction term drops 
considerably when Chad is excluded and become statistically not significant. The same 
happens when several other cases are excluded. This raises doubts about the results. 
Especially as Chad is a case which does not really qualify the definition of SOS according the 
UCDP dataset as it was over government and not territory, and it is excluded from the 
updated list of SOS wars (Fearon and Laitin 2011). However, a test of the parameters of SOS, 
Territory of SOS*Territory shows that they are jointly significant. It should be noted that the 
dfbeta-plot shows that the most extreme cases in the graph are SOS cases, while the other 
civil war cases are closer to zero.  
Thus, after controlling for influential outliers we may confirm H1b as SOS wars over territory 
last longer, while the remaining SOS wars over government tend to be brief wars, although, 
the covariate for the interaction term drops dramatically when I exclude cases such as Chad. 
This may mean that SOS wars explained as lasting longer because of the territorial dimension 
might in fact have to be subjected to closer scrutiny. According to Figure 6.1 and Table 6.2 
we may also accept H2 SOS wars last longer than other civil wars. I want to test the SOS 
variable in a disaggregated dataset with a lower threshold to see whether the results uphold. 
Consequently, I perform the same tests with dataset 3 in the following section where civil war 
conflict episodes are determined at a lower battle-death threshold than in dataset 1. 
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6.2.3 Testing SOS2004 Duration and Territory in Dataset 3 
Table 6.3 uses dataset 3 and focuses on the SOS2004 conflict episodes. The reported results 
confirm the difference in duration indicated by Figure 6.2. Model 1 indicates that SOS2004 
conflict episodes last more than 4 times (4.555) longer than other intrastate conflict episodes, 
and is highly statistically significant. Model 2 indicates that the SOS2004 covariate captures 
some of the effect of population and GDP per capita, as it decreases slightly when these 
variables are includes, however this may also be due to the loss of 48 data points. The 
population and GDP per capita variables indicate that civil wars in richer and more populous 
countries tend to last longer, and the results are statistically significant. The latter finding is 
quite established within civil war literature, as populous countries tend to experience civil war 
and longer conflicts than less populous countries. However, as it has been claimed that richer 
countries experience less civil war, therefore the results of GDP per capita is surprising68.  
Model 3 includes SOS2004 conflict episodes and the territory variable. The covariates in 
Model 3 indicate that SOS2004 conflict episodes last longer than other intrastate conflicts. 
The covariate for the territory variable indicates a longer duration for conflicts over territory 
(1.197), but it is not statistically significant. Table 6.3, Model 4 includes the SOS2004 
variable, the territory variable and the interaction term of Territory*SOS2004. Rather, 
surprisingly the covariate for the SOS variable indicate that the duration of SOS2004 conflict 
episodes over government is more than eight times (8.884) longer than intrastate conflict 
episodes which do not include this attribute, and the covariate is statistically significant. The 
covariate for the territory variable indicates that civil wars over territory last longer (1.246), 
although it is not statistically significant. The interaction term indicate that SOS2004 conflict 
episodes over territory last dramatically shorter (0.399), although this is not statistically 
significant. This may be due to inflated standard errors, and a test of the joint significance 
shows that the variables are highly statistically significant (p<0.0065). Thus, it seems as if 
SOS2004 conflict episodes over government last dramatically longer than SOS2004 conflict 
episodes over territory, consequently the Weibull analysis using dataset 3 indicate the 
opposite of what dataset 1 reported as the former indicates that SOS wars over government 
last longer than SOS over territory. Table 6.3, Model 5 confirms the reported findings from 
                                                 
68 This result may be due to the low lethality threshold as this dataset would register a civil war before other 
datasets with higher battle-death threshold. Consequently, the latter datasets may measure the levels of GDP per 
capita in the middle of a war, which would naturally be lowered due to the disastrous effect a civil war has on a 
state. 
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model 4, and the SOS2004 covariate increases even more in this model (11.78) as population 
and GDP is controlled for, but as this result is so dramatically increased it may be caused by 
drop in observations. 
Table 6.3. Determinants of Civil War Duration using SOS2004, 1946-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
SOS2004 4.555*** 3.664*** 4.285*** 8.884* 11.14* 
 (3.96) (3.49) (3.76) (2.23) (2.57) 
Population(logged)  1.262***   1.285*** 
  (3.55)   (3.61) 
GDP/Capita(logged)  1.205*   1.226** 
  (2.42)   (2.60) 
Territory   1.197 1.246 0.930 
   (0.93) (1.10) (-0.31) 
Territory*SOS2004    0.399 0.245 
    (-0.86) (-1.38) 
N 245 197 245 245 197 
Log lik. -425.2 -328.8 -424.8 -424.3 -327.4 
Chi-squared 21.55 35.84 22.41 23.27 38.63 
Prob.>chi-squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N(ended) 208 164 208 208 164 
Weibull regression with duration in years as the dependent variable. The coefficients are reported in the 
estimated multiplicative effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on mean war duration; e.g. .32 
means that a one-unit change is associated with a reduction in mean war duration by a factor of about three. T-
statistics are in parentheses. Estimations performed by using Stata 11.0. Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in 
parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Source: Kreutz 2010 and Fearon 2004 
 
The probability of a greater chi-squared is low enough in model 5 to reject the null hypothesis 
(p<0.0001). Consequently, the findings in Table 6.3 seem to reject H1b as SOS wars over 
territory do not last longer than SOS wars over government, but confirms H2 as SOS wars last 
longer than other civil wars.  
6.2.4 Influential Observations in the SOS2004 Variable 
As the results for the duration of the same SOS conflict episodes changed dramatically from 
dataset 1 to dataset 3 the findings raise some doubts about the robustness of the SOS 
explanation, but also whether the reported covariates are reliable. It seems likely that the SOS 
covariates in either dataset 1 or 3 are driven by a few influential observations. As we already 
know that the covariates in Table 6.2 dropped considerably when Chad was excluded, this 
result is not that surprising as it seems as if there are some influential outliers in the SOS 
variable. However, the results may also be caused by a drop of observations, which also 
indicates that the results of the SOS covariate may be driven by a few observations, especially 
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since table 6.1 established that only a few SOS wars are over government, observations like 
Sudan, Chad or Pakistan may be driving these results. Although the previous analysis might 
display a convincing pattern, it may reveal a different pattern if the robustness tests display 
disproportionally influential outliers. The results of the robustness test imply that analysts 
should worry about the fragility of their inferences as closely related variables, as uncertainty 
regarding meaning and measuring including interactions may produce different results (Hegre 
and Sambanis 2006:532). Robustness tests such as dfbeta focuses on how much influence the 
observations have on the results. 
Consequently, I test the SOS2004 with dfbeta to control for influential outliers before I reject 
or confirm the hypothesis. Figure 6.5 is a dfbeta-plot based on the SOS2004 variable in 
dataset 3. The figure displays that if Georgia was removed it would increase the covariate of  
SOS by approximately 0.05, or if we removed Algeria it would increase the covariate of SOS 
by approximately by 0.05. First, I test the general model of SOS2004 Table 6.3, Model 1 as I 
lose several cases if I include the control variables GDP per capita and population. I exclude 
possible influential cases suggested by the dfbeta-plot such as Georgia, Papua New Guinea, 
Zimbabwe, but also Sri Lanka, Angola, Ethiopia Chad, Myanmar and Philippines.  
Figure 6.6. Influential Outliers in the SOS2004 Variable in Dataset 3 
Figure 6.7. Influential Outliers in the Territory*SOS2004 Variable in Dataset 3 
 
The test shows that the exclusion of these cases has little effect on the SOS variable, and the 
SOS2004 covariate never drops in significance. However, as the contradictory results seem to 
concern the differentiation between SOS conflict episodes over government and territory, I 
perform the same test as with dataset 1 where I exclude possible outliers from the model 
which includes the interaction term. Consequently, I exclude the same cases as previously, but 
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the covariate forSOS2004 and the interaction seem robust, with one important exemption 
which is when I exclude Chad from the analysis, in which the SOS covariate drops from 
6.109 to 3.170 and it is no longer statistically significant, conversely the interaction term 
which measures the duration of SOS over territory increases from 0.582 to 1.118. Although, 
neither of the covariates are statistically significant, this may be due to inflated standard errors 
as a test of the parameters shows that they are jointly statistically significant. Consequently, it 
may seem as some of the reported results concerning the long duration of SOS wars seems to 
be due to a disproportionate influence from Chad. Although, the dfbeta-test does not fully 
explain why dataset 1 find a longer duration for SOS wars over territory, while dataset 3 finds 
that SOS conflict episodes over government last longer, we are probably closer to an 
explanation as we know that some of the difference in the reported results using dataset 1 and 
dataset 3 is caused by influential observations. Consequently, some of the difference may also 
be due to discrepancies in the identification of civil wars using two different thresholds of 
battle-death. 
As the updated list of SOS2011 was published without a dataset I cannot perform a 
replication study of it (Fearon and Laitin 2011). However, as the list contains all information 
needed to identify the correct SOS wars, I test SOS2011 conflict episodes in dataset 3 next, 
before I test possible influential outliers with dfbeta. 
6.2.5 Testing SOS2011 Duration and Territory in Dataset 3 
Table 6.4 is uses dataset 3 and includes the same variables as in Table 6.3, but tests the 
SOS2011 variable. The covariate for SOS2011 is statistically significant (p<0.01) and 
indicates that SOS2011 conflict episodes last almost three times longer (2.825) than other 
conflict episodes, which is slightly less than the covariate reported in Table 6.3 for SOS2004 
conflict episodes (4.555). Model 2 includes logged population and GDP per capita which 
displays that populous countries tend to experience longer-lasting conflict episodes, while the 
effect for richer countries is smaller and insignificant. Model 3 includes only the SOS2011 
variable, but leaves out the observations which drops when using the control variable, to test 
whether SOS2011 is weakened by the drop in observations, but also to test whether the 
variable capture some of the effect of the control variables. As the covariate clearly increases, 
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Model 3 indicates that the SOS variable captures some of the effect of GDP per capita and 
population69. 
Table 6.4. Determinants of Civil War Duration using SOS2011, 1946-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
SOS2011 2.825*** 2.565** 2.867** 2.670** 3.949 3.366 
 (3.44) (2.96) (3.22) (3.08) (1.39) (1.28) 
Population(logged)  1.270***    1.311*** 
  (3.62)    (3.80) 
GDP/Capita(logged)  1.127    1.141 
  (1.53)    (1.67) 
Territory    1.120 1.143 0.743 
    (0.56) (0.64) (-1.16) 
Territory*SOS2011     0.641 0.876 
     (-0.42) (-0.13) 
N 245 197 197 245 245 197 
Log lik. -428.9 -331.4 -340.4 -428.7 -428.6 -330.6 
Chi-squared 14.14 30.65 12.52 14.45 14.65 32.15 
Prob.>chi-squared 0.0002 0.0000 0.0004 0.0007 0.0021 0.0000 
N(ended) 208 164 164 208 208 164 
Weibull regression with duration in years as the dependent variable. The coefficients are reported in the 
estimated multiplicative effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on mean war duration. 
Estimations performed by using Stata 11.0. Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Source: Kreutz 2010 and Fearon and Laitin 2011 
 
Model 4 includes the SOS variable and the territory variable. The SOS covariate decreases 
some, but is statistically significant. The territory covariate is not statistically significant, but 
indicates that intrastate conflicts over territory last longer than those over government (1.120). 
Model 5 includes the SOS variable, the territory variable and the interaction term of 
Territory*SOS2011 and displays the same patterns as the analysis using SOS2004 in dataset 
3. Although, the significance of the covariates drops, they indicate the opposite of what we 
would expect from the definition of SOS wars and what Table 6.2 using dataset 1 reported. 
SOS conflict episodes over government last almost four times longer (3.949) than those which 
do not exhibit these attribute, while SOS over territory have a shorter duration (0.641). The 
covariate for territory indicates that intrastate conflicts over territory last longer (1.143), 
although it is not statistically significant. As the covariates may not be  statistically significant 
                                                 
69 This is a surprising finding as Fearon has previously tested for GDP per capita and population which reported 
insignificant results. See Appendix B for replication study of Fearon`s (2004) analysis. Additionally, it has 
previously been claimed that SOS may explain civil war in populous and poorer countries (Fearon and Laitin 
2011). I created an interaction term with GDP per capita and SOS to test SOS in richer countries which indicated 
positive results, although the interaction term was not statistically significant which may be due to inflated 
standard errors and few observations. Consequently, I tested the joint significance which showed that the 
correlation was in fact highly statistically significant which indicates that there is a correlation between SOS 
wars and richer countries. 
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due to inflated standard errors or few observations, I test the joint significance for the 
parameters, which shows that the results are statistically significant (P<0.0159). Model 5 
includes all the variables where population is the only statistically significant covariate.  
Log likelihood shows that the final model explains the data best while Chi-square test 
indicates that we may reject the null hypothesis in all the models (p<0.0001).Table 6.4 
displays much of the same pattern as Table 6.3. Consequently, we may reject H1b as SOS 
conflict episodes over territory do not last longer, and confirm H2 as the analysis clearly 
shows that SOS conflict episodes over government last longer than other conflict episodes. 
Although it may be questioned whether this means that SOS conflict episodes last longer than 
other intrastate conflicts, as SOS over government should not fulfill the criteria`s of the 
definition of SOS wars. As previously mentioned, the results from the analyses should be 
tested using dfbeta, before I reject or confirm the hypothesis. 
6.2.6 Influential Observations in SOS2011 Variable 
Graph 6.5 is a dfbeta-plot based on the SOS2011 variable in dataset 3. The graph displays that 
if we remove Russia it would increase the covariate of SOS by approximately 0.03, or if we 
removed Myanmar it would increase the covariate of SOS by approximately by 0.06. First I 
test the general model of SOS2011 Table 6.4, Model 1 as I lose 48 data points if I include the 
control variables GDP per capita and population. I exclude possible influential cases 
suggested by the dfbeta-plot such as the cases of Russia (Soviet Union), but also Mali, Sri 
Lanka, Philippines and Myanmar. The exclusion of these cases has little effect on the 
SOS2011 covariate. Further, I include the interaction term of Territory*SOS2011, but the 
exclusion of these cases has little or no effect of any on the reported results of the covariate. 
This indicates that the interaction term of SOS2011 has fewer influential observations that the 
interaction term using dataset 1 or the Territory*SOS2004 variable using dataset 3.This 
means that the reported results using SOS2011 in dataset 3, may report more reliable results. 
Table 6.4 reports shorter duration for SOS2011 conflict episodes and less difference between 
SOS2011 conflict episodes compared to other intrastate conflict episodes than Table 6.2 and 
6.3. However, the results reported in Table 6.4 seem more reliable as the covariates are more 
stable, which would indicate that the results are not dependent on a few data points. The 
dfbeta plot confirms this as there are fewer influential data points in Figure 6.8 compared to 
the dfbeta plots for dataset 1 and SOS2004 using dataset 3.   
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Figure 6.8. Influential Outliers in the SOS2011 Variable in Dataset 3 
Figure 6.9. Influential Outliers in the Territory*SOS2011 Variable in Dataset 3 
 
The previous analyses test the duration of SOS, and the duration of SOS wars after 
differentiating between SOS conflicts over government and SOS over territory. They indicate 
very different results. Dataset 1, Table 6.2, Model 5 shows that SOS2004 wars over territory 
last more than four times longer (4.483) than civil wars which do not include this attribute, 
while SOS2004 wars over government tend to be brief (0.899). Dataset 3, Table 6.3, Model 4 
finds that SOS2004 conflict episodes over territory tend to be brief (0.399) compared to 
conflict episodes which do not include this attribute, while SOS2004 conflict episodes over 
government are rather long-lasting (8.884). Dataset 3, Table 6.4, Model 5 displays that 
SOS2011 over government are long-lasting (3.949), while SOS2011 conflict episodes over 
territory are rather brief (0.641). Possible influential outliers have also been indentified, 
although none of the data points seem to dominate the variable. The interaction term using 
dataset 1 and Territory*SOS2004 using dataset 3 indicated that Chad may be influencing the 
reported results disproportionally. The interaction term of Territory*SOS2011 using dataset 3 
indicates fewer influential outliers, and it may also be worth noting that Chad is not included 
by Fearon and Laitin (2011) in the updated list of SOS conflicts. Thus, the difference in the 
reported results may in part be due to Chad, but may also be caused by coding discrepancies 
or that one of the datasets fits the model poorly. I will test how well the datasets fits the model 
after the following analyses which focus on the termination of SOS conflict episodes and the 
changes of duration of SOS conflict episodes after the end of the Cold War using dataset 3.  
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6.3 How SOS Wars End 
The model shows how a commitment problem could prevent an insurgency from being 
ended in any other way than except military victories due to the commitment problem 
           Fearon (2004:290) 
H3: Due to the commitment problem SOS wars terminate in military victories 
H4a: SOS wars terminate in other outcomes than military victory after the end of the Cold War 
Table 6.5 and 6.6 are based on dataset 3, but separate between SOS2004 and SOS201170. I 
have also separated the between two periods of time, 1946-1990 and 1991-2009, as I want to 
know whether the termination of SOS wars changed after the end of the Cold War71. By 
following the logic of Fearon`s (2004) SOS-explanation,  all SOS wars are expected to end in 
military victory as a commitment problem hinders the government from giving credible 
commitments to the ethnic minority group. As SOS wars are internally focused civil wars in 
which the belligerents cannot agree on a peace agreement, Fearon (2004; Fearon and Laitin 
2011) has not considered third parties as plausible actors which may construct or guarantee a 
peaceful termination of these wars. 
Table 6.5 is based on dataset 3 and it differentiates between SOS2004 and other conflict 
episodes and reveals a different pattern than what we would expect by following the logic of 
the SOS-explanation. Table 6.5 shows that 5 SOS conflict episodes were terminated during 
the Cold War, while 17 SOS conflict episodes were terminated after the 1991. Further, it 
displays that one SOS2004 conflict episodes ended in military victory from 1946 to 1991, 
while none of the SOS conflict episodes ended with this termination mode after the end of the 
Cold War. Two SOS conflict episodes ended in low or no activity from in the first time 
period, while 3 SOS wars ended with this termination mode after the end of the Cold War72. 
                                                 
70 Note that I have made two tables based on dataset 3 which include information of how the SOS2004 and 
SOS2011conflict episodes were terminated and whether they were over government or territory. The only SOS 
case which follows the assumptions of the explanation of SOS in SOS2004 is the case of UK/Kenya over Mau 
Mau in 1952 which ended in military victory. Initially, UCDP regard this as an anti-colonial war, but as I have 
implemented extra state wars into the dataset this case is now included in all the analysis. Further, in SOS2011 it 
is UK/Kenya and two conflict episodes in China over Tibet end in military victories. 
71 Table 6.5 and 6.6 are based on dataset 3, consequently it collapses conflict episodes with less than five years 
between the end year of the previous conflict episode and the start year of the new conflict. However, I have 
included two tables in the appendix which is based on dataset 2 and includes all the conflict episodes.  
72 As this category is vague and it`s definition unconvincing, I cannot interpret much from this finding nor place 
it in one of the more traditional categories of termination, although future research should define this category 
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More surprisingly, 1 SOS2004 conflict episode ended in a peace agreement before 1991, 
while 4 SOS2004 episodes ended with a peace agreement after the end of the Cold War. 
Three SOS2004 conflict episodes ended in ceasefires in the entire time span. These findings 
indicate that peaceful terminations of SOS conflict episodes after 1991 increase by a factor of 
four. However, it also confirms the explanation of SOS to a certain degree as 8 SOS conflict 
episodes are ongoing after 1991, but this is a shorter time span. 
Table 6.5. Termination of SOS2004 and Non-SOS Conflict Episodes using Dataset 3 
1946-1990 SOS2004 Conflict Episodes % Other Conflict Episodes % 
Ongoing - 0 - 0 
Peace agreement 1 20.0 10 8.6 
Ceasefire 1 20.0 5 4.4 
Military victory 1 20.0 64 56.6 
Other outcome 2 40.0 34 30.1 
Total 5 100 113 100 
     
1991-2009     
Ongoing  8 47.1 27 25.0 
Peace agreement 4 23.5 17 15.7 
Ceasefire  2 11.8 17 15.7 
Military victory - - 18 16.7 
Other outcome 3 17.7 29 26.9 
Total 17 100 108 100 
Source: Kreutz 2010 and Fearon 2004 
The duration and termination of SOS wars are supposedly independent of the change in the 
international system, but Table 6.5 supports the idea that something in the context of these 
wars must have changed after the Cold War as several of SOS wars have ended peacefully, 
especially after 1991. It may very well be that increased intervention by the international 
community has led to more peaceful terminations of SOS wars. Thus, Table 6.5 suggests that 
SOS conflict episodes rarely end in military victories, especially after the end of the Cold 
War. 
Table 6.6 is based on dataset 3, but focuses on SOS2011. As several of the SOS wars have 
changed from the initial list of SOS wars (Fearon 2004) to the updated list of SOS wars 
(Fearon and Laitin 2011), it shows that three SOS2011 conflict episodes ended in military 
victory from 1946 to 1991, while none of the SOS2011 conflict episodes were terminated in 
military victory after the end of the Cold War. Four SOS2011 conflict episodes ended in 
                                                                                                                                                        
more detailed as it seems important especially for SOS wars as so many SOS conflict episodes end in this 
category. 
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peace agreements during the entire period of the Cold War (48 years:4/48=0.08), while three 
SOS conflict episodes ended in the same termination mode after the end of the Cold War (19 
years: 3/19=0.15). Further, two SOS conflict episodes ended in ceasefire in the first time 
period, while two SOS conflict episodes ended in ceasefire after the end of the Cold War. 
However, 5 SOS wars ended in no or low activity during the Cold War, while 5 SOS conflict 
episodes ended in the same terminated mode after the end of the Cold War. As Fearon (2004) 
claims that ceasefires or peace agreements are dependent on a minimum of trust between the 
belligerents, this is a surprising result. Although, we cannot draw conclusions based on the 
descriptive statistics, it certainly points in a rather surprising direction of how these SOS 
conflicts actually ended. It does not seem to correspond with an interesting part of the SOS 
explanation.   
Table 6.6.Termination of SOS2011 and Non-SOS Conflict Episodes using Dataset 3 
1946-1990 SOS2011 Conflict Episodes % Other Conflict Episodes % 
Ongoing - - - - 
Peace agreement 4 28.6 7 6.7 
Ceasefire 2 14.4 4 3.9 
Military victory 3 21.4 62 59.6 
Low activity 5 35.7 31 29.8 
Total 14 100 104 100 
     
1991-2009     
Ongoing 8 44.4 27 25.2 
Peace agreement 3 16.8 18 16.9 
Ceasefire 2 11.1 17 15.9 
Military victory - - 18 16.8 
Low activity 5 27.8 27 25.2 
Total 18 100 107 100 
Source: Kreutz 2010 and Fearon and Laitin 2011 
Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 indicate that military victory is one of the least likely outcomes for 
SOS wars, which is the opposite of what the SOS explanation predicts. Further, none of the 
SOS2004 or SOS2011 conflict episodes ended in military victory after 1991. To formally test 
the likelihood of the different termination modes of SOS conflict episodes, I run multinomial 
regression analyses for SOS004 and SOS2011 using dataset 3. 
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6.3.1 Multinomial analysis – The Termination of SOS  
Table 6.7 is a multinomial analysis using dataset 3. I use military victory as the baseline 
outcome73. Following the logic of the SOS explanation, this category is the most likely 
outcome for SOS conflict episodes. The outcome with most observations is usually chosen as 
the base outcome, but as we are interested in the probability of SOS wars ending in military 
victory compared to the other categories, military victory is used as the reference category. 
The coefficients are reported in relative risk ratios (hereafter rrr),which means that rrr is the 
relative risk ratio in comparison with the base outcome, i.e. the rrr of a SOS2004 war ending 
in a peace agreement compared to ending in a military victory (Long and Freese 2006:227). 
As the rrr is multiplicative it means that values above 1 are positive and more likely to be the 
outcome compared to the base outcome, while rrr value below 1 denotes the opposite74. Table 
6.7, Model 1 and Model 2 use the SOS2004 variable, while Model 3 and 4 focus on the 
SOS2011 variable.  I have included two control variables which are GDP per capita and 
population75.  
Table 6.7, Model 1 reveals that SOS wars seem to be far more likely to be ongoing, terminate 
in peace agreement, or ceasefires than terminate through military victory. The results are 
highly statistically significant and substantively large. Further, it may be worth noting that 
other outcome is not statistically significant. Table 6.7, Model 2 includes the logged GDP per 
capita variable and the logged population variable, which leads to a decrease in data points. 
Consequently, Model 2 indicates that the rrr for a SOS2004 conflict episode ending in a peace 
agreement compared to ending in a military victory is 16.52 time and highly statistically 
significant, and the same is true for ceasefires (14.18).Model 2 also indicates that the rrr for a 
SOS2004 conflict episode to be ongoing compared to end in military victory is quite large 
(19.99) and statistically significant. However, other outcome is still not statistically 
significant.  
 
                                                 
73 I performed three additional multinomial analyses using dataset 2 with military victory as base outcome, one 
with low activity in the ceasefire category, and one with low activity in the military category. The results 
remained in favor of ceasefire, ongoing and low activity as the most likely outcome. 
74 Only the relevant findings will be discussed. 
75 Note that 48 observations drops out of the when I use the population and GDP variables as the data is not 
registered before 1950 and excludes Myanmar for which there is no GDP per capita data in the Penn World 
Tables dataset.  
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Table 6.7. Multinomial Analysis of SOS Termination, 1946-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ongoing     
SOS2004 23.71** 19.99**   
 [25.70] [23.16]   
Population(logged)  1.724***  1.709** 
  [0.284]  [0.285] 
GDP/Capita(logged)  1.796**  1.722** 
  [0.348]  [0.353] 
SOS2011   7.714* 6.670* 
   [6.534] [5.863] 
Peace Agreement     
SOS2004 15.37* 16.52*   
 [17.84] [19.87]   
Population(logged)  0.843  0.795 
  [0.152]  [0.150] 
GDP/Capita(logged)  1.158  1.150 
  [0.253]  [0.231] 
SOS2011   7.560* 13.44** 
   [6.622] [11.35] 
Ceasefire     
SOS2004 11.32* 14.18*   
 [13.35] [16.34]   
Population(logged)  0.969  0.932 
  [0.177]  [0.171] 
GDP/Capita(logged)  1.441  1.420 
  [0.316]  [0.306] 
SOS2011   5.143 9.240** 
   [4.792] [7.902] 
Other Outcome     
SOS2004 6.587 6.540   
 [7.903] [6.963]   
Population(logged)  1.702***  1.683*** 
  [0.238]  [0.251] 
GDP/Capita(logged)  1.324  1.317 
  [0.214]  [0.214] 
SOS2011   4.655 3.563 
   [4.358] [3.041] 
N 245 197 245 197 
Log lik. -359.7 -267.6 -361.6 -267.9 
Chi-squared 10.37 55.34 6.942 61.47 
Prob.>chi-squared 0.0346 0.0000 0.1390 0.0000 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in brackets. Base outcome is Military Victory. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Interestingly, Model 3 and Model 4 focus on the conflict episodes included in SOS2011 and 
reveal that ongoing (rrr=7.714) and peace agreements (rrr=7.560) are more likely termination 
modes than military victory. Model 3 indicates that ceasefire (rrr=5.143) may also be a more 
likely termination mode for SOS2011 conflict episodes compared to military victories, 
although it is not statistically significant. Thus, Model 3 indicates a different pattern for the 
termination of SOS2011 conflict episodes compared to SOS2004 as Model 1 and 2 displayed 
that ceasefire was statistically significant in the latter models. 
Model 4 includes the control variable, in which all the other outcomes are highly statistically 
significant and more likely termination modes for SOS2011 wars compared to military 
victory. As the rrr increases rather dramatically it may indicate that the inclusion of the 
control variable exclude several important cases.  
The findings in table 6.7 indicate a different pattern of the termination of SOS wars than the 
explanation of SOS wars suggests since all four models using SOS2004 and SOS2011 
reported that SOS conflict episodes are more likely to end in most of the other categories 
relative to military victories. It also supports the explanation of SOS to some degree as it 
suggests that they are very likely to be ongoing compared to military victory. As H3 was 
derived from the definition of the SOS explanation, it assumed that SOS wars terminate in 
military victories due to the commitment problem, but this hypothesis has to be rejected 
(p<0.0001). This does not support the theoretical expectations and leads to some questions 
about the strength of the commitment problem as suggested by the theory. It might also mean 
that the nature of insurgency is such that military victories are simply too rare in the SOS 
category, but it is interesting that so many peace agreements and ceasefires have also occurred 
despite the SOS explanation’s prediction.  
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To test the pattern of termination of SOS conflict episodes, I test the predicted probabilities. 
The following model differentiates between SOS2004 and SOS2011 and displays the 
predicted probabilities for the termination in different termination modes while holding the 
control variables constant at their mean.  
Table 6.8. Predicted Probabilities of SOS Termination 
Termination/ 
Type of War 
Ongoing Peace 
Agreement 
Ceasefire Military 
Victory 
Other 
Outcome 
Non-SOS2004  0.1244 0.1280 0.1060 0.3835 0.2581 
SOS2004 0.3043 0.2587 0.1838 0.0469 0.2064 
Non-SOS2011 0.1356 0.1137 0.1009 0.3892 0.2607 
SOS2011 0.1931 0.3263 0.1991 0.0831 0.1983 
Source: Dataset 3 
Table 6.8 indicates that the probability of ongoing increases when we hold the control 
variables at a mean and move from other conflict episodes (0.1244) to SOS2004 conflict 
episodes (0.3043), this pattern is less clear when testing SOS2011 conflict episodes. This 
confirms one important feature in the explanation of SOS as it is claimed that SOS wars last 
longer than other civil wars, thus a termination of the former is less likely. The difference in 
reported predicted probabilities between SOS2004 and SOS2011 could indicate that SOS2011 
have a shorter duration than SOS2004, which is a pattern that the previous analyses also have 
reported. Further, the predicted probability of terminating in a peace agreement when we hold 
the control variables at their mean and move from other conflict episodes to SOS conflict 
episodes increases dramatically (from 0.1280 to 0.2587), and the difference is even larger for 
SOS2011 conflict episodes (0.1137 to 0.3263). This indicates large differences in predicted 
probabilities and it contradicts the explanation of SOS. The predicted probabilities indicate 
that SOS conflict episodes have a higher predicted probability in ending in peace agreements 
and ceasefires compared to other conflict episodes. Further, the predicted probability of 
terminating in a military victory decrease when you move from other conflict episodes to SOS 
conflict episodes decreases dramatically (from 0.3835 to 0.0469), and the same pattern is 
indicated for SOS2011 conflict episodes (0.3892 to 0.0831). Thus, the predicted probability of 
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a military victory in other conflict episodes is dramatically higher compared to SOS conflict 
episodes. This is the opposite of what the explanation of SOS predicts. Recall that other 
outcome is a fuzzy category as it includes cases with a lull in fighting, but may also include 
conflict episodes with informal agreements and other informal outcomes. The predicted 
probability of other outcome decreases when you move from other conflict episodes to SOS 
conflict episodes. This pattern is obvious for both SOS2004 and SOS2011, which means that 
other conflict episodes are more likely of ending with this category. The descriptive statistics 
in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6, the multinomial analysis in Table 6.7, and the predicted 
probabilities in Table 6.8 report the same pattern and allows us to reject H3,  which is that SOS 
wars end in military victories since peace agreements and other forms of termination are 
difficult due to commitment problems.  
6.3.2 The Duration of SOS2004 Conflicts After 1991 
The previous analyses have demonstrated that there are SOS wars which are over 
government, although most SOS wars are over territory. Further, SOS conflict episodes last 
longer than other conflict episodes, although dataset 1 and 3 disagree in whether it is the SOS 
conflict over government or those over territory which cause longer duration. Further, Table 
6.5 and Table 6.6 displayed that there was one SOS2004 conflict episode and three SOS2011 
conflict episode which ended in military victory, while the rest are either ongoing or have 
ended in peace agreements, ceasefires or other outcome. The multinomial analyses and the 
predicted probabilities have confirmed this pattern and demonstrated that military victory is 
the least likely termination mode for SOS2004 and SOS2011 conflict episodes. The 
explanation of SOS corresponds rather poorly with the pattern of the empirical observations 
and tests that have been conducted here. The remaining hypotheses test the effect of the end 
of the Cold War on SOS conflict episodes. Consequently, I test these hypotheses using 
SOS2004 and SOS2011 in Weibull analyses employing dataset 3. 
H4b: SOS wars lasted longer during the Cold War, than after 1991 
H4c: The end of the Cold War has had a larger effect on the duration of SOS conflict episodes 
than other intrastate conflicts, as the commitment problem in SOS wars may be ameliorated 
by third party intervention. 
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Table 6.9 use dataset 3, it focuses on SOS2004 and includes a dummy variable for the post-
Cold War period (1991-2009) and an interaction term for SOS2004 conflict episodes after the 
end of the Cold War. Table 6.9, Model 1 includes the SOS2004 variable which is statistically 
significant and indicates a longer duration (2.925) for SOS2004 conflict episodes, while the 
dummy variable for the post-Cold War period indicates that intrastate conflict episodes last 
over three times longer (3.614) after 1991. This is surprising as we would assume that civil 
wars would end quicker after the end of the Cold War because of increased intervention. 
However, this covariate may include cases of SOS2004 in which a termination is hindered by 
a commitment problem. Consequently, I create an interaction term between SOS2004 and 
post-Cold War. 
Table 6.9. Determinants of Civil War Duration using SOS2004, 1946-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
SOS2004 2.925** 2.462 2.335 
 (3.02) (1.52) (1.49) 
Post-Cold War 3.614*** 3.557*** 3.701*** 
 (7.11) (6.83) (6.22) 
Post-Cold War*2004  1.284 1.049 
  (0.35) (0.07) 
Population(logged)   1.173* 
   (2.56) 
GDP/Capita(logged)   1.032 
   (0.43) 
N 245 245 197 
Log lik. -400.6 -400.6 -309.4 
Chi-squared 70.64 70.77 74.63 
Prob.>chi-squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N(ended) 208 208 164 
Weibull regression with duration in years as the dependent variable.  
The coefficients are reported in the estimated multiplicative effect of a one-unit  
change in the independent variable on mean war duration. T-statistics are in parentheses.  
Estimations performed by using Stata 11.0. Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Source: Kreutz 2010 and Fearon 2004. 
 
Table 6.9 Model 2 includes the SOS2004 variable, the post-Cold War variable and the 
interaction term with post-Cold War*SOS2004, which means that the covariates change in 
interpretation. As the SOS2004 variable measures the duration of SOS2004 conflict episodes 
during the Cold War it indicates that they lasted longer during the Cold War, although it not 
significant. The post-Cold War covariate is statistically significant and shows that non-SOS 
conflict episodes last more than three times longer after 1991. The interaction term with post-
Cold War*SOS2004 measures the duration of SOS wars after the end of the Cold War, 
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although it is not statistically significant it indicates that the duration of SOS conflict episodes 
has decreased after 1991(1.284). Thus, the duration of SOS2004 conflict episodes seem 
affected by the end of the Cold War, even more so than other intrastate conflict episodes. 
Model 3 also include logged GDP per capita and logged population, where only the latter is 
statistically significant and indicates a longer duration for conflict episodes in populous 
countries (1.173). Further, the covariates in Model 3 report the same results as in Model 2. 
SOS2004 conflict episodes seem to last longer during the Cold War, while other conflict 
episodes seem to last dramatically longer after the end of the Cold War. Since some of the 
variables may be insignificant due to inflated standard errors because of the interaction term 
and few observations I test the joint significance of the main parameters which is SOS2004, 
Post-Cold War and Post-Cold War*SOS.  The parameter test confirms that they are jointly 
highly significant (p<0.001).  Log likelihood confirms that the latter model fits the data best 
as the reported number are lowest for the last model, and chi-squared rejects the null 
hypothesis (p<0.0001). Consequently, the analysis confirms hypothesis H4b and H4c: 
SOS2004 conflict episodes lasted longer during the Cold War than after 1991 and the effect 
of the Cold War seems to have been larger on termination of SOS wars than other types of 
intrastate conflicts. Non-SOS conflict episodes seem to last longer after the end of the Cold 
War. This shows that an activist period of the international community stops those wars 
identified as longer lasting for special reasons. 
These findings are highly contradictory of what the explanation of SOS suggests as Fearon 
(2004; Fearon and Laitin 2011) do not even include the international community as a 
plausible actor in the termination of SOS wars. Although, the post-Cold War is only a proxy 
for the increased intervention it suggests a change in the context or circumstances surrounding 
the SOS wars, as there is nothing in the nature of SOS wars which would indicate that they 
change so dramatically after 1991. To ensure that this pattern is not unique for SOS2004, I 
perform the same survival analysis using dataset 3 but focusing on SOS2011 list of SOS wars.  
6.3.3 The Duration of SOS2011 Conflicts After 1991 
Table 6.10 displays results using dataset 3. Model 1 includes the SOS2011 variable and the 
post-Cold War variable, and both coefficients are statistically significant and positive. It 
shows that SOS conflict episodes last longer than other intrastate conflict episodes (2.242) 
and civil wars after 1991 last almost four times longer (3.876) than conflict episodes during 
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the Cold War. Model 2 includes the interaction term, which means that the covariates change 
in interpretation. The SOS variable decreases considerably and  it is not statistically 
significant. It indicates that SOS conflict episodes during the Cold War last 1.5 times longer 
than conflict episodes which do not include this attribute. The post-Cold War variable 
indicates that other conflict episodes last almost four times longer (3.537) after 1991. These 
results are generally in line with what we found in dataset 1. A test of the 3 parameters jointly 
reveals that the three variables included in Model 2 are jointly significant (P<0.0001).  
Table 6.10. Determinants of Civil War Duration using SOS2011, 1946-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
SOS2011 2.242** 1.559 2.264* 
 (2.92) (1.24) (1.99) 
Post-Cold War 3.876*** 3.537*** 4.023*** 
 (7.54) (6.68) (6.83) 
Post-Cold War*SOS2011  2.144 1.097 
  (1.38) (0.16) 
Population(logged)   1.171** 
   (2.58) 
GDP/Capita(logged)   0.995 
   (-0.07) 
N 245 245 197 
Log lik. -401.4 -400.4 -307.6 
Chi-squared 69.12 71.05 78.08 
Prob.>chi-squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N(ended) 208 208 164 
Weibull regression with duration in years as the dependent variable.  
The coefficients are reported in the estimated multiplicative effect of a one-unit  
change in the independent variable on mean war duration. T-statistics are in parentheses.  
Estimations performed by using Stata 11.0. Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Source: Kreutz 2010 and Fearon and Laitin 2011. 
 
Table 6.10 Model 3 includes the GDP per capita and population variables. SOS2011 is 
statistically significant and indicates a longer duration (2.264) compared to the covariate in 
Model 2. However, this may be caused by a drop in data points too. Further, the post-Cold 
War covariate indicates that other conflict episodes last four times longer after the end of the 
Cold War, while SOS2011 wars after the end of the Cold War have shorter duration. Again, 
these data too show that other conflict episodes seem to last dramatically longer than 
SOS2004 and SOS2011 conflict episodes after the end of the Cold War. The results reported 
for SOS2004 and the comparison to other conflict episodes do not correspond with the 
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explanation of SOS, which is that SOS wars are not affected by change in the international 
system. Before I proceed to the discussion I test how well dataset 1 and 3 fit the model. 
6.4 Residuals  
As econometric studies of civil wars have progressed in their sophistication since the 
pioneering work of scholars such as Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004), some researchers have proceeded to conduct meta-analyses that test the validity of 
findings across different definitions of conflict, and different configurations of independent 
variables (Brown and Langer 2011:188; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). However, most empirical 
studies in political science tend not to subject their inferences to robustness tests. Studies on 
civil war onset, duration and termination find little consensus, and without these tests the 
results are tentative (Hegre and Sambanis 2006:508). As some of the analyses in this thesis 
have reported contradictory results, I have already controlled for influential outliers. 
However, as none of the data points seemed to be disproportionally influential, I test how well 
dataset 1 and dataset 3 fits the model as this could possibly display that one of the datasets fits  
the models poorly. Further, if both datasets fit the models the differences may be due to 
coding differences or discrepancies regarding the actual duration of each civil war76. 
Consequently, subjecting the models and results to residual and robustness tests may 
contribute in establishing which empirical results are more robust, and identify empirical 
patterns worth explaining. 
Residuals from estimated models can be tested differently. For example Cox-Snell and 
Martingale. These methods help determine the functional form of the covariates to be 
included in the model (Cleves et al 2004:184). As I want to assess the overall models using 
dataset 1 and dataset 3, I test the Cox-Snell residuals. If the Cox regression model fits the 
data, the residuals should have a standard censored exponential distribution with hazard ratio 
1. I have verified the model`s fit by calculation based on the Kaplan-Meier estimated survivor 
function. I use the Cox-Snell test of the residuals in the full models in Table 6.3, 6.4, 6.9 and 
                                                 
76 There are many cases where the UCDP treats a long-lasting civil war as several conflict episodes due to few 
battle-deaths or the belligerents cease fighting for a period of time before they resume war, while Fearon has 
coded it as a continuous war. This is interesting as the UCDP dataset has ¼ of Fearon's battle-death threshold, 
consequently by following the logic of coding rules civil wars should disappear from Fearon`s dataset before the 
UCDP. 
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6.10 which produce fairly straight lines with slope 1. This indicates that both datasets fit the 
models well77.    
Further, a way of testing the proportional hazards assumption is based on analysis of the 
residuals. The idea is to retrieve the residuals, fit a smooth function of time to them, and test 
whether there is a relationship. Stata`s stphtest command does this as the following graphs 
calculates a Kaplan-Meier curve for each level of the variable. It calculates for each curve the 
transformation and plots these curves on the x-axis (Cleves et al 2004:181). If the plotted lines 
are reasonably parallel it supports the assumption that the hazard ratio does not change with 
time and the proportional-hazards assumption has not been violated (Hamilton 2009:307). 
Figure 6.7 test the SOS variable in dataset 1, which produces a curve which is less than 
perfect, and may indicate that the proportional-hazards assumption may been violated or it 
may also be caused by few data points. Further, I test the residuals for the SOS2004 and 
SOS2011 variable in dataset 3, which produce reasonably parallel and acceptable lines.  
Figure 6.7 for SOS2004 Wars 
  
Figure 6.8 and 6.9. Stphplots for SOS2004 and SOS2011 Conflict Episodes  
  
                                                 
77 Note that the Cox-Snell graphs are in Appendix D. 
-1
0
1
2
3
-ln
[-l
n(
S
ur
vi
va
l P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y)
]
0 1 2 3 4
ln(analysis time)
sos= Other Civil Wars sos = SOS Wars
-1
0
1
2
3
-ln
[-l
n(
S
ur
vi
va
l P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y)
]
0 1 2 3 4
ln(analysis time)
Other Conflict Episodes SOS2004 Conflict Episodes
-1
0
1
2
3
-ln
[-l
n(
S
ur
vi
va
l P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y)
]
0 1 2 3 4
ln(analysis time)
Other Conflict Episodes SOS2011 Conflict Episodes
91 
 
Another method for graphically assessing proportional hazards is to evaluate the proportional-
hazards assumption by plotting the Kaplan-Meier observed survival curves and compare them 
with the Cox predicted curves for the same variable. When the predicted and observed curves 
are close together, the proportional-hazards assumption has not been violated (Cleves et al 
2004). Consequently, I tested the observed and predicted survival rate of the SOS2004 and 
SOS2011 conflict episodes compared to other conflict episodes using dataset 3, to see 
whether there are large differences in their predicted and observed survival rates in a Kaplan-
Meier and Cox survivor function. The following graphs indicate few differences between the 
survival rates of predicted and observed survival rate of SOS conflict episodes and other 
conflict episodes. Thus, these graphs show that the datasets fit the model well, and that there 
are few differences in the predicted and observed survival rate of SOS conflict episodes and 
other intrastate conflicts episodes.  
Figure 6.10 and 6.11. Predicted and Observed Survival Rate for SOS and Other Conflict 
Episodes 
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7 Summary and Discussion 
This chapter summarizes the results of the analyses and discusses implications. The last 
section includes a discussion of a few caveats.  
7.1 Incompatibility and the Duration of SOS Wars 
H1a is one of the simplest hypotheses to reject as Table 6.1 clearly shows that not all of SOS 
wars were over territory78. This has implications for the explanation of SOS because it 
assumes that a SOS war is caused by ethnic majority in-migration, which causes competition 
over territory or scarce resources. This factor led the minority ethnic groups to fight for 
autonomy over their homeland. If the SOS wars are over government and not territory, then 
where does the story of ethnic in-migration and claims for autonomy fit in? 
Further, H2 may be accepted as dataset 1 and 3 shows that there is a difference in duration 
between SOS wars/conflict episodes and other civil wars/conflict episodes, and that the 
former last longer79. Moreover, by following the logic of the SOS explanation all SOS wars 
should be over territory as the sons-of-the-soil are not concerned with political ambitions, but 
rather concerned with their homeland or the natural resources in their homeland. By 
definition, SOS wars should not be over government. As descriptive statistics using both 
datasets show that several of the SOS wars were over government, it became important to 
separate between the two types of SOS as I want to ensure that the long duration of SOS wars 
is not driven by the cases of SOS over government.   
Dataset 1, Table 6.2 showed that it is the SOS over territory which drives the result as the 
SOS wars over government had considerably shorter duration. This result corresponds with 
the explanation of SOS and it also conforms with general literature on civil war, since others 
too report that civil wars over territory tend to last longer. However, Table 6.3 and 6.4 using 
dataset 3 showed that SOS2004 and SOS2011 conflict episodes over government last from 
four to eleven times longer, while SOS2004 and SOS2011 conflict episodes over territory 
                                                 
78 Note that I have included two complete lists of SOS conflict episodes in Appendix C, which displays country, 
years of war, whether it was over government or territory, and how it was terminated. The list is based on dataset 
3, while table 6.1 is based on dataset 1. Note that I also tested this in my Bachelor thesis where I found the same 
results (Gaski 2009).  
79 The analyses using dataset 2 in Appendix E does not correspond with these findings as the covariates report 
that SOS2004 conflict episodes does not last longer than other conflict episodes, while SOS2011 conflict 
episodes may last slightly longer than other conflict episodes.  
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tend to be shorter. After controlling for influential outliers the reported covariates drop in 
power for SOS2004 conflict episodes, while the results for SOS2011 remain. Dfbeta tests for 
influential outliers indicate that Chad influenced the results disproportionally when using 
dataset 1 or SOS2004 in dataset 3. Interestingly, Chad does not appear to be a SOS war in 
Fearon and Laitin’s (2011) updated list. However, these findings are problematic in terms of 
rejecting or accepting the H1B as it is not clear which of the datasets are correct or why they 
report contradictory results80. Thus, dataset 1 argues that SOS wars over territory last longer, 
while dataset 3 finds that SOS wars over government last dramatically longer than those over 
territory. The former finding fits better with other empirical studies, as it has been suggested 
that civil wars over territory and especially those placed in the periphery of a state last longer 
than other civil wars (Walter 2003; Buhaug et al 2009). Further, it may also contribute in 
establishing the conditions for when ethnic minorities rebel (Cederman et al 2009: 497) and 
propose a framework for understanding when in-migration causes conflict (Urdal 2008). 
However, if the SOS wars over government are the ones which drive the results it must be 
something with the dynamic of these wars which prolong their duration despite the fact that 
they are over government.  
7.2 Termination of SOS Wars 
H3 concerns the termination of SOS wars as Fearon (2004; Fearon and Laitin 2011) claims 
that military victory is the most plausible termination mode for these wars since peaceful 
outcomes are hindered by the commitment problem. This assumption contradicts several 
empirical studies which suggest that most civil wars tend to end in other outcomes than 
military victories (Kreutz 2010), although it corresponds with other findings which indicate 
that civil wars over territory rarely end peacefully (Walter 2003).  
                                                 
80 Although, it is not included in the analysis I found that an interactive term between GDP per capita and SOS 
is larger, and jointly significant. This indicates that SOS wars may be more prone to last longer among richer 
countries, which is an unexpected and contradictory finding to previous empirical findings concerning civil wars. 
It also contradicts the findings reported by Fearon (2004), who also controls for the effect of GDP per capita, and 
finds the coefficient to be insignificant. However, this may also be caused by Fearon`s (2004) relatively high 
battle-death threshold, as the civil war may have started long before 100 battle-death is reached. As we know 
that civil war has a disastrous effect on a state`s economy it is expected to find a higher probability for civil war 
in poorer countries when the battle-death threshold only includes the civil war in the dataset midway in the 
conflict. Although, this cannot be pushed further in this thesis, it certainly promotes further research.  
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The descriptive statistics in Table 6.5 using dataset 3 showed that there was only 1 SOS2004 
conflict episode which ended in military victory which is the United Kingdom against Kenya 
over Mau Mau in 1952. The UCDP dataset had initially coded this as an anti-colonial war, but 
it was added from the list of extra state wars as Fearon (2004) considers it a SOS war. The 
descriptive statistics in Table 6.6 using dataset 3 showed that there were 3 SOS2011 conflict 
episodes which ended in military victories. In addition to the previously mentioned case of 
United Kingdom against Kenya, it also includes two cases of China over Tibet. Thus, most of 
the SOS2004 and SOS2011 cases ended in peace agreements, ceasefires or other outcome, 
which contradicts the logic of the explanation of SOS, but confirms findings in other 
empirical studies (Kreutz 2010). Several of the SOS2004 and SOS2011 cases are also coded 
as ongoing, which corresponds with the explanation of SOS which argues that they last for 
longer periods of time. The multinomial analysis showed that all other outcomes included in 
the analysis were more likely termination modes for SOS conflict episodes than military 
victory, and the reported results were highly statistically significant. Further, Table 6.8 
calculated the predicted probabilities of the termination SOS2004 and SOS2011 conflict 
episodes while holding the control variables at their mean, and reported that military victory 
was the least likely outcome for these wars. The predicted probability for a military victory in 
other conflict episodes was far higher, than for SOS conflict episodes, which does not support 
the SOS explanation.  
The descriptive statistics in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6, the multinomial analysis in Table 6.7, 
and the predicted probabilities in Table 6.8 report the same pattern and rejects H3 as SOS wars 
terminate in other outcomes than military victories. Further, a brief summary of the most 
likely case of Sri Lanka showed that the SOS wars do not necessarily follow the pattern 
proposed by the SOS explanation. Apparently, SOS wars are quite often terminated 
peacefully, an issue that needs more explanation than the explanation of SOS currently 
provides in a very stylized manner.  
H4a is related to the previous hypothesis as it focused on the termination of SOS wars after the 
end of Cold War. It was argued that increased intervention of the international community 
into intrastate conflicts after the Cold War may ameliorate the commitment problem. The 
Cold War dynamics may have hindered peaceful terminations of SOS wars (Lacina 2004; 
Kreutz 2010). Table 6.5 and 6.6 using dataset 3 showed that none of the SOS conflict 
episodes have ended in military victories after 1991. Consequently, we may confirm H4a as 1 
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SOS 2004 conflict episode and 3 SOS2011 conflict episodes terminated in military victory 
during the Cold War, while none of the SOS2004 or SOS2011 conflict episodes have 
terminated in military victories after 1991. The analyses of the termination of SOS seem to 
support empirical studies which find a larger degree of intervention after 1991 (Lacina 2004; 
Kreutz 2010).  
7.3 Duration After the End of the Cold War 
Both analyses show that other conflict episodes last longer after the end of the Cold War, 
which is a surprising finding, but it also indicates that we may confirm H4c.The trend of SOS 
wars seems to confirm other empirical findings concerning the intervention of the 
international community, although it does not seem to have affected other civil wars to the 
same extent, consequently the end of the Cold War has had a larger impact on the duration of 
SOS wars than non-SOS conflict episodes. Why SOS wars should display a change in 
duration after 1991 is difficult to explain. It may very well be that SOS conflicts were more 
neglected during the Cold War because they were relatively uninteresting to the superpowers.  
The duration of SOS wars may not necessarily be caused by SOS dynamics, but rather system 
failure as these civil wars may have been neglected before 1991. This would confirm the 
findings in other empirical studies, as it has been suggested that the end of the Cold War may 
be understood as a turning point for the international community as it seems to intervene to a 
larger extent for bringing about negotiated settlements (Lacina 2004; Fortna 2004).  
7.4 SOS Dynamics or System Failure? 
This thesis has carefully tested several aspects of the logic of the SOS explanation. The 
proposition of SOS wars has become a very important explanation about why some conflicts 
last long and are hard to end. This thesis has used the UCDP dataset which is a disaggregated 
dataset separating civil wars into conflict episodes if the fighting ceases for a few years, but it 
also includes information of how and when the civil wars ended. The UCDP dataset includes 
more low-intensity civil wars as it`s battle-death threshold is ¼ in the disaggregated dataset 
compared to Fearon`s (2004) original dataset, which means that low-intensity civil wars 
should be registered sooner in the former dataset, but also for a longer period of time. I have 
thus compared SOS conflict episodes to other low-intensity and longer-lasting civil wars, 
which may have been excluded from Fearon`s dataset. Moreover, the new UCDP dataset 
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provides vital information of how the civil wars ended, which is a better option than assuming 
that some types of civil wars only terminate in military victories because they are impossible 
to affect through peace talks. Thus, this study has tested a vital aspect of the SOS dynamic by 
examining whether SOS conflict episodes are that different in duration and termination 
compared to other low-intensity conflict episodes, using the UCDP`s more accepted battle-
death threshold. Surprisingly, there is less support for the SOS explanation using the UCDP 
data.  
If we review the findings it is obvious that SOS wars are not necessarily over territory, and it 
is not clear whether it is the SOS conflicts over government or territory which drives the long 
duration of this variable. If the long duration of SOS wars are caused by the cases of SOS 
over government, this undermines the important feature of in-migration and the sons-of-the-
soils battle for autonomy of their homeland or their rights to the scarce resources in the area. 
Moreover, if SOS wars over government are the longest-lasting civil wars it contradicts other 
findings in civil war literature as it has been suggested that civil wars over territory last 
dramatically longer than those over government. It may be something about the dynamic of 
the SOS wars over government which makes them last longer, although it cannot be the SOS 
dynamic as these wars per definition should not qualify as SOS wars.  
The SOS conflicts included in SOS2004 and in the updated SOS2011 end quicker after the 
end of the Cold War. Why this is so is difficult to assert from the SOS explanation. The most 
important feature of the SOS explanation is the commitment problem which supposedly 
hinders any other termination than military victory. However, the analysis showed that the 
commitment problem rarely hinders SOS wars from ending peacefully, although it may 
possibly prolong their duration. The civil wars which ended in military victories (China over 
Tibet), are definitely not completely over, or they are civil wars which others regard as anti-
colonial wars (United Kingdom-Kenya over Mau Mau). Fearon (2004) argues that it qualifies 
as a civil war because it was perceived as an intrastate conflict, and that scholars cannot code 
based on ex-post assessments of civil wars (Kreutz 2010).  
After reviewing the results from the analyses performed in this thesis it is difficult to 
understand what a true SOS conflict really is, and it seems challenging to argue that these 
civil wars have not been coded by some kind of ex-post assessment since the only feature they 
seem to have in common is their duration. Consequently, after testing the incompatibility, 
duration and termination of SOS wars it is rather challenging to argue that SOS wars stand out 
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as a homogenous group of civil wars, or that their features are so similar that the SOS 
explanation may be used to predict their duration and termination. Why they would end 
sooner after the Cold War is also a challenge for future theorizing.  
Another point which is troubling is the coding of duration of some of the SOS cases in dataset 
1, as their duration is longer in dataset 1 than in dataset 2 and 3. By following the logic of the 
coding rules this should not be possible as the battle-death threshold of dataset 2 and 3 is ¼ of 
the battle-death threshold in dataset 1.All civil wars should be registered first in the two 
former datasets. This may compromise some of the credibility regarding the duration in 
dataset 1. However, this thesis cannot assess the validity of the data and the theories 
simultaneously.  
This thesis has shown that the nature of the SOS conflicts is not as homogenous as the SOS 
explanation assumes. Although, most of these wars are long-lasting it is not clear why they 
are so long-lasting, and they do not fit in the narrative of the explanation of SOS. Nor does the 
most likely case of Sri Lanka really fit the SOS explanation. Unless we use the SOS 
explanation as a category for long-lasting wars after an ex-post assessment, which is not 
particularly useful for research or policy, it is difficult to argue what a true SOS war is and 
which features it displays. The analyses performed in this thesis shows that SOS wars are 
long-lasting civil wars, although their duration after 1991 seems shortened. They occur in the 
periphery, and they are most often over territory. They occur most often in Asia, in populous 
countries and are to some degree correlated with ethnicity and natural resources. Many SOS 
wars lasted longer during the Cold-War, and they have a high probability of ending in peace 
agreement, ceasefires or they simply fizzle out. Thus, the explanation of SOS offers an 
intricate proposition for why some civil wars last longer than others by combining factors 
which have proven vital in explaining civil war, such as territory, ethnicity, natural resources, 
in-migration and distance to the capital (Buhaug and Gates 2002; Urdal 2002; Walter 2003; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2009). Although, the rationalist narrative fails to explain the pattern of 
the SOS wars, it includes features which are assumed to provide ideal conditions for rebel 
group. Consequently, it may not be the dynamic of SOS which are driving these longer-
lasting wars, but rather conditions which make it profitable or feasible for certain groups to 
rebel. 
Several of the findings seem to support other findings within the civil war literature, as it 
certainly includes all the factors which have proven important for explaining the onset, 
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duration and termination of civil wars. The SOS explanation suggested that civil wars tend to 
last for longer periods of time, but as rebel victories are rare it is more likely to reflect 
benefits during than after the conflict (Collier et al 2009). Consequently, if the rebellion is 
rationally motivated it is likely to benefit the rebel leaders, rather than provide social justice 
for a wider group (Collier et al 2009:4). The results here suggest that some aspects of the SOS 
explanation do not logically fit with the empirical findings. This is not surprising since many 
of the ingredients of SOS wars, such as ethnicity, territoriality and in-migration are all 
contested in the civil war literature (Buhaug and Gates 2002; Urdal 2002; Cederman et al 
2009; Jakobsen and de Soysa 2009).  
This thesis has also demonstrated that military victory is the least likely outcome for SOS 
wars. It may be relevant to move the focus of the explanation of SOS from the commitment 
problem to another important feature of these conflicts, which is the importance of the system. 
Whether, the commitment problem exists or not may be contested, but this thesis has shown 
that it does not hinder the SOS wars from ending peacefully, particularly after the end of the 
Cold War. Also, it may be relevant to devote more focus to in-migration issues as it clearly is 
an important part of the puzzle of SOS wars, and may contribute to establishing under what 
conditions it holds. Moreover, scholars may also test whether resources scarcity and 
population pressures are more prevalent in the context of SOS wars, as these factors have not 
been very robust in more general tests of civil war.   
This thesis shows that SOS wars may not be that different from other civil wars in terms of 
termination. It has also shown that the end of the Cold War has mattered for the duration of 
SOS wars. Future research might focus especially on why this is so and on unpacking other 
important features of civil wars that may predict better why some civil wars last so much 
longer than others. Perhaps all long-lasting civil war share many common traits because they 
simply have lasted long and not because any one trait explains their onset such as the SOS 
explanation wants to do.  
7.5 A Few Caveats 
There are several possible caveats with this thesis. Although, I have argued that the 
disaggregated dataset reports more accurate information, it may also display misleading 
results if SOS conflict episodes are divided into more conflict episodes than other civil wars. 
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Consequently, dataset 2 may be criticized for reporting misleading results. I have tried to 
correct for that with dataset 3 by collapsing conflict episodes where the fighting ceased for 
five years or less. Secondly, there is some loss of observations when using the control 
variables: GDP per capita and population as they only include information from 1950 and also 
excludes Myanmar which is an important SOS conflict. Future research might correct for 
these by getting to the bottom of why UCDP coding maybe different to Fearon (2004).  
Thirdly, I use a dummy variable “Post-Cold War” as a proxy for increased intervention. 
Although, it is common to use such dummies to measure possible differences after the end of 
the Cold War, it is still just a proxy. It would have been better to include data on intervention 
directly. Such a variable could also indicate whether third party intervention increases the 
chances of a peaceful outcome among SOS wars. However, such information is not available 
in the updated version of the UCDP dataset as of yet. 
It may also be argued that the standard battle-death thresholds used in empirical studies are 
insensitive to the differences in countries. Although, the low battle-death threshold used in the 
UCDP dataset certainly measures low-intensity wars, a more accurate measure of battle-
deaths would be relative to total population. As of now most studies rely on a battle-death 
threshold of 25 killed or 100 killed per year and 1,000 battle-deaths per conflict, and we 
separate civil wars based on casualties to determine whether they were high-intensity or low-
intensity wars with no regard to the total population. However, a civil war which kills 100 
people per year in i.e. Sri Lanka should be regarded as a war with higher intensity than 100 
battle-deaths in an intrastate conflict in China. Consequently, a battle-death measure relative 
to the population seems more accurate, especially when an explanation assumes low-intensity. 
The use of population size as a control takes care of some of this problem, but not when it 
comes to defining what a SOS war is.  
Lastly, I wanted to implement the termination variable from the UCDP dataset into dataset 1, 
but this proved challenging as they operate with different start and end years for most 
conflicts. This is not surprising as the criteria differs, especially regarding the battle-death 
threshold. However, what is more unexpected is that dataset 1 registers some civil wars before 
and for longer periods of time in dataset 2 and 3. SOS wars such as Angola and Senegal are 
coded into respectively, 7 and 5 conflict episodes in dataset 2, while the fighting is these wars 
are coded continuously in dataset 1. This is unexpected as the battle-death threshold in dataset 
2 and 3 is ¼ of the battle-death threshold in Fearon`s (2004) dataset. Further, the end date for 
101 
 
many conflicts is often coded in the middle of a conflict or between conflict episodes in the 
UCDP dataset, which makes it difficult to know which conflict Fearon (2004) refers to. Thus, 
I found it simply too unreliable to code the outcome of the civil wars into dataset 1 from the 
UCDP dataset.  These small differences, however, will not prove to be decisive.  
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8 Conclusions 
Fearon`s (2004; Fearon and Laitin 2011) explanation of SOS is important for a number of 
reasons. It is an elegant explanation of why some civil wars last longer than other wars. It is 
important because it suggests several ways to stop civil wars, particularly by paying attention 
to a certain dynamic. It focuses on the problem of ethnic relations and the issue of ethnic in-
migration. These issues also relate to current discussions on climate change, land issues, 
resource scarcity and ethnic politics. Thus understanding fully how powerful the SOS 
explanation is has very important theoretical and practical implications.  
This thesis has tested important implications of the explanation of SOS. Since SOS wars last 
longer because of territory or scarce resources and not over governmental power, this thesis 
has tested whether all SOS wars are over territory. The analyses showed that there are several 
SOS wars which according to the UCDP dataset are in fact over government, which suggests 
that there maybe room for solving ethnic issues short of claims of autonomy. 
Since SOS wars simmer at a low intensity level I tested whether SOS wars last longer in a 
dataset with a lower battle-death threshold, consequently the duration of these civil wars was 
compared to other civil wars. The SOS wars seem to last longer compared to other long-
lasting civil wars, although the SOS wars in the initial list of wars (Fearon 2004) seemed to 
last longer compared to other intrastate conflicts. The difference in duration of the updated list 
of SOS wars compared to other intrastate conflicts was smaller. Further, I tested whether SOS 
wars last longer because of neglect during the Cold War. Consequently, I tested whether they 
end quicker after the end of the Cold War. The analyses show that they do. Further, the 
analyses indicated that other conflict episodes seem to last longer after the end of the Cold 
War compared to SOS wars. Thus, it seems as if other conflicts are harder to end after the end 
of the Cold War compared to SOS wars, an issue that goes counter to the SOS explanation 
based on the commitment problem. 
The most important test in this thesis was whether SOS wars end in military victories as the 
explanation of SOS clearly states. Because of the commitment problem SOS wars last longer 
and they can only end in military victories. However, descriptive statistics, a multinomial 
analysis and a test of predicted probabilities demonstrated that military victory is the least 
likely termination mode for SOS wars, and that all other termination modes are more likely 
for SOS wars. These factors too bring into question the power of Fearon’s (2004) explanation 
104 
 
that has come to be regarded as one of the most elegant explanations of why some wars are so 
slow to end. Since Fearon’s (2004) list of SOS wars is a post hoc assessment one might try to 
unpack whether the SOS dynamic causes long lasting civil wars or whether all long lasting 
civil wars share some very similar features simply because they have been around for some 
time.  
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Appendix A 
Table A.I.  SOS Wars by Region from 1945-1999  
Region SOS cases w area/rebel groups 
Asia China 1991 (Xinjiang); India 1952 (NE); Pakistan 1993 (MQM); Bangladesh 
1976 (Chittagong); Burma 1948 (Karens); Sri Lanka 1983 (LTTE); 
Philippines 1968 (MNLF, MILF); Indonesia 1965 (OPM, West Papua), 1976 
(East Timor), 1989(GAM I), 1999 (GAM  II); Papua New Guinea 1989 
(Bougainville). 
Eastern Europe Georgia 1992 (Abkhazia) 
LA/Ca  
NA/ME  
SSA Mali 1989 (Tuaregs); Senegal 1989 (MFDC); Zimbabwe 1972(ZANU, 
ZAPU); Chad 1994 (Rebels in the South) Sudan 1983 (SPLA, etc). Ethiopia 
1992 (Oromo Liberation Front). Angola 1992 (FLEC) 
West/ anticolonial 
wars 
UK/Kenya 1952 (Mau Mau). 
World  
Source: Fearon 2004 
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Table A.2.  SOS Wars by Region from 1945-2008  
Region SOS cases 
Asia China 1950, 1956 (Tibet), 1990 (Xinjiang); India 1956 (NE); Pakistan 1973, 2004 
(Baluchistan), 1993 (MQM); Bangladesh 1976 (Chittagong); Myanmar 1948 
(Karens); Sri Lanka 1983; Thailand 2004 (Pattani); Philippines 1970 (Moros); 
Indonesia 1965 (Papua), 1975 (E. Timor), 1989, 1999 (GAM); PNG 1989 
(Bougainville). 
Eastern Europe USSR 1946 (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia); Russia 1994, 1999 (Chechnya). 
LA/Ca  
NA/ME Iraq 1974 (Kurds); Israel 1949 (Palestinians). 
SSA Mali 1989 (Tuaregs); Senegal 1989 (Casamance); Zimbabwe 1972; Sudan 2003 
(Darfur). 
West/ Anti-colonial 
wars 
UK/Kenya 1952 (Mau Mau); France/Algeria 1954; Portugal/Angola 1961; 
Portugal/Mozambique 1964. 
World  
Source: Fearon and Laitin 2011 
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Appendix B 
Table B.1. Replication of Fearon`s (2004) Analysis: Determinants of Civil War Duration, 
1945-1999”.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Coup/Revolution 0.320*** 0.346*** 0.335*** 0.312*** 0.349*** 0.309*** 0.313*** 
 (-5.36) (-4.87) (-5.08) (-5.20) (-4.66) (-5.30) (-5.38) 
Eastern Europe 0.330*** 0.322*** 0.375*** 0.335*** 0.313*** 0.335*** 0.341*** 
 (-4.21) (-4.34) (-3.32) (-4.13) (-4.35) (-4.01) (-3.41) 
Not contiguous 0.684 0.591* 0.709 0.705 0.644 0.629 0.683 
 (-1.62) (-2.03) (-1.49) (-1.41) (-1.81) (-0.96) (-1.60) 
Sons of the Soil 3.102*** 3.150*** 3.016*** 3.125*** 2.988*** 3.472** 2.885*** 
 (3.86) (3.94) (3.81) (3.89) (3.69) (3.10) (3.47) 
Contraband 2.562** 2.568** 2.618** 2.571** 2.709** 2.460* 2.551** 
 (2.76) (2.80) (2.86) (2.77) (2.89) (2.53) (2.72) 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
 1.546      
  (1.36)      
GDP/capita 
(lagged in 1000s) 
  0.914     
   (-1.34)     
Log(Population) 
(lagged) 
   0.977    
    (-0.37)    
Ethnic war 
(1,2,3) 
    1.126   
     (1.15)   
Democracy (-10 
to 10 lagged) 
     1.012  
      (0.85)  
Log(Deaths/year)       0.952 
       (-0.95) 
N 128 128 124 128 127 114 122 
N (ended) 103 103 99 103 103 89 97 
Source: Fearon 2004. Weibull regression with duration in years as the dependent variable. The coefficients are 
reported in the estimated multiplicative effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on mean war 
duration; Estimations performed by using Stata 11.0.Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
114 
 
Appendix C 
Table C.1. Incompatibility and Termination of SOS2004 Conflict Episodes, 1946-2009 
Conflict 
code 
Country Rebel/Territory Years of 
fighting 
Incompatibility Termination 
122 Zimbabwe ZANU, ZAPU 1967-1979 Government Peace 
Agreement 
113 Sudan SPLA, etc 1983-2009 Government Ongoing 
209 Pakistan MQM 1990-1996 Government Other Outcome 
91 Chad Frolinat, First 
Liberation Army 
1966-2009 Government Ongoing 
197 Georgia Abkhazia 1992-1993 Territory Peace 
Agreement 
177 Mali Tuaregs 1990-2009 Territory Ongoing 
171 Indonesia GAM II/Aceh 1999-2005 Territory Peace 
Agreement 
126 Bangladesh Chittagong Hills 1975-1992 Territory Ceasefire 
23 Myanmar CPB, Karens, etc 1949-2009 Territory Ongoing 
174 Papua New 
Guinea 
BRA/ Bougainville 1989-1996 Territory Ceasefire 
157 Sri Lanka LTTE 1984-2009 Territory Ongoing 
44 UK/Kenya Mau Mau 1952-1956 Territory Military 
Victory 
180 Senegal MFDC/Casamance 1990-2003 Territory Peace 
Agreement 
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219 Ethiopia Oromo Lib. Front 1977-2009 Territory Ongoing 
192 Angola FLEC/Cabinda 1991-2009 Territory Ongoing 
54 India North East 
rebels/Nagaland 
1956-1968 Territory Ceasefire 
54 India North East 
Rebels/Nagaland 
1992-2007 Territory Other Outcome 
112 Philippines MNLF,MILF 1970-2009 Territory Ongoing 
94 Indonesia OPM/West Papua 1965-1969 Territory Other Outcome 
94 Indonesia OPM/West Papua 1976-1981 Territory Other Outcome 
134 Indonesia East Timor 1975-1998 Territory Peace 
Agreement 
171 Indonesia GAMI/Aceh 1990-1991 Territory Other Outcome 
 China Xinjiang 1991 Missing in 
UCDP 
Missing in 
UCDP 
Source: Fearon 2004 and Kreutz 2010. Based on dataset 3 
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Table C.2. Incompatibility and Termination of SOS2011 Conflict Episodes, 1946-2009 
Country 
code 
Country Rebel/Territory Start of 
conflict 
Incompatibility Termination 
122 Zimbabwe ZANU, ZAPU 1967-1979 Government Peace 
Agreement 
113 Sudan  SPLM, etc 2003-2009 Government Ongoing 
209 Pakistan  MQM 1990-1996 Government Other 
Outcome 
39 China Tibet 1950 Territory Military 
Victory 
39 China Tibet 1956-1959 Territory Military 
Victory 
54 India North East 
Rebels/Nagaland 
1956-1968 Territory Ceasefire 
54 India NSCN-IM/Nagaland 1992-2007 Territory Other 
Outcome 
129 Pakistan Baluchistan 1974-1977 Territory Ceasefire 
129 Pakistan  Baluchistan 2004-2009 Territory Ongoing 
126 Bangladesh Chittagong 1975-1992 Territory Ceasefire 
23 Myanmar Karens 1949-2009 Territory Ongoing 
157 Sri Lanka LTTE 1984-2009 Territory Ongoing 
248 Thailand Pattani insurgents 2003-2009 Territory Ongoing 
112 Philippines MIM, MNFL, MILF 1970-2009 Territory Ongoing  
94 Indonesia OPM/Papua 1965-1969 Territory Other 
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outcome 
94 Indonesia OPM/Papua 1976-1981 Territory Other 
Outcome 
134 Indonesia East Timor 1975-1998 Territory Peace 
Agreement 
171 Indonesia GAM I 1990-1991 Territory Other 
Outcome 
171 Indonesia  GAM II 1999-2005 Territory Peace 
Agreement 
174 Papua New 
Guinea 
Bougainville 1989-1996 Territory Ceasefire 
12 USSR LTS(p)A, 
LNPA/Latvia 
1946 Territory Other 
Outcome 
13 USSR BDPS/Lithuania 1946-1948 Territory Other 
Outcome 
11 USSR Forest Brothers 
/Estonia 
1946-1948 Territory Other 
Outcome 
206 Russia Chechnya 1994-2007 Territory Other 
Outcome 
74 Iraq Kurds 1961-1996 Territory Other 
Outcome 
37 Israel Palestinians 1949 Territory Ongoing 
177 Mali Tuaregs 1990-2009 Territory Ongoing 
180 Senegal Casamance 1990-2003 Territory Peace 
Agreement 
44 United Kenya/Mau Mau 1952-1956 Territory Military 
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Kingdom victory 
49 France/Algeria Algeria 1954-1962 Territory Peace 
Agreement 
66 Portugal UNITA/Angola 1961-1974 Territory Peace 
Agreement 
88 Portugal Frelimo/Mozambique 1964-1974  Territory Peace 
Agreement 
 China  Xinjiang 1990 Missing Missing 
Source: Fearon and Laitin 2011 and Kreutz 2010. Based in dataset 3 
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Appendix D 
Residuals 
Cox-Snell test to measure the overall fit of dataset 1 and dataset 3 
Figure D.1. Cox-Snell Graph of Table 6.2, Model 1 using Dataset 1 
Figure D.2. Cox-Snell Graph of Table 6.2, Model 5 using Dataset 1  
 
Figure D.3. Cox-Snell Graph of Table 6.3, Model 5 using Dataset 3 
Figure D.4. Cox-Snell Graph of Table 6.9, Model 6 using Dataset 3 
 
Figure D.5. Cox-Snell Graph of Table 6.4, Model 3 using Dataset 3 
Figure D.6. Cox-Snell Graph of Table 6.10, Model 3 using Dataset 3 
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Appendix E 
Tests and Analyses performed using dataset 2: 
Table E.1. Descriptive Statistics for Dataset 2 
 
Figure E.1. Kaplan-Meier Estimates of SOS2004 Conflict Episodes and Other Conflict 
Episodes 
Figure E.2. Kaplan-Meier Estimates of SOS2011 Conflict Episodes and Other Conflict 
Episodes 
 
The log-rank test for Figure E.1 confirms that the pattern displayed in the graph is not 
significant (P=0.44), which means that there is no statistically significant difference between 
non-SOS and SOS wars. The log-rank test of Figure E.2 indicates that the difference between 
non-SOS wars and SOS2011 wars is statistically significant (P=0.03).  
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Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of SOS wars (2004)
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Kaplan-Meier survival estimates of SOS wars (2011)
Variable  Observations Mean  Std.dev Minimum Maximum 
SOS2004 371 0.16 0.37 0 1 
SOS2011 371 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Territory 371 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Territory*SOS2004 371 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Territory*SOS2011 371 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Post-Cold War 371 0.53 0.49 0 1 
Post-Cold War*SOS2004 371 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Post-Cold War*SOS2011 371 0.09 0.29 0 1 
GPD/Capita (logged) 305 7.05 1.32 3.49 10.72 
Population (logged) 323 9.99 1.76 5.95 13.96 
Duration 371 4.25 6.77 1 47 
Outcome 371 2.77 1.34 0 4 
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Table E.2. Determinants of Civil War Duration using SOS2004 in Dataset 2, 1946-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
SOS2004 1.173 1.028 1.099 1.884 2.160 
 (0.87) (0.15) (0.50) (1.51) (1.95) 
Population(logged)  1.194***   1.219*** 
  (3.87)   (4.13) 
GDP/Capita(logged)  1.236***   1.249*** 
  (4.02)   (4.20) 
Territory   1.229 1.334 1.008 
   (1.49) (1.94) (0.05) 
Territory*SOS2004    0.488 0.363* 
    (-1.52) (-2.25) 
N 371 305 371 371 305 
Log lik. -607.5 -478.9 -606.4 -605.1 -475.6 
Chi-squared 0.778 36.69 3.003 5.563 43.14 
Prob.>chi-squared 0.3777 0.0000 0.2228 0.1349 0.0000 
N(ended) 335 273 335 335 273 
Weibull regression with duration in years as the dependent variable. The coefficients are reported in the 
estimated multiplicative effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on mean war duration. T-
statistics are in parentheses. Estimations performed by using Stata 11.0. Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in 
parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Source: Kreutz 2010 and Fearon 2004 
 
Table E.3. Determinants of Civil War Duration using SOS2011 in Dataset 2, 1946-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
SOS2011 1.634** 1.491* 1.566* 2.154 1.967 
 (2.71) (2.15) (2.30) (1.25) (1.18) 
GDP/Capita(logged)  1.226***   1.238*** 
  (3.86)   (4.08) 
Population(logged)  1.187***   1.230*** 
  (3.81)   (4.34) 
Territory   1.088 1.111 0.708* 
   (0.59) (0.71) (-2.02) 
Territory*SOS2011    0.698 0.904 
    (-0.55) (-0.16) 
N 371 305 371 371 305 
Log lik. -603.9 -476.4 -603.8 -603.6 -474.1 
Chi-squared 7.940 41.62 8.286 8.616 46.15 
Prob.>chi-squared 0.0048 0.0000 0.0159 0.0349 0.0000 
N(ended) 335 273 335 335 273 
Weibull regression with duration in years as the dependent variable. The coefficients are reported in the 
estimated multiplicative effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on mean war duration. T-
statistics are in parentheses. Estimations performed by using Stata 11.0. Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in 
parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Source: Kreutz 2010 and Fearon and Laitin 2011 
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Table E.4. Termination of SOS2004 and Non-SOS Conflict Episodes using Dataset 2 
1946-1990 SOS Conflict Episodes % Non-SOS Conflict Episodes % 
Ongoing - 0 - 0 
Peace agreement 2 9.5 13 8.5 
Ceasefire 2 9.5 5 3.3 
Military victory 3 14.3 78 51.3 
Other outcome 14 66.7 56 36.8 
Total 21 100 152 100 
     
1991-2009     
Ongoing  8 19.5 27 17.2 
Peace agreement 4 9.7 26 16.6 
Ceasefire  7 17.1 24 15.3 
Military victory - - 22 14.0 
Other outcome 22 53.6 58 36.9 
Total 41 100 157 100 
Source: Kreutz 2010 and Fearon 2004 
Table E.5.Termination of SOS2011 and Non-SOS Conflict Episodes using Dataset 2 
1946-1990 SOS Conflict Episodes % Non-SOS Conflict Episodes % 
Ongoing - - - - 
Peace agreement 6 23.1 9 6.1 
Ceasefire 3 11.5 4 2.7 
Military victory 3 11.5 78 53.1 
Other outcome 14 53.8 56 38.1 
Total 26 100 147 100 
     
1991-2009     
Ongoing 8 22.9 27 16.6 
Peace agreement 3 8.6 27 16.6 
Ceasefire 8 22.9 23 14.1 
Military victory - - 22 13.5 
Other outcome 16 45.7 64 39.3 
Total 35 100 163 100 
Source: Kreutz 2010 and Fearon and Laitin 2011 
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Table E.6. Multinomial Analysis of SOS Termination using Dataset 2, 1946-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ongoing     
SOS2004 9.877** 14.90***   
 [7.478] [10.77]   
GDP/Capita(logged)  3.039***  2.860*** 
  [0.723]  [0.709] 
Population(logged)  1.975***  1.900*** 
  [0.284]  [0.290] 
SOS2011   9.876** 10.81** 
   [8.378] [9.423] 
Peace Agreement     
SOS2004 5.128 4.551   
 [4.701] [4.169]   
GDP/Capita(logged)  1.174  1.200 
  [0.219]  [0.221] 
Population(logged)  1.033  0.984 
  [0.208]  [0.213] 
SOS2011   8.333* 11.57** 
   [7.105] [9.375] 
Ceasefire     
SOS2004 10.34** 10.23**   
 [9.237] [8.906]   
GDP/Capita(logged)  1.789**  1.774** 
  [0.338]  [0.331] 
Population(logged)  1.276  1.206 
  [0.260]  [0.259] 
SOS2011   13.58** 17.55*** 
   [11.74] [14.34] 
Other Outcome     
SOS2004 10.53** 11.11***   
 [7.933] [7.225]   
GDP/Capita(logged)  1.483*  1.444* 
  [0.254]  [0.266] 
Population(logged)  1.707***  1.658*** 
  [0.200]  [0.221] 
SOS2011   8.333** 7.941* 
   [6.717] [6.414] 
N 371 305 371 305 
Log lik. -518.1 -389.6 -519.0 -392.0 
Chi-squared 14.30 79.44 9.753 83.26 
Prob.>chi-squared 0.0064 0.0000 0.0448 0.0000 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in brackets. Base outcome is military victory 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table E.7. Multinomial Analysis of SOS Termination using Dataset 2, 1946-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ongoing     
SOS2004 9.877** 14.86***   
 [7.478] [10.74]   
GDP/Capita(logged)  3.058***  2.865*** 
  [0.721]  [0.706] 
Population(logged)  1.963***  1.897*** 
  [0.281]  [0.288] 
SOS2011   9.877** 10.95** 
   [8.378] [9.515] 
Peace Agreement     
SOS2004 5.128 4.554   
 [4.701] [4.175]   
GDP/Capita(logged)  1.174  1.196 
  [0.219]  [0.219] 
GDP/Capita(logged)  1.032  0.988 
  [0.206]  [0.211] 
SOS2011   8.333* 11.49** 
   [7.105] [9.313] 
Ceasefire     
SOS2004 10.49** 10.83***   
 [7.827] [7.040]   
GDP/Capita(logged)  1.550**  1.513* 
  [0.241]  [0.257] 
GDP/Capita(logged)  1.600***  1.552** 
  [0.200]  [0.215] 
SOS2011   9.297** 9.722** 
   [7.337] [7.501] 
N 371 305 371 305 
Log lik. -423.4 -313.5 -425.0 -317.2 
Chi-squared 14.19 55.23 8.362 63.75 
Prob.>chi-squared 0.0027 0.0000 0.0391 0.0000 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in brackets. Base outcome is military victory. Other outcome is 
collapsed with ceasefire. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table E.8. Multinomial Analysis of SOS Termination using Dataset 2, 1946-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Ongoing     
SOS2004 1.626 2.113   
 [0.638] [1.141]   
GDP/Capita(logged)  2.322***  2.214*** 
  [0.382]  [0.361] 
Population(logged)  1.322***  1.302*** 
  [0.0960]  [0.0901] 
SOS2011   1.975 1.941 
   [0.910] [1.022] 
Peace Agreement     
SOS2004 0.844 0.834   
 [0.384] [0.422]   
GDP/Capita(logged)  0.926  0.946 
  [0.154]  [0.149] 
Population(logged)  0.756  0.719* 
  [0.110]  [0.115] 
SOS2011   1.667 2.444* 
   [0.585] [0.962] 
Ceasefire     
SOS2004 1.703 1.710   
 [0.944] [1.060]   
GDP/Capita(logged)  1.394*  1.386* 
  [0.232]  [0.216] 
Population(logged)  0.894  0.853 
  [0.132]  [0.135] 
SOS2011   2.716* 3.469* 
   [1.301] [1.792] 
N 371 305 371 305 
Log lik. -359.6 -287.0 -357.3 -284.0 
Chi-squared 2.598 54.32 7.704 68.28 
Prob.>chi-squared 0.4578 0.0000 0.0525 0.0913 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in brackets. Base outcome is military victory which is collapsed with 
other outcome. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
126 
 
Table E.9. Determinants of Civil War Duration using SOS2004, 1946-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
SOS2004 1.101 1.300 1.405 
 (0.54) (0.95) (1.26) 
Post-Cold War 1.968*** 2.061*** 1.888*** 
 (5.19) (5.08) (3.93) 
Post-Cold War*SOS2004  0.746 0.565 
  (-0.81) (-1.61) 
Population(logged)   1.163*** 
   (3.39) 
GDP/Capita(logged)   1.154** 
   (2.61) 
N 371 371 305 
Log lik. -594.6 -594.2 -471.4 
Chi-squared 26.71 27.37 51.53 
Prob.>chi-squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N(ended) 335 335 273 
Weibull regression with duration in years as the dependent variable. The coefficients are reported in the 
estimated multiplicative effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on mean war duration. T-
statistics are in parentheses. Estimations performed by using Stata 11.0. Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in 
parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Source: Kreutz 2010 and Fearon 2004 
 
 
 
Table E.10. Determinants of Civil War Duration using SOS2011, 1946-2009 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
SOS2011 1.573** 1.511 1.968** 
 (2.58) (1.65) (2.59) 
Post-Cold War 1.945*** 1.921*** 1.887*** 
 (5.16) (4.64) (4.10) 
Post-Cold War*SOS2011  1.080 0.663 
  (0.22) (-1.11) 
Population(logged)   1.152** 
   (3.24) 
GDP/Capita(logged)   1.153* 
   (2.56) 
N 371 371 305 
Log lik. -591.1 -591.1 -468.4 
Chi-squared 33.60 33.65 57.63 
Prob.>chi-squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N(ended) 335 335 273 
Weibull regression with duration in years as the dependent variable. The coefficients are reported in the 
estimated multiplicative effect of a one-unit change in the independent variable on mean war duration.T-statistics 
are in parentheses. Estimations performed by using Stata 11.0. Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in 
parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Source: Kreutz 2010 and Fearon and Laitin 2011. 
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Figure E.3. Stphplot for SOS2004 Conflict Episodes in Dataset 2 
Figure E.4 . Stphplots for SOS2011 Conflict Episodes in Dataset 2 
  
Figure E.5. Predicted and Observed Survival Rate for SOS2004 Conflict Episodes and 
Other Conflict Episodes using Dataset 2 
Figure E.6. Predicted and Observed Survival Rate for SOS2011 Conflict Episodes and 
Other Conflict Episodes using Dataset 2 
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Cox-Snell to measure the overall fit of dataset 2 
Figure E.7. Cox-Snell Graph of Table E.2, Model 5 
Figure E.8. Cox-Snell Graph of Table E.3, Model 5 
 
Figure E.9. Cox-Snell Graph of Table E.9, Model 3 
Figure E.10. Cox-Snell Graph of Table E.10, Model 3 
 
Figure E.11. Influential Outliers in the SOS2004 Variable in Dataset 2 
Figure E.12. Influential Outliers in the SOS2011 Variable in Dataset 2 
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Appendix F 
The following display coding of relevant variables, and the commands used to produce most 
of the analyses in this thesis.  
Logging GDP per Capita and Population: 
gen lncgdp=ln(cgdp) 
gen lnpop=ln(pop) 
Interaction term with incompatibility and SOS2004 
gen incomp12004 = incomp1*sos2004 
Interaction term with incompatibility and SOS2011 
gen incomp12011 = incomp1*sos2011 
Generate Post-Cold War 
gen pcwar =1 if year >1990 
replace pcwar =0 if pcwar !=1 
Multinomial analysis with military victory as base outcome for SOS2004 and SOS2011 
Conflict Episodes 
eststo clear 
eststo: xi: mlogit outcome1  sos2004, nolog baseoutcome(3) robust cl(country) rrr  
eststo: xi: mlogit outcome1  sos2004  lnpop lncgdp, nolog baseoutcome(3) robust cl(country) 
rrr 
eststo: xi: mlogit outcome1  sos2011, nolog baseoutcome(3) robust cl(country) rrr 
eststo: xi: mlogit outcome1  sos2011  lnpop lncgdp, nolog baseoutcome(3) robust cl(country) 
rrr 
esttab using "M:\4025\ado\_\multinomial.rtf", se brackets nogaps scalars("ll Log lik." "chi2 
Chi-squared") eform title(Table 14. Multinomial Analysis of SOS Termination, 1946-
2009)replace nonumbers mtitles("Model 1" "Model 2" "Model 3" "Model 4") 
 
//Predicted Probability of SOS2011 Conflict Episodes 
prtab sos2011, rest(mean) 
130 
 
Stsetting dataset 3 with my duration variable which counts years of each conflict episode 
stset cumduryr, failure(epend) 
 
Kaplan-Meier Graph of SOS2011 
sts graph, by(sos2011) 
Test of the difference between SOS2011 conflict episodes and other conflict episodes 
sts test sos2011  
stsum, by (sos2011) 
 
Weibull Analysis of SOS2011 with incompatibility 
eststo clear 
eststo: xi: streg sos2011, dist(weibull) nolog time tr 
eststo: xi: streg sos2011 lnpop lncgdp , dist(weibull) nolog time tr 
eststo: xi: streg sos2011 if lncgdp !=., dist(weibull) nolog time tr  
eststo: xi: streg sos2011 incomp1, dist(weibull) nolog time tr 
eststo: xi: streg sos2011 incomp1 incomp12011, dist(weibull) nolog time tr 
eststo: xi: streg sos2011 lnpop lncgdp incomp1 incomp12011 , dist(weibull) nolog time tr 
esttab using "M:\4025\ado\_\kreutzincomp2011completemodel.rtf", replace scalars("ll Log 
lik." "chi2 Chi-squared" "N_fail") eform t(2) nogaps compress title(Model II. Determinants of 
Civil War Duration, 1946-2009)mtitles("Model 1" "Model 2" "Model 3" "Model 4" "Model 
5" "Model 6") 
Testing joint significance 
testparm sos2011 incomp1 incomp12011 
 
Testing the model`s overall fit with Cox-Snell 
stcox sos2011  incomp1 incomp12011 lnpop lncgdp , nolog 
predict cs, csnell 
stset cs, failure(epend) 
131 
 
sts generate km= s 
generate H = -ln(km) 
line H cs cs, sort ytitle("") clstyle(. refline) 
 
//Stratified tests  
stphplot, by(sos2011) 
 
//Comparison of Kaplan-Meier and Cox survivor functions.  
stcoxkm, by (sos2011) 
 
//DFBETA for SOS2011 variable 
stcox sos2011 
predict df*, dfbeta 
gen obs =_n 
twoway (scatter df1 cumduryr if sos2011==0, yline(0) mlabel(country) msymbol(o)) /// 
 (scatter df1 cumduryr if sos2011==1, yline(0) mlabel(country) msymbol(X)) 
  
  
 
